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1 Introduction and outline 
 
1.1 Heterogeneity 
“We inhabit a universe that is characterized by diversity.” – Desmond Tutu 
 
Our world is characterized by diversity in infinite dimensions. There are countless 
examples already in the human spectrum alone. There is diversity among people in obvious 
ways, such as age, gender, ethnicity and culture. Then there are the differences that are less 
easily observable, such as physical and mental strength, skills and abilities, religion, generosity. 
And there is a diversity of experiences, beliefs, and preferences, that may or may not be 
related to the differences mentioned before. Yet, in the majority of textbooks and research 
papers in economics and finance, agents, (economic) actors, investors, and the like are 
assumed to have the same beliefs and preferences and act in the same ways. Have these 
economists forgotten that the main drivers of their primary study object, the economy, are in 
fact people? You may call them actors, agents, investors, or any other name, but at the core it 
comes down to the same: people, human beings, who may or may not be rational, who may or 
may not behave in a homogeneous way, who may or may not behave the same individually as 
they do in groups. Of course, there is no way we can incorporate all the diversity there is in a 
well-functioning, comprehensive model of the economy. But we can work towards a stylized 
model that is more representative of the world around us. And in my opinion, relaxing the 
assumption of homogeneous beliefs and preferences is crucial.  
This dissertation is part of a growing research field in which the diversity of human 
beings, as economic actors, is slowly incorporated. Instead of diversity, a more accepted term 
in economics and finance is heterogeneity. In the rest of the introduction I will first set out 
how research in finance is slowly moving from classical homogenous and rational agents 
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models to an increasing amount of behavioral and heterogeneous agent models. Finally, I will 
summarize the rest of the chapters and how they relate to the current debate on investor 
heterogeneity and the different components of the title of this dissertation: measurement, 
dynamics, and implications of heterogeneous beliefs. 
1.2 From rational expectations to bounded rationality 
The efficient markets hypothesis (EMH), and rational expectations as a crucial 
assumption for this theory, have been important building blocks for financial theory and 
economic models for several decades. Although economists have always been aware that not 
all market participants are fully rational, it was assumed that the main share of them was able 
to incorporate all available information in an efficient way in order to have an optimal forecast 
of the future and make optimal decisions. In this framework, it is not a necessary condition 
that all market participants are rational in order to have efficient markets. According to 
Friedman, so-called noise traders would be driven out of the market by sophisticated rational 
agents. Throughout the years, empirical evidence such as observed excessive trading (Milgrom 
and Stokey, 1982), financial market anomalies, psychological biases (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974; among others) and survey evidence on expectations (Dominguez, 1986; among others), 
showed that the reality on financial markets could not be fully described by rational 
expectations models. 
This empirical evidence resulted in the emergence of behavioral finance as a new 
academic field. The behavioral finance literature developed in two dimensions: beliefs and 
preferences. Kahneman and Tversky (1974, 1979) played a big role in the advancement of 
both. With respect to preferences, they presented their “Prospect Theory”. As opposed to the 
conventional wisdom at the time, prospect theory predicts that people are loss averse, risk 
averse over gains, risk seeking over losses (both compared to some agent-specific reference 
point), and overweight small probabilities. With respect to beliefs, they showed, mostly by 
running (lab) experiments, that people are subject to severe biases, which makes them unable 
to act in a rational way when making decisions. Examples of biases that have relevance for 
finance are representativeness, anchoring, conservatism (Edwards (1968)), overconfidence 
(Fischhoff et al. (1977)) and status quo bias (Samuelson & Zeckhauser (1988)). Literature on 
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such biases has been growing rapidly over the past decades, to an extent that even overview 
articles can only cover a part of them (e.g. Hirshleifer, 2001; Barber and Odean, 2013). Shiller 
(2003) provides an excellent overview of the evolvement of the field of behavioral finance. 
Inherent to the rational agent models is the assumption of homogeneity. After all, there 
is only one way to be rational and thus the actors in the economy can be modeled as one 
‘representative agent’. There are, however, infinite ways to be irrational. A substantial part of 
the behavioral finance literature therefore focuses on the heterogeneous nature of economic 
agents. In this dissertation I will explain and employ some models that acknowledge and 
incorporate the heterogeneity of financial market participants. More specifically, the focus is 
on the estimation of dynamic heterogeneous agent models (HAM) that have their roots in the 
agent-based literature. This branch of behavioral finance assumes that agents are boundedly 
rational (Simon, 1975), and that they use certain rules of thumb in order to form expectations 
about future asset prices. This setup was first proposed by Zeeman (1974), and was further 
advanced by, amongst others, Frankel & Froot (1987b), Chiarella (1992), Brock & Hommes 
(1997, 1998), Lux (1998) and De Grauwe & Grimaldi (2006). Although different names are 
being used in the literature for different forecasting strategies, they roughly come down to two 
or three types of agents. The first type of agent uses past price movements to predict future 
returns. The strategy this agent uses is referred to as (trend) extrapolation, technical analysis, 
bandwagon (for positive trend extrapolation), contrarian (for trend reversion) or chartism. 
The second type of agent bases his expectations on the deviation of the asset price from its 
fundamental value. This agent is said to be mean reverting, regressive or fundamentalist. Third 
or fourth types differ among studies and markets. Heterogeneous agent models usually use the 
distinction between chartists and fundamentalists. A crucial component of heterogeneous 
agent models is that the weights of different groups of market participants are not stable over 
time. Instead, market participants can ‘switch’ between groups. This switching, together with 
the destabilizing behavior of some of the groups, generates most of the market dynamics that 
we observe.  
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1.3 Measurement, dynamics, and implications of heterogeneous 
beliefs 
In this dissertation, I will consider the measurement, dynamics and implications of 
heterogeneous beliefs in financial markets. For a large part, I will build upon the 
heterogeneous agent models mentioned before. As such, I will measure the type of 
heterogeneous beliefs, the dynamics of these different types of beliefs, and the implications of 
such beliefs in Chapters 3 and 4. In Chapter 5 I will deviate from the heterogeneous agent 
models and consider a widely used variable to measure the current level of heterogeneity: 
dispersion in analyst forecasts, also referred to as disagreement. This dissertation is an 
extension of the heterogeneous agents literature as described above. However, it is also an 
attempt to close the gap between a specific branch of literature that I label ‘agent-based’ 
literature and a wider branch of literature labeled ‘behavioral finance’ literature.  
In Chapter 21 I survey the literature on empirical estimation of heterogeneous agents 
models, i.e. models that incorporate the (dynamics of the) beliefs of different types of 
investors, and explain how the terminology of this literature relates to the terminology used in 
other branches of behavioral finance. I will also give a more detailed overview of the 
evolvement of the behavioral finance literature in this chapter.  
In Chapter 32, I analyze how investors in the foreign exchange market form expectations 
and whether they update these expectations based on several factors. To get a better 
understanding of their expectation formation process, I use a dataset of investor expectations. 
This is a survey dataset from FX Week which contains forecasts at the weekly frequency from 
a large number of wholesale investors for several exchange rates and forecast horizons. First 
of all, I investigate whether investors’ expectations are heterogeneous by assessing the fit of 
various forecasting rules. I distinguish three different general rules that are well-known foreign 
exchange forecasting strategies: a momentum rule, a PPP rule and an interest parity rule. 
                                                          
1 Chapter 2 is partly based on my master’s thesis: “Ellen, ter S. (2010), Heterogeneous forecasting rules in the 
foreign exchange market: evidence from survey data, Erasmus University Rotterdam master’s thesis.” 
2 Chapter 3 is based on “Ellen, ter S. (2010), Heterogeneous forecasting rules in the foreign exchange market: 
evidence from survey data, Erasmus University Rotterdam master’s thesis.” and “Ellen, ter S., W.F.C. Verschoor and 
R.C.J. Zwinkels (2013), Dynamic expectation formation in the foreign exchange market, Journal of International 
Money and Finance.” 
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These rules have an academic base but are also often used in industry. Furthermore, I assess 
whether investors change the way they form their expectations over time and for different 
forecasting horizons. From earlier literature, we can expect that investors update their beliefs 
when relative performance of the forecasting strategies changes, use more fundamentals-based 
forecasting rules such as purchasing power parity (PPP) or uncovered interest parity (UIP) for 
forecasts of longer horizons (say, for a year or more ahead), and use non-fundamentals-based 
trading rules such as momentum or carry trade for forecasts of short horizons (say, for up to 
one to three months ahead). The methodology I apply in this method is very much related to 
that used in the empirical estimation of heterogeneous agents models (HAM), which I 
elaborate on in Chapter 2. 
In Chapter 43 I focus on the implications of heterogeneous beliefs during the European 
sovereign debt crisis. In this chapter I investigate whether heterogeneity of investors and 
dynamics in their beliefs can explain the escalation of sovereign credit default swap (CDS) 
spreads and the widening variations across European sovereigns following the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC). While controlling for changes in global risk (re)pricing, I examine 
whether the widespread escalation in European sovereign CDS spreads were the effect of 
weakened fundamentals in combination with increasing market-wide momentum,. In order to 
do this, I first develop a pragmatic method to compute fundamentals-based sovereign CDS 
spreads, as there are no readily available models to compute fundamental values for this asset 
class4. The computation of these fundamental spreads is a combination of extracting risk 
neutral hazard rates from a reduced form CDS pricing model and regressing those on a 
number of financial and economic variables that affect the default probability of a country. 
After having established this I develop and estimate a model for the pricing of CDS spreads 
based on heterogeneous expectations. The heterogeneous agent paradigm can be merged with 
more traditional credit pricing theories as follows. The expectation of each investor is a 
weighted average of fundamental and momentum (chartist) expectations. Fundamental 
expectations of future sovereign CDS spread movements are based on the state of the 
                                                          
3 Chapter 4 is based on “Chiarella, C., S. ter Ellen, X. He, E. Wu (2014), Fear or Fundamentals? Heterogeneous 
Beliefs in the European Sovereign CDS Market, Journal of Empirical Finance.” 
4 This in contrast to some other asset classes, such as equity and foreign exchange. In these asset classes there may 
not be agreement on which is the right model, but one may have reasons to choose one over the other. 
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country's fundamentals and the ability of the market to price this. Momentum expectations are 
formed based on the belief of persistence in trends (or trend reversals) in credit risk. On top 
of these fundamental and momentum expectations, CDS spreads are driven by an extra 
premium, often referred to as the ‘credit risk premium’. The credit risk premium depends on 
the time-varying willingness of investors to be exposed to the variability in CDS spreads and 
thus the price they require to bear the volatility risk in sovereign CDS markets. In other 
words, the credit risk premium captures investors' average risk appetite. I estimate the model 
with fixed and time-varying weights for both groups. This allows me to evaluate whether 
dynamic switching between a momentum and fundamental strategy has had an additional 
impact on European sovereign CDS spreads.  
I further study the measurement of heterogeneous beliefs in Chapter 55, where I use a 
similar set of survey expectations as in Chapter 3, this time from Consensus Economics, to 
assess whether cross-sectional dispersion between those forecasts, labeled as ‘disagreement’, is 
a good proxy for heterogeneity or for uncertainty. Despite the fact that the literature on 
dispersion of beliefs is quite extensive, a solid conclusion about the different interpretation of 
disagreement has not been reached. Arguments for disagreement being a measure of 
heterogeneity or uncertainty are appealing for both interpretations. If there is high uncertainty 
about future exchange rate movements, distance between forecasts is large (i.e. agents heavily 
disagree about their point forecasts). However, the distance between forecasts may also be 
large because investors (prefer to) have different forecasting models, have information 
asymmetry, have limited attention, and/or are affected by other psychological traits. To 
analyze whether the time-variation in disagreement is mostly representative of time-variation 
in the heterogeneity of agents’ beliefs, or rather of time-variation in uncertainty I make use of 
the bi-directional relation between disagreement and volatility and the effect of disagreement 
on FX trading volume and liquidity. For the former, I utilize a standard VAR model, building 
on the proposition that the relation between uncertainty and volatility is mostly 
contemporaneous (volatility is often even used as a measure or proxy for uncertainty), and the 
relation between heterogeneity and volatility runs from the former to the latter (more 
                                                          
5 Chapter 5 is based on “Ellen, ter S., W.F.C. Verschoor and R.C.J. Zwinkels (2015), Agreeing on Disagreement: 
heterogeneity or uncertainty in the foreign exchange market?, working paper.” 
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heterogeneity induces more noise trading, which leads to higher levels of volatility). I also look 
into the (possibly time-varying) relation between disagreement and volume and disagreement 
and liquidity, thereby building on the proposition that there should be a positive relation 
running from heterogeneity (uncertainty) to volume (illiquidity) and vice versa. I further 
analyze whether disagreement has added value over realized volatility when linking it to risk 
and risk premium.  
Finally, I will summarize and comment on the findings of the previous chapters in 
Chapter 6. I will conclude by giving my views on how to proceed in modeling, measuring, and 
utilizing heterogeneous beliefs in financial markets. 
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
2 Heterogeneous beliefs in financial markets: an overview6 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of a specific branch of the behavioral finance 
literature: heterogeneous agent models. The behavioral finance literature can be roughly 
divided into three strands. The first strand covers limits to arbitrage (De Long et al., 1990; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and focuses on the reasons for why arbitrage opportunities cannot 
always be exploited. The second strand models preferences, and models people’s preferences 
in a more realistic way, such as in Kahneman and Tversky’s ‘Prospect Theory’ (1979). The 
third strand covers non-rational beliefs, and is often associated with the literature on 
psychological heuristics and biases (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974; Hirshleifer, 2001).  
In this overview we will not zoom into the different biases much, but will rather survey 
the empirical literature that acknowledges and incorporates the heterogeneous beliefs of 
financial market participants. More specifically, the focus is on the validation and estimation 
of (dynamic) heterogeneous agent models (HAM) that have their roots in the agent-based 
literature. This branch of behavioral finance assumes that agents are at least boundedly 
rational (Simon, 1975), and that they use certain rules of thumb in order to form expectations 
about future asset prices. This setup was first proposed by Zeeman (1974), and was further 
advanced by, among others, Frankel & Froot (1987), Chiarella (1992), Brock & Hommes 
(1997, 1998), Lux (1998) and De Grauwe & Grimaldi (2006). Although different names are 
being used in the literature for different forecasting strategies, they roughly come down to two 
or three types of agents. One typical type of agent uses past (price) information in order to 
predict future returns. The strategy this agent uses is referred to as (trend) extrapolation, 
                                                          
6 This chapter is partly based on my master’s thesis: “Ellen, ter S. (2010), Heterogeneous forecasting rules in the 
foreign exchange market: evidence from survey data, Erasmus University Rotterdam master’s thesis.” 
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technical analysis, bandwagon (for positive trend extrapolation), contrarian (for trend 
reversion) or chartism. The second type of agent bases his expectations on the deviation of the 
asset price from its fundamental value. This agent is said to be mean reverting, regressive or 
fundamentalist. Third or fourth types differ among studies and markets. 
The purpose of this chapter is to give a comprehensive and extensive overview of the 
empirical work on heterogeneous agent models. Although several studies survey the 
theoretical work on this type of models (Hommes, 2006; LeBaron, 2000; Chiarella et al., 2009, 
among others), there is a gap in the literature when it comes to surveying empirical work. 
Although heterogeneous agent models perform very well in describing, explaining, and often 
forecasting (financial) markets dynamics, they are well-known to only a relatively small group 
of scholars. It is therefore important to summarize the overwhelming empirical support for 
these models, in order to show to the rest of the profession that these models are very 
successful and a promising alley for future research.  
The remainder of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 gives a short description of how 
the field developed from rational agent models to models with boundedly rational agents. 
Section 3 summarizes the first theoretical contributions that have been made and some of the 
empirical support from experiments and survey studies. Section 4 gives an overview of the 
empirical work on heterogeneous agent models and the different types of estimation methods, 
and Section 5 concludes. 
2.2 From rational expectations to bounded rationality 
2.2.1 Efficient markets 
Since the sixties, financial economists modeled financial markets based on assumptions 
of rationality of agents and efficient markets. In `Rational Expectations and the Theory of 
Price Movements' Muth (1961) states that "[expectations] are essentially the same as the 
predictions of the relevant economic theory". Fama (1965, 1970) further developed these 
implied assumptions from the `Efficient Markets Hypothesis' (EMH) in his famous work 
"Random Walks in Stock Market Prices", and they have been important building blocks for 
traditional finance theory ever since. Fama argued that financial markets are efficient because 
of rational behavior and -expectations of agents. 
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The assumption of rational agents implies that agents incorporate all available 
information in their decision-making process and that they are able to do this in an efficient 
way because they have full knowledge about the economic models underlying financial 
markets. This means that all agents should have the same expectations and that all prices of 
(financial) products should reflect their fundamental values. It is acknowledged that some 
agents might not be rational and that therefore mispricing may occur. However, the theory 
states that overreaction of some agents will be compensated by underreaction of other agents. 
Moreover, according to Friedman (1953), possible mispricing caused by so-called noise traders 
will soon vanish through the actions of rational agents. He argues that in such a way, 
speculators keep foreign exchange markets stable and efficient in case of a flexible exchange 
rate system. 
The concept of arbitrage, as described by Friedman, is one of the main fundaments of 
the EMH. It entails that rational agents will observe mispricing and take actions upon it. 
Therefore, noise traders do not have a significant effect on prices, and it is impossible to 
consistently beat the market and earn riskless returns. In other words `there's no such thing as 
a free lunch'. 
Although the efficient market hypothesis has been the conventional way of thinking 
about financial markets at least since the seventies, it has also been target of criticism since its 
publication. An important reason for the criticism is that the theory has some internal 
contradictions. If agents are rational and thus have the same expectations, there would be no 
trade in financial securities at all. With transaction costs taken into account and prices being 
perfect reflections of all (available) information no agent would either want to sell or buy its 
assets, since no extra returns can be made with that transaction. Milgrom and Stokey (1982) 
show that even when some agents have private information, this `no trade-theorem' applies. 
The fact that trade does take place, and in large and growing amounts, is one of the 
observations that weaken the EMH. 
2.2.2 Limits of the EMH 
Excessive trade (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982) is one of the anomalies that have caused a 
decline in the popularity of the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Other observed market 
12  Chapter 2. Heterogeneous beliefs in financial markets: an overview 
 
 
 
anomalies that are difficult to explain in the conventional setup are, for example, momentum 
effect (Jegadeesh, 1990; on the short term recent losers tend to underperform the market, 
recent winners tend to outperform the market), post earnings announcement drift (Ball and 
Brown, 1968; prices do not adjust to information immediately but adjust slowly, causing a 
positive drift after positive news and a negative drift after disappointing news), long term 
reversal (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985; extreme past losers tend to outperform the market, past 
winners tend to underperform the market), size effect (Black et al., 1972; small firm stocks 
outperform stocks from large companies) and exchange rate puzzles (e.g. reversed evidence 
on purchasing power parity and interest parity).  
Barberis and Thaler (2003) provide some more evidence on the statement that prices are 
not always right. They discuss mispricing in twin-shares (based on the Royal Dutch -- Shell 
Transport case, where the price ratio largely deviated from the equilibrium value), for stocks 
that get included in an important index (e.g. Yahoo stocks which rose 24% after being 
included in the S&P 500) and for internet carve-outs (where they use the example of the 
heavily underpriced 3Com). Since these cases of persistent mispricing show that seemingly 
riskless profit opportunities were not exploited by sophisticated investors they illustrate the 
frugalities of the Efficient Market Hypothesis. 
One explanation for the persistence of mispricing that can be found in the literature is 
that there are serious limits to arbitrage. Among others, DeLong et al. (1990) explain why 
arbitrage opportunities cannot always be fully exploited. They argue that the existence of noise 
traders in the market brings along a significant amount of uncertainty that affects the riskiness 
of arbitrage. After all, if the effect of noise traders was strong enough to create the mispricing, 
these traders could as well increase the gap even further. Therefore noise traders can heavily 
destabilize the market. According to the EMH, mispricing cannot persist because it creates the 
possibility of a riskless return that would immediately be exploited. However, if the profit 
opportunity is not riskless because of the unpredictable behavior of noise traders, the 
mispricing can persist. This limit to arbitrage is usually labelled `noise trader risk', but there 
can be other risks that limit arbitrage opportunities.  
Another limitation to arbitrage, described by Barberis and Thaler (2003) is fundamental 
risk. An arbitrage opportunity can be very risky if there is no perfect substitute security for the 
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mispriced asset. An imperfect substitute asset is subject to idiosyncratic factors, which makes 
the opposite position in this security an extra risk factor. On top of that, the substitute 
security might be mispriced as well, which adds even more risk. 
Besides the fact that arbitrage opportunities are not riskless, they are costly. The EMH 
leaves out both transaction and information costs. Acquiring information about mispricing is 
costly, but also exploiting arbitrage possibilities brings along significant costs like commissions 
and costs for borrowing stocks to be able to obtain a short position in specific securities. On 
top of that, regulators have imposed severe legal restrictions on investment constructions that 
involve short selling. In the words of Barberis and Thaler (2003): there is no free lunch if the 
prices are right, but this logic does not imply when reversed (i.e. the fact that there is no free 
lunch does not imply that prices are right).  
Still, limits to arbitrage are no explanation of exchange rate puzzles, the inefficiency of 
markets and the inherent mispricing. After all, it does not explain how mispricing can occur in 
the first place. In the field of behavioral finance, the behavior of investors is evaluated and 
modelled using theories and experiment results from psychology and sociology. In such a way, 
economists get some insight in the non-rational beliefs and preferences of investors which 
may help to understand the anomalies we observe in financial markets. 
Research on such non-rational preferences and beliefs in an economic setting was 
introduced by Kahneman and Tversky in the seventies. Their 1974 work on psychological 
biases that showed there is no such thing as a `homo economicus' has been very influential. 
Their work was mainly picked up in the eighties and nineties when more economists starting 
investigating the behavior of (financial) market participants. Some overview articles include 
Hirshleifer (2001) and Barber and Odean (2013). In 1979, they published a theory about 
decision making under risk, as an alternative to the `expected utility framework' that was 
extensively used before. 
2.2.3 Survey evidence and bounded rationality 
Although these contributions from the field of psychology are a great insight in the 
actual behavior of people and clearly show that agents do not behave in a rational way, they 
have generated quite some skepticism. After all, most economists already knew from the start 
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that not all investors behave fully rational, but they saw it as a necessary assumption to be able 
to include investor behavior in their sophisticated economic models. They argued that 
behavioral economics and behavioral finance were impractical bifurcations of economics, 
since it was impossible to model the complex behavior of human beings. On top of that, the 
results from psychology were mainly generated by laboratory experiments which did not 
always replicate the real world in a very accurate way. These difficulties were reinforced by the 
problem that we could only observe price reactions to human behavior instead of observing 
the actual expectations. 
The latter problem was partly overcome in the eighties, when companies like Money 
Market Services International (MMSI) and Consensus Economics started to gather investors' 
expectations of future asset prices by means of surveys. The use of survey data allows 
researchers to directly observe investors' expectations about future prices and exchange rates, 
therefore making it easier for them to test investor rationality and information efficiency and 
to detect possible expectation formation mechanisms that are used by institutional investors. 
One of the first authors that used survey data to test for rationality was Dominguez (1986). 
The author uses aggregated survey responses on exchange rates from MMS and finds that the 
null-hypothesis of unbiasedness can be rejected. Other papers (e.g. MacDonald and Marsh 
(1996); Cavaglia et al. (1993); Ito (1990); Frenkel et al. (2009)) confirm this result. Survey data 
therefore shows that investors are not fully rational. 
Rationality within the Efficient Market Hypothesis roughly consists of two pillars: 
besides the unbiasedness assumption, we can also distinguish the assumption of efficient use 
of information. This entails that all investors use all available information as efficient as 
possible in forming expectations. Information orthogonality tests were also conducted by 
Dominguez in her 1986 paper. She showed that investors efficiently incorporate the 
information from past forecast errors in their expectation formation, but inefficiently use the 
information from the forward premium and leave out exogenous information, which is also 
confirmed by several follow-up studies. Cavaglia et al. (1994) find that the forward premium 
puzzle is caused by a combination of irrational traders and the existence of time-varying risk 
premia. 
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Because of the convincing evidence of non-rationality, it is of great interest to unravel 
the way agents behave and form expectations. Expectational mechanisms that are usually 
evaluated are mainly of the form of extrapolative, regressive and adaptive models. 
Extrapolative models generally have an autoregressive component: agents extrapolate 
historical movements into their expectations about the future. There is overwhelming micro-
evidence that investors’ expectations indeed have an extrapolative component (e.g. from 
surveys and experiments). Technical analysis is a form of extrapolation. Regressive models are 
in turn based on some reversion to the mean or a fundamental value of the asset, and adaptive 
models predict that agents adapt their expectations after they have made forecast errors in 
previous periods. Investigations of expectational mechanisms have shown that expectations 
for a period longer than 3 months ahead are stabilizing, while expectations for shorter periods 
ahead are destabilizing (Frankel and Froot, 1987, 1990; Cavaglia et al., 1993; Ito, 1990). 
2.2.4 Boundedly rational heterogeneous agents models 
Although survey studies provided evidence to reject the assumptions of rational 
expectation formation and information efficiency, the problem of modeling behavior 
persisted. As a response, some authors tried to stylize and model the behavior of investors, 
including some of the main biases. One of those models comes from Barberis et al. (1998). In 
their `model of investor sentiment' they include conservatism and representativeness to 
explain under- and overreaction of stock prices. Another response came from a new strand of 
behavioral finance theory in the form of boundedly rational heterogeneous agents models 
(BRHA models, or HAM). This heterogeneous agents theory, originally founded by Zeeman 
(1974), Beja and Goldman (1980) and Frankel and Froot (1987) and further developed by, 
among others, Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998), Day and Huang (1990), De Long et al. 
(1990a,b), Chiarella (1992), and De Grauwe et al. (1993), rejects the idea that investors behave 
rationally. Instead of focusing on the psychological microfoundations of behavioral finance 
like Barberis et al. (1998) do, they focus on modeling boundedly rational behavior (Simon, 
1957). 
With some exceptions, these investigations have in common that the distinction they 
make is one between a fundamental approach in forming expectations and an extrapolative 
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approach, which is usually referred to as `technical analysis' or `chartist behavior'. 
Furthermore, some of the models assume that agents switch between the two strategies, 
depending on the forecasting performance or profitability of a certain strategy. 
Fundamentalists base their expectations on economic theory. This group believes that 
the market price will revert to the intrinsic value of an asset and therefore bases expectations 
on the deviation of the market price from the fundamental value. Technical traders, or 
chartists, base their expectations on past price behavior. They extrapolate information from 
the past, expecting trends to continue in the same direction. Fundamentalist behavior is 
generally found to have a stabilizing effect on prices, while chartists tend to have a 
destabilizing effect driving asset prices away from the intrinsic value of the asset. 
2.3 Early contributions and supporting evidence 
2.3.1 Early contributions 
One of the earliest examples of a heterogeneous agent model that we can find in the 
literature comes from Zeeman (1974). He is the first who recognizes and distinguishes two 
types of agents in the stock market, similar to the ones used in the BRHA models. One group, 
chartists, chases trends, therefore buying when prices go up and selling when prices go down. 
The other group, fundamentalists, is aware of the true fundamental value, and buys (sells) 
when the stock is currently undervalued (overvalued). Zeeman explains the slow feedback 
flow observed in the stock market by the fact that the rate of change of stock market indices 
responds to chartist and fundamentalist demand faster than their demand responds to the 
return changes of these indices. In other words, while chartists and fundamentalists demand 
has a direct effect on returns, fundamentalists may only start selling when a stock is 
overvalued by a certain amount, thereby causing bull (chartists driving the price up) and bear 
(both chartists and fundamentalists selling stocks) markets. Although Zeeman's model is very 
similar in terms of set-up and implications to the BRHA models as we know them now, it 
lacked clear micro-foundations (Hommes, 2006) and his theory was not picked up in the 
seventies. 
Another important contribution came from Beja and Goldman (1980). According to 
them it is obvious that a man-made market where people interact and respond to each other 
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cannot be fully efficient. Therefore, discrepancies will exist and human beings will naturally 
respond to these discrepancies by speculating on their expected direction of the market. Since 
this is bound to lead to different price dynamics than would occur under the efficient markets 
hypothesis they propose an alternative theory. In line with Zeeman (1974), Beja and Goldman 
assume a mechanism where the speed of price changes and the speed of demand changes are 
not in line. Furthermore, they propose a market which consists of fundamental (based on 
expectations of future equilibrium prices) demand and speculative (based on the state of the 
market) demand. Dynamics in the aggregate demand especially occur due to relative sizes of 
the fundamental and speculative demand (which becomes larger if the price change is larger 
than expected) and the flexibility of the trend followers. The market will be stable if the 
impact of the fundamental demand is sufficiently high or if the impact of the trend followers 
is sufficiently low. 
The heterogeneous agents literature has thereafter benefitted a lot from contributions 
from, among others, Frankel and Froot (1987, 1990a,b), DeLong et al. (1990b), and Brock and 
Hommes (1997, 1998). Frankel and Froot showed, by using survey data, that expectations 
could be classified as extrapolative, regressive, and adaptive (1987), or as chartist and 
fundamentalist (1990a). Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998) introduced an intuitive switching 
rule, effectively implying that investors would switch to the rule with the best recent 
performance. HAM have been very well able to explain and replicate certain stylized facts of 
financial markets (Lux, 2009), such as volatility clustering, fat tails, and bull and bear markets. 
For comprehensive overviews of the (theoretical) HAM literature, see for example Hommes 
(2006), Chiarella (2009), and LaBaron (2000).  
2.3.2 Supporting evidence on micro-level 
Over the years studies have collected empirical evidence in favor of the chartist-
fundamentalist approach in various ways. As the models are agent-based, there is evidence 
confirming the behavior of the market participants on micro-level. However, the models have 
clear implications for the dynamics of the markets in which these agents participate. This 
means that there is also supporting evidence on macro-level, confirming the ‘behavior’ of 
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markets. In this section we will discuss some of the evidence collected on micro-level, of 
which the majority comes from laboratory experiments and survey studies.  
Schmalensee (1976) was one of the first to use experimental methods to reveal 
expectation formation processes for time series, in particular with respect to technical rules. 
Smith et al. (1988) are able to replicate bubbles and crashes within laboratory experiment 
expectations. De Bondt (1993) and Bloomfield and Hales (2002) use classroom experiments 
and find evidence of trend-following behavior, where Bloomfield and Hales (2002) also find 
support for the assumption in Barberis et al. (1998) that investors perceive past trend reversals 
as an indicator for the probability of future reversals even though they are aware of the 
random walk character. A laboratory experiment is used by Hommes et al. (2005) to evaluate 
how subjects form expectations when all they know is dividend yield, interest rates and past 
realized prices. The authors find that participants make use of very similar linear rules, such as 
autoregressive or adaptive strategies, in forming expectations. 
As (laboratory) experiments are, in general, not fully able to replicate the real world 
situation, and the generalizability has, therefore, been questioned, attempts have been made to 
directly measure investor expectations and expectation formation rules. To this end, both 
quantitative and qualitative surveys have been conducted. Taylor and Allen (1992) show, 
based on a questionnaire survey, that 90% of the foreign exchange dealers based in London 
use some form of technical analysis in forming expectations about future exchange rates, 
particularly for short-term horizons. The foreign exchange dealers further expressed that they 
see fundamental and technical analyses as complementary strategies for making forecasts and 
that technical analysis can serve as a self-fulfilling mechanism. Menkhoff (2010) gathered 
similar data from fund managers in five different countries. In line with the findings of Taylor 
and Allen, they find that 87% of the fund managers they survey uses technical analysis. About 
20% of the fund managers considers technical analysis as more important than fundamental 
analysis. 
Various quantitative surveys have been evaluated as well. For a more extensive 
overview, see Jongen et al. (2008). Frankel and Froot (1987, 1990, 1991) have had a great 
impact on the foreign exchange literature and the further development of heterogeneous agent 
models. They were among the first to show that survey data reveals non-rationality and 
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heterogeneity of investors. They also find evidence for the chartist-fundamentalist approach 
employed in many of the heterogeneous agent models. Others have confirmed these findings 
in later years, and with various datasets. Dick and Menkhoff (2013) use forecasters’ self-
assessment to classify themselves as chartists, fundamentalists, or a mix. They find that 
forecasters who classify their forecasting tools as chartist use trend-following strategies and 
who classify as fundamentalist have a stronger behavior toward purchasing power parity. They 
also find that chartists update their forecasts more frequently than fundamentalists. 
Ter Ellen et al. (2012) are among the first to estimate a dynamic heterogeneous agent 
model on survey data, meaning that the expectations of investors can be dynamic in various 
ways. They find that three forecasting rules fit the survey data very well: a PPP rule 
(fundamentalist), a momentum rule (chartist) and an interest parity rule. They confirm the 
earlier finding from Frankel and Froot (1990, 1991) that investors use more speculative 
strategies for shorter horizons (1 month) and more fundamental strategies for longer horizons 
(12 months). Moreover, investors switch between forecasting rules depending on the past 
performance of these rules. Goldbaum and Zwinkels (2014) find that a model with 
fundamentalists and chartists can explain the survey data well. As in Ter Ellen et al. (2012), 
they find that fundamentalists are mean reverting and that this model is increasingly used for 
longer horizons. Chartists have contrarian expectations. A model with time-varying weights 
on the different strategies outperforms a static version of this model. 
Jongen et al. (2012) also allow the weights on different strategies to vary depending on 
market circumstances. However, instead of directly explaining the survey expectations, they 
analyze the dispersion between forecasts. They find that the dispersion is caused by investors 
using heterogeneous forecasting rules and having private information. This is in line with the 
earlier findings of Menkhoff et al. (2009) for a dataset on German financial market 
professionals. 
Zwinkels and co-authors have collected evidence for heterogeneous beliefs from data 
on fund managers’ exposure. Verschoor and Zwinkels (2013) show that foreign exchange 
fund managers behave like heterogeneous agents. They find that fund managers allocate 
capital to a momentum, carry, and value strategy depending on the past performance of these 
strategies. They make money by employing a negative feedback strategy: shifting money from 
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recent winning strategies to recent losing strategies. Schauten et al. (2011) apply a 
heterogeneous agent model to hedge fund risk exposure. Because of the non-linear trading 
strategies that hedge fund managers employ, a non-linear model with dynamic weights seems 
to be appropriate to capture the hedge fund risk exposure. The heterogeneity of the hedge 
funds lies in the dynamic weighing of exposure to different risk factors 
2.3.3 An example 
We will now provide an example of a heterogeneous agent model with chartists, 
fundamentalists, and dynamic weighting of the two groups. Many of the models employed can 
be simplified to this model. The form of the model we show here is mostly related to some of 
our own applications of HAM (e.g. De Jong et al., 2010; Ter Ellen and Zwinkels, 2010; 
Chiarella et al., 2014b), which are largely based on the functional form from Brock and 
Hommes (1997, 1998). 
The base of the model is the price of an asset. The price of an asset tomorrow, 𝑃𝑡+1, 
equals the price of today, 𝑃𝑡 , and the weighted demand of different types of agents, typically 
chartists and fundamentalists: 
𝑃𝑡+1 = 𝑃𝑡 + 𝑊𝑡 𝐷𝑡
𝑐 + (1 − 𝑊𝑡) 𝐷𝑡
𝑓    (2.1) 
Here, 𝑊𝑡 is the chartist weight in the market, 𝐷𝑡
𝑐  is the chartist demand, (1 − 𝑊𝑡) is the 
weight of fundamentalists in the market, and 𝐷𝑡
𝑓
 is the demand function of fundamentalists. 
The demand functions can be specified as the difference between the current asset price and 
the expected asset price under chartist (𝐸𝑡
𝑐[𝑃𝑡+1]) or fundamentalist (𝐸𝑡
𝑓[𝑃𝑡+1]) expectations: 
𝐷𝑡
𝑐 = 𝑎𝑐(𝐸𝑡
𝑐[𝑃𝑡+1] − 𝑃𝑡)    (2.2) 
𝐷𝑡
𝑓
= 𝑎𝑓(𝐸𝑡
𝑓[𝑃𝑡+1] − 𝑃𝑡)    (2.3) 
The demand is naturally positively related to the expected price change for both 
chartists and fundamentalists. In other words, when agents expect the price to increase in the 
coming period, they will increase their demand for that asset today. However, chartists and 
fundamentalists differ in the way they form expectations about future prices. Chartists form 
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their expectations based on some form of technical analysis. Commonly used rules are moving 
average (MA) rules and AR(n) rules. For simplicity we will focus on a simple AR(1) rule for 
chartists: 
𝐸𝑡
𝑐[𝑃𝑡+1] = 𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽𝑐(𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡−1)    (2.4) 
According to this rule, chartists expect price movements to continue if 𝛽𝑐 > 0 or to 
reverse if 𝛽𝑐 < 0. This often depends on the time horizon, i.e. whether 𝑡 denotes a week, 
month, or year, for example. 
Fundamentalists form their expectations based on their perception of a fundamental 
value of the asset, 𝑃?̅? , and the current price deviation thereof: 
𝐸𝑡
𝑓[𝑃𝑡+1] = 𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽𝑓(𝑃?̅? − 𝑃𝑡).    (2.5) 
Often fundamentalists are a stabilizing force, which means they expect prices to revert 
back to their fundamental levels.  In such a case 𝛽𝑓 > 0. The expected speed of reversion in 
periods can be calculated by 
1
𝛽𝑓
.  Often, computing a fundamental value as input for the model 
is one of the most challenging tasks of estimating a HAM. For some markets there are 
multiple competing models, for example in the foreign exchange market (PPP, UIP, monetary 
model, …), at other times there are no obvious candidates at all (for example in commodity 
markets). 
In many applications, the dynamics of the market can be best explained with time-
varying weights for chartists and fundamentalists (in other words, when agents can ‘switch’ 
between the strategies). Switching functions may vary. For an evaluation of different switching 
functions, see Baur and Glover (2014). The example we show is an adapted multinomial logit 
rule from Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998) and similar to Ter Ellen and Zwinkels (2010) and 
Chiarella et al. (2014). 
In this case, the weight of the chartists depends on the recent forecasting accuracy of 
the chartist forecasting rule, 𝜋𝑡
𝑐 , relative to the recent forecasting accuracy of the 
fundamentalist rule, 𝜋𝑡
𝑓
: 
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𝑊𝑡 = [1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝛾 [
𝜋𝑡
𝑐−𝜋𝑡
𝑓
𝜋𝑡
𝑐+𝜋𝑡
𝑓])]
−1
    (2.6) 
In this setup 𝑊𝑡 is the proportion of chartists in the market (or the weight put on the 
chartist forecasting rule), and 1 − 𝑊𝑡 is the proportion of fundamentalists. The forecasting 
accuracy of chartists (fundamentalists) is measured as the mean squared error of the chartists 
(fundamentalists) over the past period. Note that it is also possible that the agents evaluate the 
rule over more than one period. 
𝜋𝑡
𝑐 = [(𝐸𝑡−1
𝑐 [𝑃𝑡] − 𝑃𝑡−1) − ∆𝑃𝑡]
2    (2.7) 
𝜋𝑡
𝑓
= [(𝐸𝑡−1
𝑓 [𝑃𝑡] − 𝑃𝑡−1) − ∆𝑃𝑡]
2    (2.8) 
As in Ter Ellen and Zwinkels (2010) and Chiarella et al. (2014), equation (2.6) differs 
slightly from the weighting mechanism originally proposed by Brock and Hommes (1997). 
Instead of using the absolute difference in forecasting accuracy of the two rules, 𝜋𝑡
𝑐 − 𝜋𝑡
𝑓
, 
weights are calculated by using the relative forecasting (in)accuracy (
𝜋𝑡
𝑐−𝜋𝑡
𝑓
𝜋𝑡
𝑐+𝜋𝑡
𝑓). Ter Ellen and 
Zwinkels (2010) argue that this method has the advantages of ease of estimation and 
comparability between different markets. The coefficient 𝛾 is called the intensity of choice and 
represents the investors’ speed of switching7. If 𝛾 = 0, investors  do not adapt the importance 
given to the two rules and 𝑊𝑡 = 0.5. The other extreme is when 𝛾 = ∞ where investors are 
perfectly adaptive and immediately adjust all weight to the rule with the smallest forecast error. 
A small positive 𝛾 can be an indication of status quo bias, introduced by Kahneman et al. 
(1982). If investors suffer from this bias, they are reluctant to change their status quo belief, 
which results in slower updating of beliefs. 
2.4 Estimation 
Due to the complex and nonlinear nature of the bounded rationality heterogeneous 
agent models, most of the early papers in this field were restricted to theoretical explanations 
and simulations of these models. These simulations produced interesting results and were able 
                                                          
7 Or, in essence, the flexibility of an investor to change weights on the two respective trading rules. 
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to reproduce many of the stylized facts observed in (financial) markets. However, it was not 
clear whether these outcomes resulted from the strength of the model or from the choice of 
parameter values. Therefore, direct confrontation of the model with real financial data was 
desirable. Vigfusson (1997) was the first to make an attempt to estimate the parameters of a 
model with chartists and fundamentalists to financial data. Given that the dynamic weighting 
of the two strategies is unobserved, Vigfusson applied the Markov regime switching approach 
to the foreign exchange market, where chartist and fundamentalist behavior can be seen as 
different states. After him, several other authors used this approach for the foreign exchange 
market (Ahrens and Reitz, 2005) and the stock market (Alfarano et al., 2005, 2006; Chiarella et 
al., 2012). Baak (1999) and Chavas (2000) suggested an approach with General Method of 
Moments (GMM) and Kalman filtering to estimate a chartist-fundamentalist model for the 
beef market. Not much later, Winker and Gilli (2001, 2003) used a simulation based indirect 
estimation approach by minimizing loss functions based on the simulated moments and the 
realized moments from foreign exchange data. Westerhoff and Reitz (2003, 2005) 
incorporated dynamic weighting in one of the two types of agents by means of a STAR 
GARCH estimation for the foreign exchange market (2003, time-varying fundamentalist 
impact) and the commodity market (2005, time-varying chartist impact). Manzan and 
Westerhoff (2007) also apply this method with time-varying weights on the chartist impact for 
the foreign exchange market, whereas Reitz and Slopek (2009) apply it to the oil market. 
An important contribution in the estimation of heterogeneous agents models came from 
Boswijk et al. (2007). They use nonlinear least squares estimation combined with a 
multinomial logit switching rule to empirically validate a heterogeneous agents model for the 
S&P 500. The main improvements of their method over estimating based on Markov 
switching are the smaller number of parameters to be estimated and the deterministic nature 
of their switching process, in contrast to a stochastic Markov process. Many empirical papers 
on heterogeneous agents models have successfully used the techniques from Boswijk et al. 
(2007) for stock markets (De Jong et al., 2009; Chiarella et al., 2014a) and foreign exchange 
markets (De Jong et al., 2010), but also for less obvious asset classes, such as oil (Ter Ellen 
and Zwinkels, 2010), housing (Kouwenberg and Zwinkels, 2014), gold (Baur and Glover, 
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2014), options (Frijns et al., 2010) hedge funds (Schauten et al., 2011), and credit markets 
(Chiarella et al., 2014). 
2.4.1 Choice of estimation method 
2.4.1.1 Markov switching 
Vigfusson (1997) was the first in attempting to estimate a chartists and fundamentalists 
(c&f) model similar to the one described in Frankel and Froot (1987). Because the dynamic 
weighting of the two strategies is unobservable, he uses a Markov regime switching approach, 
where chartist and fundamentalist behavior can be seen as two different states. Ahrens and 
Reitz (2005) follow Vigfusson (1997) by taking a regime switching approach to estimate a 
heterogeneous agent model with chartists and fundamentalists. Similarly, Alfarano et al. (2005, 
2006) use Markov switching. They recognize the complexity of the agent based models and 
the fact that this makes them difficult to directly estimates the underlying parameters. They 
simplify the model to a closed-form solution for returns to overcome this problem. Although 
their model is highly simplified compared to some of the earlier agent-based models for 
financial markets, the authors are still able to reproduce some of the stylized features of stock 
returns. The two groups of traders are labeled as fundamentalists and noise traders, and 
switching between the two groups occurs based on asymmetric switching probabilities, 
inspired by Kirman's herding mechanism. The switching is asymmetric because the transition 
probability of an agent switching from the group of noise traders to the group of 
fundamentalists differs from the transition probability of a switch in the opposite direction. 
Chiarella et al. (2012) use Markov regime switching to explain the market dynamics of the 
S&P500. In their model, investors' beliefs about returns are regime dependent, and regimes (a 
bull state of the market with positive returns and low volatility or a bust state of the market 
with negative returns and high volatility) are generated by a stochastic process. 
2.4.1.2 Indirect and optimization estimation techniques 
Baak investigates whether a bounded rationality model has added value compared to a 
model with only rational agents. He tries to detect bounded rationality in the beef cattle 
market by converting the model in an optimal regulator problem with distortions and using 
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Kalman filtering. The model he uses is a version of a rational agents model, extended with a 
fixed proportion of boundedly rational agents who base their expectations on time series 
observations. Baak finds that the extended model has a better fit than the original rational 
agents model. Chavas (2000) uses General Method of Moments (GMM) to detect 
heterogeneity and to measure the size of groups with different levels of rationality for the US 
beef market. One of the main drawbacks of these papers is that in the models used there is no 
time variation in the market composition. Franke (2009) estimates the parameters of a 
heterogeneous agent model by applying the simulated method of moments. He finds that, 
when using an adjusted weighting function in the objective functions, the models parameters 
are economically and statistically satisfactory. Not all papers on HAM estimation are positive 
about the use and appropriateness of such models. Amilon (2008) uses maximum likelihood 
and efficient method of moments and finds that the models generally have a poor fit and do 
not generate all the stylized facts that some of the simulation studies are able to match. 
Both papers of Gilli and Winker (2001, 2003) use a simulation based indirect estimation 
approach to find the parameter values of a heterogeneous agent model applied to the US 
Dollar - German Mark exchange rate. The parameter values of the model are obtained by 
minimizing a loss function based on the model simulated moments and the moments from 
the real data. The 2001 paper serves as an introduction of this method and therefore only 
focuses on two moments: kurtosis and ARCH-effects. The authors only estimate the random 
switching probability parameter and the probability that an agent will switch after interacting 
with another agent. In the 2003 paper, the optimization algorithm is improved and a third 
parameter, the standard deviation of noise in the majority assessment, is estimated. 
2.4.1.3 STAR GARCH 
Westerhoff, Reitz and Manzan use a STAR-GARCH approach in several papers. An 
important characteristic of this estimation technique is that only one type of agents can have a 
deterministic time-varying weight. Westerhoff and Reitz (2003) estimate a STAR GARCH 
model where the impact of fundamentalists depends on the strength of their belief in 
fundamental analysis. If the misalignment of the exchange rate with the fundamental value 
increases, fundamentalists lose their faith in fundamental analysis and leave the market. In 
their 2005 paper they estimate a model for the US corn market with constant stabilizing 
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fundamentalist behavior and dynamic technical trading activity, which is time-varying 
depending on the misalignment of the corn price. Manzan and Westerhoff (2007) estimate a 
heterogeneous agent model with nonlinear time variation in the chartists' extrapolation rate 
(similar to the model of Westerhoff and Reitz, 2005) on five major currencies against the US 
dollar. Whereas fundamentalists have a constant belief about the exchange rate misalignment 
(the difference between the spot rate and the PPP rate), namely that it will decrease, chartists 
expect trends to continue when the absolute change is below a certain threshold band and 
expect mean reversion beyond that threshold (unlike the chartists in Westerhoff and Reitz 
(2005), who become more active the larger the misalignment is). 
2.4.2 Full switching models 
2.4.2.1 Stock market 
Nowadays, the most popular method of estimating a heterogeneous agents model is 
with nonlinear least squares or maximum likelihood, combined with a multinomial logit 
switching rule which is inspired by the work of Brock and Hommes (1997,1998). This method 
was introduced by Boswijk et al. (2007), who directly estimate a BRHA model on stock 
returns (S&P 500). In their model there are heterogeneous agents with access to the 
fundamental value of a risky asset, but with different beliefs about the persistence of the 
deviation between the spot price and the fundamental price of the asset. Switching between 
the different beliefs takes place based on the relative past profitability of that strategy. 
Chiarella et al. (2014) estimate a heterogeneous agents model for the S&P500 with three types 
of agents: fundamentalists, chartist and noise traders. Consistent with most of the other 
empirical studies, fundamentalists are stabilizing with respect to the fundamental value of the 
asset. Chartists trade based on a moving average rule given by a geometric decay process, 
whilst most empirical studies rely on an AR(1) rule. The relative weight of fundamentalists and 
chartists in the market changes over time based on the relative performance of these rules, the 
impact of noise traders is assumed to be constant. Noise traders have no specific expectations 
of future returns, their demand is driven by a noisy signal that depends on volatility. De Jong 
et al. (2009) also distinguish three types of agents, to shed light on the Asian crisis in the 
context of heterogeneous agents. Besides chartists and fundamentalists, they distinguish 
2.4 Estimation 27 
 
 
 
internationalists, who condition their expectations on foreign market conditions. In a two-
country model (with Hong Kong and Thailand) for the stock market, chartists and 
fundamentalists base their expectations on past price changes and the price deviation from the 
fundamental value, respectively, whereas internationalists base their expectations on the past 
price changes of the foreign market. Market dynamics occur due to switching between the 
different groups conditional on their past forecasting performance. Their estimation method 
is in many ways comparable to the one in Boswijk et al. (2007), yet De Jong et al. use 
maximum likelihood techniques instead of nonlinear least squares. All these studies compute a 
fundamental stock price by taking the discounted value of expected future dividends, which 
comes down to a simple Gordon growth model when a constant growth rate of dividends is 
assumed. 
2.4.2.2 Foreign exchange market 
De Jong et al. (2010) estimate a full heterogeneous agents model with switching on 
exchange rates. By estimating the chartist-fundamentalist model on EMS rates, they 
circumvent the problem of having to choose a fundamental rate. Instead, they can use the 
`parity' rate. With a survey dataset from Consensus Economics London, Goldbaum and 
Zwinkels (2014) directly test investor heterogeneity and expectation formation for the 
Japanese yen and the Euro against the U.S. dollar. The authors estimate three different models 
with chartists and fundamentalists. In the first model, both rules are estimated for the full 
sample of respondents and time. In the second model, every forecaster is labeled as being 
either fundamentalist or chartist, based on the sum of the relative difference between the 
forecast and the outcome of the respective forecasting strategy. Finally, the respondents are 
allowed to switch their strategy. Every single forecast is labeled as resulting from either the 
fundamentalist or chartist strategy. The authors use the monetary model to compute a 
fundamental value for the exchange rates. Another paper that evaluates investor expectations 
for the foreign exchange market with survey data comes from Ter Ellen et al. (2011). They 
estimate a full heterogeneous agent model with dynamic weights of PPP traders 
(fundamentalists), momentum traders (chartists) and interest parity traders on forecasts for the 
Euro, Great Britain pound and Japanese yen against the U.S. dollar and the Japenese yen 
against the Euro. 
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2.4.2.3 Other asset classes 
Where Reitz and Slopek (2009) take a STAR-GARCH approach with heterogeneous 
agents to explain large oil price swings, ter Ellen and Zwinkels (2010) employ maximum 
likelihood with a multinomial logit switching rule. In their approach, the market impact of 
trend extrapolating chartists and mean reversion fundamentalists is time varying, based on the 
relative past forecasting accuracy of the strategies. Fundamentalists believe in mean reversion 
of the WTI and Brent price of crude oil to a long term moving average of the oil price, 
whereas chartists extrapolate the price movement from the previous period. Considering that 
there is no concensus on the fundamental value of oil and computing one can be costly, the 
authors use a two-year moving average as a proxy for the fundamental value. 
Frijns et al. (2010) propose a way to model heterogeneous expectations of volatility by 
applying a heterogeneous agent model to the option market, where volatility is priced and 
traded. Fundamentalists believe that conditional volatility will revert to the level of the 
unconditional volatility and chartists trade based on recently observed unexpected shocks. 
Their heterogeneous agent model simplifies to a GJR-Garch(1,1) model with time-varying 
coefficients, which depend on the time-varying market impact of chartists and 
fundamentalists. 
Kouwenberg and Zwinkels (2014) show that even the price movements in the U.S. 
housing market can be well explained by a dynamic heterogeneous agent model. The model is 
estimated with maximum likelihood, including fundamentalists who believe in mean reversion 
of housing prices to a rents-based fundamental value and chartists who destabilize the market 
by extrapolating trends. Agents switch between strategies based on the past forecasting 
accuracy of the respective strategies. 
2.4.3 Behavior of chartists and fundamentalists 
Most empirical studies on BRHA models use the classification of chartists and 
fundamentalists as found in the theoretical literature, where chartists either base their 
expectations on an autoregressive or moving average rule, and fundamentalists choose a 
fundamental value that is appropriate for the asset class under consideration. According to the 
theory on chartists and fundamentalists, chartists are generally destabilizing by extrapolating 
and enforcing trends, whereas fundamentalists have a stabilizing impact on the asset price due 
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to their mean reverting expectations. This presumption is confirmed by many empirical 
validations of the model. Both Boswijk et al. (2007) and Chiarella et al. (2014a) find support 
for mean reversion in fundamentalists' expectations and trend extrapolation in chartists' 
expectations of the S&P500. The model with time-varying weights has a significantly better fit 
than the static model. Lof (2014) also estimates a heterogeneous agent model on S&P500 data. 
The types of agents he distinguishes are fundamentalists, rational speculators and contrarian 
speculators. The latter two types have exactly opposing beliefs to one another. He finds that 
the existence of contrarians can explain some of the most volatile episodes of the S&P500.  
Similar results are found for commodity markets. Westerhoff and Reitz (2005) find that 
chartists are highly stabilizing, and that this effect becomes stronger the further the price of 
corn is away from its fundamental, or long-run equilibrium, price. Reitz and Slopek (2009) 
explain the large price swings observed in the oil market by stabilizing fundamentalists, who 
have a larger impact the larger the misalignment of the oil price is, and chartists, who are 
dominant and destabilizing when the price of oil is close to its fundamental value. Ter Ellen 
and Zwinkels (2010) confirm the destabilizing (stabilizing) effect of chartists (fundamentalists) 
in the WTI and Brent markets for crude oil. They also find asymmetry in the responses of 
both chartists and fundamentalists. Furthermore, high weights for the chartist strategy 
coincide with different price spikes in the sample period, suggesting that they contributed to 
an oil price bubble in these periods. The model has a good out-of-sample fit. The authors 
show that the heterogeneous agent model outperform the random walk model and a 
VAR(1,1) model. Baur and Glover (2014) find that investors in the gold market are 
heterogeneous. However, the coefficients they obtain for chartist and fundamentalist behavior 
are quite different from what is commonly found in other financial markets.  
Results for the foreign exchange market are not that consistent. Manzan and Westerhoff 
(2007) find that for a large number of currencies against the U.S. dollar, fundamentalists are 
increasingly stabilizing for a larger misalignment of the exchange rate. However, chartists are 
destabilizing only within a certain range. When the past appreciation or depreciation of the 
exchange rate is larger than the threshold value, their behavior becomes stabilizing. De Jong et 
al. (2010) find evidence of stabilizing behavior of all types of agents for EMS rates, a result 
they assign to the investors' trust in the monetary authorities. Westerhoff and Reitz (2003) 
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find less optimistic results for The U.S. dollar against the British pound, German mark and 
Japanese yen. In their model, fundamentalists lose their faith in fundamental analysis if the 
misalignment of the exchange rate with the fundamental value increases, and leave the market. 
Therefore the dynamics in the fundamentalists' behavior further destabilize the exchange rate. 
Another remarkable outcome is found by Vigfusson (1997). His results show that periods of 
stability in the CAN$/US$ exchange rate correspond to high probabilities of being in the 
chartist regime (based on the moving average rule). The opposite effect is observed for the 
autoregressive chartist rule.  
The evidence in favor of heterogeneous agents extends more and more to other 
(financial) markets. Frijns et al. (2010) estimate a heterogeneous agent model on the option 
market, where investors have heterogeneous expectations about the future level of volatility. 
They confirm the presence of different types of traders in that market. Kouwenberg and 
Zwinkels (2014) show with their HAM estimation for the U.S. housing market that the 
dominance of chartists in the housing market from 1992 to 2005 can explain the bubble-like 
behavior of housing prices in that period. Their model with time-varying impact of 
fundamentalists, who believe in mean reversion to a fundamental value based on rents, and 
chartists, who extrapolate past price trends, explains the housing price for the in-sample 
period, and is also able to predict the decline in housing prices from 2006 onwards. Chiarella 
et al. (2014) analyze the large deviations from fundamental levels of credit risk for some 
European countries during the European sovereign debt crisis and find that these can be 
partly explained by a combination of increased global risk aversion and the dynamics between 
momentum traders (chartists) and fundamentalists. 
2.5 Conclusion 
Although the rational paradigm has been at the forefront of financial markets research 
since the seventies, rejections of this paradigm and attempts to model investor behavior in a 
different way are gaining ground. Boundedly rational heterogeneous agent models (HAM) are 
an example of such models. In this chapter I have provided an overview of papers estimating 
such models and their main results. 
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Heterogeneous agent models typically explain the stylized facts of financial markets well, 
and they are able to replicate important episodes of turmoil. Nevertheless, work on these 
models rarely appears in general economics and finance journals. This may be partly explained 
by the terminology used in this niche of behavioral finance. After all, the applications that do 
get attention from such journals generally use a different terminology, such as ‘momentum’ 
instead of ‘chartist’. To grow further from a niche model to a generally accepted subject, 
adapting the terminology used in these models may be the way forward. 
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
3 Dynamic expectation formation in the foreign exchange 
market8 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Several foreign exchange market anomalies (e.g. excessive trade, momentum, forward 
premium puzzle) cannot be fully explained within the traditional framework. Also, non-
fundamental strategies such as carry trade (Menkhoff et al., 2012a) and momentum (Menkhoff 
et al., 2012b) can be profitable. In addition, there is ample evidence of investors having 
expectations that are non-rational in the traditional sense, and also heterogeneous (Ito, 1990; 
Cavaglia et al., 1993; MacDonald and Marsh, 1996; Menkhoff et al., 2009; Jongen et al. 2012). 
Several approaches have been suggested in the literature to address these issues. For example, 
the scapegoat approach (Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2009; Sarno and Valente, 2009) assumes 
that exchange rates can be explained by varying fundamentals over time. The learning 
approach (see e.g. Markiewicz, 2012 and Markiewicz and De Grauwe, 2013) poses that agents 
in the foreign exchange market behave as econometricians and attempt to learn the true data 
generating process from the empirical data. In this chapter, we follow the behavioral finance 
literature and use survey data to test whether expectations are formed using heuristics, and 
whether the use of these heuristics is time-varying following the theoretical work of De 
Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) and Spronk et al. (2013). 
                                                          
8 This chapter is based on “Ellen, ter S. (2010), Heterogeneous forecasting rules in the foreign exchange market: 
evidence from survey data, Erasmus University Rotterdam master’s thesis.” and “Ellen, ter S., W.F.C. Verschoor and 
R.C.J. Zwinkels (2013), Dynamic expectation formation in the foreign exchange market, Journal of International 
Money and Finance.” We would like to thank the editor, an anonymous referee, Alessandro Beber, seminar 
participants at the Tinbergen Institute and Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), and participants of 
the 2011 meeting of the Society of Nonlinear Dynamics and Econometrics (SNDE), the 3rd EMG Conference on 
Emerging Markets Finance, the 16th Annual Workshop on Heterogeneous Interacting Agents (WEHIA), the 2011 
meeting of the European Economic Association (EEA) and the 2011 PREBEM Conference. 
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The assumption of rational market participants with homogeneous expectations, once 
firmly rooted in financial theory, is losing ground in favor of alternative assumptions of agent 
behavior such as bounded rationality and heterogeneous expectations. Bounded rationality of 
market participants was already introduced by Simon in 1957. In this framework it is assumed 
that agents are boundedly rational and that they use certain rules of thumb, heuristics, to form 
expectations about future asset prices. Various attempts have been made to determine what 
these rules of thumb are and how they are being used, ranging from theoretical models to lab 
experiments and survey analyses. 
 The main theoretical contributions come from Frankel and Froot (1987b), De Long 
et al. (1990) and Lux (1998). Frankel and Froot (1987b) develop a model with three types of 
actors: chartists (‘trend followers’), fundamentalists (‘model followers’) and portfolio 
managers. The portfolio manager is the only actor who buys and sells assets, and he receives 
input from the two other types. Therefore, he makes trades that can be seen as a weighted 
average between the chartist and the fundamentalist expectations. Lux’ (1998) also makes this 
distinction between chartist and fundamentalist strategies. De Long et al. (1990) make a 
distinction between noise traders and sophisticated traders. In this model, the noise traders 
create a risky investment environment and are able to obtain excess returns without having 
access to inside information. Because of the presence of this group in the market, prices can 
deviate significantly from their fundamental value for longer periods of time. All of these 
authors explain various market anomalies and stylized facts with their models of investor 
behavior. 
 The presence and behavior of different types of agents in financial markets has been 
examined in a number of ways. Schmalensee (1976) was one of the first to use experimental 
methods to reveal expectation formation processes for time series, in particular with respect 
to technical rules. De Bondt (1993) and Bloomfield and Hales (2002) use classroom 
experiments and find evidence of trend-following behavior, where Bloomfield and Hales 
(2002) also find support for the assumption in Barberis et al. (1998) that investors perceive 
past trend reversals as an indicator for the probability of future reversals even though they are 
aware of the random walk character. Hommes et al. (2005) illustrate coordination of 
expectations among participants in an experimental setting. 
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 As an alternative method to measure expectations, attempts have been made to 
directly measure investor expectations and expectation formation rules. To this end, both 
quantitative and qualitative surveys have been conducted. Taylor and Allen (1992) show, 
based on a questionnaire survey, that 90% of the foreign exchange dealers based in London 
use some form of technical analysis in forming expectations about future exchange rates, 
particularly for short-term horizons. The foreign exchange dealers further expressed that they 
see fundamental and technical analyses as complementary strategies for making forecasts and 
that technical analysis can serve as a self-fulfilling mechanism. Various quantitative surveys 
have been evaluated as well (among others, Ito, 1990; Cavaglia et al., 1993; MacDonald and 
Marsh, 1996; Branch, 2004; Menkhoff et al., 2009). They all find heterogeneity in expectations, 
and most of them attribute this to extrapolative, regressive and adaptive expectations (for an 
overview, see Jongen et al., 2008). However, all these studies assume static and non-time-
varying expectation formation.  
Branch (2004), investigates inflation expectations and finds that agents switch between 
different exogenously determined forecasting techniques (VAR, naïve and adaptive) based on 
the mean squared prediction errors of the strategies. This chapter extends Branch (2004) by 
introducing dynamics in expectation formation strategies for financial markets, being the 
foreign exchange market, where feedback effects from expectations to realizations can be 
stronger than in the case of inflation. In addition, the forecasting rules are estimated 
endogenously. Whereas Branch (2004) optimizes the forecasting rules exogenously on realized 
inflation, we estimate the forecasting rules endogenously on the survey expectations. This 
approach allows for more flexibility in results as it does not presume consistency between 
expectations and realizations.  
 In this chapter we will further investigate this heterogeneity by testing three well-
known foreign exchange forecasting strategies on a survey dataset with forecasts from foreign 
exchange analysts and large international banks. These strategies can be summarized as a 
momentum rule, a PPP rule and an interest parity rule. The choice for these three strategies is 
motivated partly by the academic literature on exchange rates and heterogeneous agents (see 
Spronk et al., 2013) and partly by evidence from industrial practice (see Pojarliev and Levich, 
2008, 2010).  
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We will advance the study of different types of agents in two ways. First, we introduce 
dynamics in the strategies by distinguishing between time-varying bandwagon versus 
contrarian expectations in the momentum strategies and by distinguishing between carry trade 
versus UIP expectations. Although, in general, it is acknowledged that the existence of such 
opposing beliefs could be hidden on an aggregated level because they even out, the distinction 
has, to the best of our knowledge, never been made when working with empirical data. 
Secondly, we will increase the dynamic nature of the model by allowing the agents to switch 
between different strategies based on forecasting accuracy with respect to the market 
exchange rate. These two additions, combined with the survey dataset, allow us to evaluate 
different currencies as well as different forecast horizons. Furthermore, the dataset has never 
been used for this purpose
9
, thus making this chapter a valuable extension to the existing 
literature on behavioral finance, expectation formation, exchange rate dynamics and survey 
data. 
We find evidence for the existence of all three strategies both when tested separately and 
when tested in a combined model, indicating that agents use these different strategies to form 
expectations about future returns. Moreover, we find dynamics in expectation formation in 
three different ways. First, agents hold opposing beliefs within different strategies and change 
these beliefs over time. Secondly, expectation formation is dynamic in the sense that the 
expectation formation rules change for different forecasting horizons. Carry trading and 
momentum are the main applied strategies for short-term forecasting, whereas PPP and UIP 
are predominantly used for long-term forecasting. Finally, the results show that agents attach 
time-varying weights to the different strategies based on the past performance of the 
strategies, especially for the long run forecast horizons.  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the 
dataset, Section 3 contains the methodology used, and Section 4 contains the results. In 
Section 5, we give some concluding remarks and suggestions for further research.   
                                                          
9 It has been used by Sarno and Sojli (2009) for an empirical investigation of the link between fundamentals and 
exchange rates. 
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3.2 Data 
To get a better understanding of the expectation formation process of agents, we use a 
dataset of investor expectations. The dataset that is central to this work is a survey dataset 
from FX Week
10,11, which contains forecasts at the weekly frequency from a large number of 
wholesale investors for several exchange rates and forecast horizons. The names of the 
respondents are revealed and include JPMorgan, Barclays Capital, Citigroup, RBS and Société 
Générale. Anecdotal evidence suggests that sell-side analysts typically fill out the 
questionnaires. To the best of our knowledge, this dataset has not yet been used for this 
purpose. 
 
 
 
Table 3.1: Survey data set description 
  
Surveying institution FX Weekly 
Exchange rates $/€, $/£, ¥/€, ¥/$ 
Frequency weekly, unbalanced 
Forecast horizons 1, 3 and 12 months 
no. Participants 61 
Background respondents Financial institutions 
Average response rate 51.16 % 
Sample period Jan 03 – Feb 08 
 
respondents periods 
Minimum no. of 9 3 
Maximum no. of 41 217 
Median no. of 37 142 
 
  
                                                          
10 FX Week is an industry newsletter for foreign exchange and money market professionals working within 
commercial banks, investment banks, central banks, brokerages, institutional investors, multinational corporations 
and vendor companies serving the banks and financial institutions. 
11 Although the survey data are time-stamped on Monday, we cannot be sure at which day expectations were 
formed exactly. To control for possible information asymmetries, we ran all analyses using exogenous data from the 
same Monday as well as the Friday before that. Results are highly similar and available upon request. 
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A typical problem that may arise with survey forecasts is that respondents do not reveal 
their true expectations, perhaps because of private information that they do not want to 
reveal. However, because the names of the respondents of this survey have been made public, 
it is not likely that this problem will arise
12
. After all, there is also a reputational aspect to 
revealing your forecast, and, therefore, we believe that the investors have an incentive to 
reveal their true expectations
13
,
14
. The Bank of International Settlement Triennial Survey 
(2010) states that the vast majority of foreign exchange activity occurs between large financial 
institutions such as the ones in our sample. Hence, our sample of institutions can be regarded 
as representative for the foreign exchange market.  
As we can see in Table 3.1, the data were sampled at a weekly frequency for the one-, 
three- and twelve-month forecast horizon. A total number of 61 investors from large 
renowned banks and investment companies participated in the survey. From January 2003 to 
February 2008, forecasts were made for the spot rate of the U.S. dollar against the Japanese 
yen (USDJPY), the pound sterling (GBPUSD) and the euro (EURUSD), and for the euro 
against the Japanese yen (EURJPY). The data analysis will mainly be conducted in a panel 
structure. The panel is unbalanced as there are some one- or two-week gaps, and some 
panelists left or entered the survey.  
Spot exchange rates and interbank lending rates were gathered from Datastream, as 
were the PPP exchange rates for the fundamental forecasting rules
15
. The OECD PPP rate is 
used as fundamental PPP value for the exchange rates, as this is a widely used and highly 
valued measure
16
. A drawback of the OECD rate is that its frequency (annual) does not 
correspond to the frequency of our survey data (weekly) and therefore contains less variation. 
However, a rather stable fundamental value is theoretically viable. 
  
                                                          
12See, for example: http://www.e-forex.net/news/e-FX+News/100625/TMS+Brokers+tops+forecast+rankings 
and https://research.standardchartered.com/about/foreignexchange/Pages/default.aspx?teamId=10. 
13 In this respect, the terms expectations and forecasts will be used interchangeably in this paper, as we assume that 
the investors’ forecasts are unbiased representations of their expectations. Jongen et al. (2011) also confirm the value 
of survey forecasts for this purpose. 
14 Forecasts are generally given by FX analysts or strategists working at the banks, we can therefore not say with 
certainty that the banks will also commit their capital accordingly. However, forecasts given by people on the sell-side 
of a bank influence investment decisions on the buy-side, which makes them a useful proxy for market expectations. 
15 Spot exchange rates: WM Reuters. Interbank rates: British Bankers’ Association. PPP rates: OECD. 
16 For instance, Deutsche Bank offers a PPP ETF that is based on the PPP measure of the OECD; see DBIQ.com. 
  
 
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of log expected and log realized returns 
                          
 
eurjpy 1m eurjpy 3m eurjpy 12m eurusd 1m eurusd 3m eurusd 12m 
 
exp real exp real exp real exp real exp real exp real 
 Mean -0.0044 0.0044 -0.0094 0.0108 -0.033 0.0156 0.0015 0.0069 0.0074 0.0163 0.0176 0.045 
 Median -0.0067 0.0085 -0.0136 0.0177 -0.0418 0.029 0.0008 0.0068 0.0057 0.0174 0.0219 0.0612 
 Maximum 0.0431 0.0626 0.042 0.0924 0.0697 0.1445 0.033 0.0746 0.0499 0.1031 0.0864 0.1919 
 Minimum -0.0358 -0.0823 -0.0504 -0.0839 -0.0792 -0.3249 -0.0409 -0.0558 -0.0395 -0.0889 -0.0498 -0.1528 
High-Low 0.0789 0.1449 0.0924 0.1762 0.1489 0.4694 0.0739 0.1304 0.0894 0.1919 0.1362 0.3447 
 Std. Dev. 0.0119 0.025 0.0167 0.0335 0.0341 0.0963 0.0122 0.0269 0.0162 0.0413 0.0308 0.0824 
 Skewness 0.9146 -0.7012 0.7592 -0.5821 1.0613 -2.0235 0.0334 0.1386 0.2131 -0.2387 -0.2007 -0.731 
 Kurtosis 4.7088 3.9569 3.1865 3.0642 3.3274 7.122 3.0602 2.647 2.2951 2.8096 2.3113 2.7136 
 Jarque-Bera 56.3947 25.9392 21.0636 12.2346 41.517 300.3187 0.0727 1.8126 6.1066 2.3776 5.7192 19.9765 
 Probability 0 0 0 0.0022 0 0 0.9643 0.404 0.0472 0.3046 0.0573 0 
 
gbpusd 1m gbpusd 3m gbpusd 12m usdjpy 1m usdjpy 3m usdjpy 12m 
 
exp real exp real exp real exp real exp real exp real 
 Mean -0.0006 0.004 0.0004 0.0093 -0.0048 0.0112 -0.0056 -0.0024 -0.017 -0.0056 -0.0519 -0.0294 
 Median -0.0008 0.0057 0 0.011 -0.0053 0.0357 -0.0064 -0.0016 -0.0176 -0.0016 -0.0576 -0.0244 
 Maximum 0.0265 0.0666 0.0434 0.1107 0.0537 0.1675 0.038 0.0675 0.0369 0.1007 0.0403 0.1648 
 Minimum -0.0319 -0.0532 -0.035 -0.0918 -0.056 -0.3383 -0.0478 -0.0864 -0.0724 -0.1224 -0.1215 -0.2289 
High-Low 0.0584 0.1199 0.0784 0.2025 0.1096 0.5058 0.0858 0.1539 0.1093 0.2231 0.1617 0.3937 
 Std. Dev. 0.0108 0.0251 0.0144 0.0377 0.0233 0.1112 0.0139 0.0269 0.0201 0.0402 0.0362 0.0841 
 Skewness -0.1844 0.025 0.1268 0.0742 0.0753 -1.4663 0.2128 -0.4137 0.1559 -0.2558 0.4912 0.0343 
 Kurtosis 2.9423 2.6028 2.928 3.0969 2.3657 5.0012 3.3434 3.1258 2.7718 2.7777 2.5052 2.1885 
 Jarque-Bera 1.2536 1.442 0.6255 0.2826 3.8256 113.44 2.6915 6.3032 1.3436 2.8008 10.8891 5.9697 
 Probability 0.5343 0.4863 0.7314 0.8682 0.1477 0 0.2603 0.0428 0.5108 0.2465 0.0043 0.0505 
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Table 3.2 shows the descriptive statistics for the expected returns and corresponding 
realized returns. From the negative period mean expectations of the one-, three- and twelve-
month future EURJPY, GBPUSD and USDJPY exchange rates we can see that investors 
expected an overall depreciation of the yen against the euro and the dollar as well as a 
depreciation of the dollar against the pound. The standard deviations of the forecasts are very 
high compared to the means, suggesting that the mean expectations are rather volatile across 
individuals and over time. Standard deviations increase as the forecast horizon increases. 
Another interesting feature is that the high-low statistic, which shows the difference between 
the maximum and the minimum observations, increases with the forecast horizon.  
It is interesting to compare these statistics to the descriptive statistics of the realized 
returns, where there is a positive mean for the first three currencies and a negative mean for 
the USDJPY. This means that for both the EURJPY and the GBPUSD exchange rates, 
investors were not able to predict the correct sign of the mean returns over time. Similar to 
the standard deviation of the forecasts, the standard deviation of the realized returns is high, 
which shows the high volatility of the foreign exchange markets. The high kurtosis shows that 
the distribution of the expectations is fat-tailed, which is in line with realized returns.  
The following section will describe the methodology used to evaluate which forecasting 
strategies are used.  
3.3 Methodology  
To investigate investors’ forecasting strategies, we assume that the investors have equal 
access to information, but they interpret it differently by attaching different weights to 
different sources of information when forming expectations. A result of the overconfidence 
bias (Fischhoff et al., 1977) is that agents try to detect patterns in the exchange rate 
movements to predict future exchange rates while the foreign exchange market actually shows 
a random walk. Bloomfield and Hales (2002) indicate this in their two experiments with MBA 
participants. These participants used past price changes as an indicator for future reversals 
even though they were told that the sequences they were dealing with were random walks. 
In contrast to traditional finance theory, several studies in the behavioral finance domain 
assume that agents use different models to process information into expectations. As noted by 
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Hong and Stein (1999), a necessary condition for alternatives to the rational expectations 
setup is that there is empirical evidence supporting the alternative to bound the imagination of 
the researcher. The models that are widely used in the foreign exchange literature are 
momentum trading and PPP trading. Next to these two models, an additional model is tested 
that is based on the interest differential between the countries. A study from Pojarliev and 
Levich (2008) reveals that these trading strategies explain a substantial portion of the 
variability in foreign exchange funds. The choice for these models is further supported by the 
ETF prospects of Deutsche Bank and Barclays Capital. Deutsche Bank shows in its 
prospectus that the bank uses a combination of a carry, momentum and valuation strategy, in 
which the valuation strategy is based on the OECD’s purchasing power parity rate. Barclays 
capital uses a combination of carry and value strategy (also based on OECD PPP rates). Allen 
and Taylor (1992) indicate that PPP is the fundamental model traders tend to apply. 
3.3.1 Momentum traders 
The first type of investor that we distinguish is the momentum trader, also referred to as 
trend chaser or (positive) feedback trader. According to Allen and Taylor (1990, 1992), 
approximately 90% of investors in the foreign exchange market use some form of technical 
analysis to predict future changes of exchange rates. Andreassen and Kraus (1990) indicate 
that investors are likely to sell if prices decline and to buy if prices increase, which is a form of 
trading on momentum. De Bondt (1993) confirms these findings with survey results that 
suggest people are optimistic in bull markets and pessimistic in bear markets. 
Momentum trading is a deviation from rationality that can partly be assigned to 
representativeness bias. Representativeness (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) can occur when 
people have to determine the probability that a series of returns generates some price or 
return. Rather than looking at the base rates and the overall distribution of returns, they look 
for similarities and think that the past returns are representative of the forecasting period.  
The most basic form of a momentum rule is a simple AR(1) rule:  
𝑠𝑡+𝑘,𝑖
𝑒 − 𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑠𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡−𝑘) + 𝜀𝑡,𝑖     (3.1) 
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where k denotes the forecast horizon. In case β>0, agents using this strategy expect 
price trends to continue. Agents are then said to be destabilizing as they drive the exchange 
rate in one direction. This is also referred to as bandwagon expectations. If β<0, traders show 
opposite behavior, which means that they expect past price movements to revert. This is also 
known as contrarian strategy.  
Several studies (Frankel and Froot, 1987a,c, 1990; Cavaglia et al., 1993; Ito, 1990) show 
that bandwagon effects especially occur in the short run (depending on the study, up to 1 to 3 
weeks) but disappear or turn into contrarian effects for longer horizons. This is in line with 
the findings of Cutler et al. (1991) of short-term positive auto-correlation and long-term 
negative auto-correlation of returns. Because the expectation formation process is the same 
for bandwagon and contrarian strategies, except for the change in sign of the explanatory 
coefficient, it is difficult to distinguish these effects. It is possible that some investors show 
extrapolative behavior and others act in a stabilizing way. When these even out on the macro 
level, making the extrapolation coefficient insignificant, it might not have an effect on the 
price; however, we cannot observe the true heterogeneity of the agents. In times of crisis or 
other financial turmoil, the bandwagon type may begin to dominate, causing severe 
destabilizations of the market. For these situations, it is useful to make a distinction between 
bandwagon and contrarian expectations. To the best of our knowledge, this distinction has 
not been made before in estimating these kinds of models. To determine whether the sign we 
find in Equation (3.1) represents a single type of investor or is a composition of a contrarian 
and bandwagon models, we estimate the following equation: 
𝑠𝑡+𝑘,𝑖
𝑒 − 𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷
𝑏(𝑠𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡−𝑘) + 𝛽2(1 − 𝐷
𝑏)(𝑠𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡−𝑘) + 𝜀𝑡,𝑖   (3.2) 
where 𝐷𝑏  is a dummy accounting for positive extrapolation (bandwagon effects), which 
takes the value of 1 if the past price movement and the individual expectation are of the same 
sign and 0 otherwise. This introduces a form of dynamics in the expectation formation as we 
allow the investors to switch between bandwagon and contrarian behavior. 
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3.3.2 PPP traders 
PPP traders use the purchasing power parity value of the exchange rate as an anchor in 
forming their expectations. They expect the exchange rate to revert back to this value. This 
means that they expect prices of overvalued assets to decrease and prices of undervalued 
assets to increase until the price of the asset reflects its PPP value. In the behavioral finance 
literature, this behavior is often referred to as ‘regressive’ or ‘mean reverting,’ as it assumes 
reversion to some kind of mean. Note that trading based on the fundamental value of the 
exchange rate (in this case, the PPP rate) would be rational if there were no other types of 
investors in the market. However, as past studies have found that there are different types of 
actors, it would be boundedly rational to fully adhere to this strategy without acknowledging 
the deviations from market efficiency. 
Obtaining the PPP value of an exchange rate is not straightforward. Economic literature 
is unclear about the true PPP value. Several versions of the model have been suggested in 
which the discussion is usually about the use of different price indices (Xu, 2003). As this is an 
empirical survey study, we are not concerned about whether we are using the correct PPP 
estimate or whether the PPP rate is the actual fundamental value; rather, we care only if 
investors assume this to be true and therefore use it in their expectation formation process. 
Although this does not particularly make it more straightforward, we can make some 
assumptions.  
Investors in the foreign exchange market need information to form expectations and to 
make investment decisions. This information is costly, especially with respect to information 
that is not directly observable, such as the PPP value of the exchange rate. Before gathering 
this information, investors are likely to make some sort of cost-benefit analysis: when do the 
costs of obtaining this value exceed the benefits? Based on this behavior, we selected the 
OECD PPP value of exchange rates as an approximation of the true PPP value, as it does not 
require complicated analyses, models and calculations, and it is available against low costs. 
Furthermore, as indicated above, it is used by Deutsche Bank and Barclays as a benchmark for 
their value ETFs. 
Figure 3.1 displays the OECD PPP rates and the nominal exchange rates used in this 
study. Figure 1 shows that the exchange rate is heavily mispriced the majority of the time. The 
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USDJPY seems to be consistently lower than the PPP rate, whereas the GBPUSD and the 
EURUSD show the opposite trend beginning at the end of 2003. This indicates that the U.S. 
dollar was underpriced against the euro, the yen and the pound for over four years. 
Interestingly, the yen rates appear to move in the opposite direction from the fundamental 
rate. Whereas the PPP rate is decreasing for both exchange rates, the spot rates are generally 
increasing. We do not see this effect for the other two currencies. Both the perverse 
movements and the constant mispricing may have effects on PPP trading strategies.  
PPP traders base their expectations on the deviation between the price and the PPP rate 
of an asset. They perceive such a situation as a mispricing, that is, an undervaluation or 
overvaluation of the currency. 
st+k,i
e -st = α + γ(st̅-st) + εt,i    (3.3) 
where ?̅? is the PPP rate. The equation shows that the price movement expected by these 
traders is caused by the deviation of the price from the PPP value. For a positive γ, they are 
stabilizing, that is, they expect the exchange rate to revert to its PPP-based value, whereas a 
negative value of γ implies destabilizing behavior.  
The second type of PPP trading behavior we test incorporates a non-linear response to 
the deviation from the PPP value (Taylor et al., 2001). The idea behind this is that a mean 
reverting expectation is more likely and probably stronger if the exchange rate is far from its 
PPP value. In such a situation, investors believe that chances are high the exchange rate will 
revert to this value. On the other hand, if the exchange rate is close to its PPP value, the risk 
of trend extrapolation is too big and the transaction costs are too high to benefit from 
fundamental analysis. This effect is captured by taking the deviation to the power of three: 
𝑠𝑡+𝑘,𝑖
𝑒 − 𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾(𝑠?̅? − 𝑠𝑡)
3 + 𝜀𝑡,𝑖     (3.4) 
  
 
 
  
  
Figure 3.1 Nominal and PPP rates (natural logarithms). 
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3.3.3 Interest differential traders 
Many violations of the UIP relationship have been recorded, resulting in a branch of 
literature that focuses on the ‘interest parity puzzle’ (see Sarno (2005) for an overview). It is 
quite plausible that the UIP puzzle exists because of the presence of non-rational 
expectations. Then, when these deviations appear to be persistent, they get picked up by 
investors who try to use the deviation to make a profitable trade. This may result in carry 
trade, of which many cases have been observed in the past decades. Carry trade occurs under 
the exact opposite assumptions from uncovered interest parity in the sense that carry traders 
exploit the interest differential by borrowing in the low-interest country and lending in the 
high-interest country.  
st+k,i
e -st = α + ϑ(it-it
*) + εt,i    (3.5) 
The sign of 𝜗 indicates whether investors apply carry trade or uncovered interest parity 
in their expectations. A positive value of 𝜗 reveals trading based on uncovered interest 
parity
17
, whereas a negative value reveals that there are carry traders in the market. 
As was the case for momentum traders, we have the problem of two different strategies 
that both use the same information but do so in an exact opposite manner. In this case, it 
would be interesting to determine if there is actually only one type of trader that uses the 
interest differential or if there are both carry traders and UIP traders. We attempt to reveal 
this in a similar way to what we did for momentum traders, by estimating the equation: 
st+k,i
e -st = α + ϑ1D
uip(it-it
*) + ϑ2(1-D
uip)(it-it
*) + εt,i  (3.6) 
where 𝜗1𝐷
𝑢𝑖𝑝(𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡
∗) (𝜗2(1 − 𝐷
𝑢𝑖𝑝)(𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡
∗)) reveals uncovered interest parity (carry 
trade) expectations and is the interest differential multiplied by a dummy with the value of one 
(zero) if the individual’s forecast and the interest differential are of the same sign and a value 
of zero (one) otherwise.  
                                                          
17 Formally, only a value of 𝜗 of 1 corresponds to uncovered interest parity, but because of limits to arbitrage and 
the fact that the coefficient is an ‘average’ over all respondents, we say that a positive coefficient indicates sentiment 
towards UIP and a negative coefficient is a clear sign of carry trade. 
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3.3.4 Heterogeneity: combined model 
If we find the individual models to be significant, it becomes interesting to merge them 
into one model to exclude the possibility of omitted variable bias by testing whether the 
coefficients are still significant. For the combined model, we begin with the basic Equations 
(3.1), (3.3) and (3.5) for the momentum, PPP and interest differential trade models, 
respectively.  
𝑠𝑡+𝑘,𝑖
𝑒 − 𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑠𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡−𝑘) + 𝛾(?̅?𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡) + 𝜗(𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡
∗) + 𝜀𝑡,𝑖   (3.7) 
As for the separate strategy models, this model is tested on the whole panel of investors 
over the entire survey sample. A valuable feature of testing this combined model on the 
different time horizons is that it enables us to see whether the strategies change in significance 
and dominance for increasing forecasting horizons. Bandwagon effects are usually only seen 
on short horizons
18
, whereas contrarian behavior is observed for medium and long horizons, 
so we would expect 𝛽 to change sign for three- and twelve-month horizons. Additionally, 
exchange rates generally need a long time to revert to their PPP value. Rogoff (1996) indicates 
that the half-life of most exchange rates is three to five years. We can therefore expect that 
this strategy only becomes significant for the longer horizons. The extent of the effect of 
horizon on the interest differential parameter is not straightforward. Nevertheless, we can 
characterize uncovered interest parity as a more fundamental strategy (i.e., more appropriate 
for longer horizons) and carry trade as a speculative strategy (for short horizons). With this 
characterization, we expect to see a negative parameter for the one-month horizon, which 
turns into a positive parameter for the twelve-month horizon. 
The sophisticated model includes adjustments to the different strategies. This means it 
allows for dynamics within the group of momentum traders and interest differential traders. 
The choice for the linear PPP model is motivated by ease of interpretation of the coefficient 
and the added complexity of the non-linear model
19
.  
                                                          
18 Short horizons in this context are usually defined as 1-3 week horizons, so it is unclear whether the 1 month 
horizon qualifies as short or medium horizon. 
19 We also estimated the sophisticated model with the nonlinear response to the fundamental deviations, and this 
generated similar results. 
48  Chapter 3. Dynamic expectation formation in the foreign exchange market 
 
 
 
st+k,i
e -st = α + β1D
b (st-st-k) + β2(1-D
b) (st-st-k) + γ(s̅t-st)   
+ϑ1D
uip(it-it
*) + ϑ2(1-D
uip)(it-it
*) + εt,I     (3.8)  
3.3.5 Time-varying rules 
In the previous sections, we have assumed that agents put constant weights on the 
forecasting rules that they use. However, both theory and empirical evidence (Barberis and 
Shleifer, 2003; Prat and Uctum, 2007; Bloomfield and Hales, 2002; Branch, 2004) suggest that 
agents change the weights assigned to a certain strategy. This is often referred to as ‘switching’ 
between rules. In this section, we will investigate whether the survey data confirms the 
assumption of evolving weights to forecasting rules. In doing so, we will follow the approach 
used in the heterogeneous agent literature and introduced by Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998) 
by using a switching rule that is based on the forecasting accuracy of a certain strategy. To do 
this, we use mean expectations of agents. De Jong et al. (2010) apply a heterogeneous agent 
model to the foreign exchange rate. Estimation results for the EMS period reveal significant 
heterogeneity and switching between rules. 
To capture agents’ switching between forecasting rules, we update Equation (3.7) with a 
weighting function: 
𝑠𝑡+𝑘
𝑒 − 𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑊𝑡
𝑐𝛽(𝑠𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡−𝑘) + 𝑊𝑡
𝑓
𝛾(?̅?𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡) + 𝑊𝑡
𝑖𝜗(𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡
∗) + 𝜀𝑡  (3.9) 
where 𝑊𝑡
𝑐 , 𝑊𝑡
𝑓
 and 𝑊𝑡
𝑖 are the weights assigned to the momentum, PPP and interest 
differential rules, respectively. How much weight agents put on a certain strategy depends on 
the forecasting accuracy of this strategy. The weights are, therefore, computed as: 
Wt
s =
exp (ρπt
s)
∑ exp (ρπt
s)s=f,c,i
    (3.10) 
which is based on the model of Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998). The weight assigned 
to strategy s is a function of the performance of strategy s on time t (𝜋𝑡
𝑠) divided by the sum of 
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all performances. The performance of a strategy is given by the previous period’s squared 
forecast error for that strategy
20
, given by  
𝜋𝑡
𝑐 = ((𝛽(𝑠𝑡−𝑘 − 𝑠𝑡−2𝑘)) − (𝑠𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡−𝑘))
2     
𝜋𝑡
𝑓
= ((𝛾(𝑠𝑡−𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑠𝑡−𝑘)) − (𝑠𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡−𝑘))
2     
𝜋𝑡
𝑖 = ((𝜗(𝑖𝑡−𝑘 − 𝑖𝑡−𝑘
∗ )) − (𝑠𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡−𝑘))
2       (3.11) 
The rationale behind these equations is that investors compare the real past change of 
the exchange rate with the change that was predicted by each of the models. The model with 
the smallest forecast error, that is, the model that had the best prediction in the previous 
period, should receive the highest weight in the coming period. Therefore, we expect the 
switching parameter ρ to be negative. If this parameter is positive, agents switch to the rule 
that performed worst in the previous period.  
The switching parameter is often referred to in the literature as the intensity of choice, 
and it captures the delay in agent response to changes in performance. It is negatively related 
to the status quo bias described by Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988), implying that people do 
not immediately change their behavior if they observe that this is desirable unless the reasons 
are appealing enough to do so. A high (absolute) ρ implies that the status quo bias is low, 
whereas the opposite occurs for a low (absolute) ρ.  
In Section 4, we will present and evaluate the results from estimating the above 
equations. All regressions in Sections 4.1 to 4.4 are estimated using ordinary least squares on 
panel data with fixed effects
21
, which captures some level of individual heterogeneity by 
allowing for individual specific intercepts. We account for the autocorrelation in the residuals, 
induced by the overlapping observations problem
22
, with a White correction to the standard 
errors. In Section 4.5, mean expectations are used in combination with a nonlinear least 
squares estimation, in which a Newey-West adjustment is used to account for autocorrelation 
                                                          
20 Experiments with alternative functional forms, such as absolute forecast errors, yield similar results. 
21 A likelihood ratio test showed that the null hypothesis of redundant fixed effects was rejected. A Hausman test 
revealed the redundancy of random effects. Therefore, a model with fixed effects was appropriate.  
22 As the forecasts are weekly, and the horizons are one month or longer, the next forecast is made before the 
first forecast has expired. This would almost certainly lead to autocorrelation in the empirical model residuals (see 
MacDonald, 2000). 
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in residuals. Accounting for serial correlation is necessary because of the overlapping character 
of the forecasts.  
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Momentum traders 
Section 4.1 describes the results from estimating the momentum models on the investor 
expectations. In this section, all equations are estimated on the full panel. Table 3.3 presents 
the results from estimating the basic momentum trading model from Equation (3.1). 
Regarding the basic setup, on the left side of the Table, the negative coefficients for all 
currencies23 and all forecast horizons indicate that momentum traders on the foreign exchange 
market are contrarian rather than extrapolative, especially for the Japanese yen against the 
euro and the U.S. dollar, where it is clear that momentum traders are mainly active on short 
horizons as the magnitude and significance of the coefficient decreases for an increasing 
forecast horizon. This is in line with results of earlier studies, which suggest that negative 
feedback trading mainly occurs at relatively long forecast horizons. The opposite effect is 
noticeable for the EURUSD, where the strategy becomes significant for the twelve-month 
horizon only. Interestingly, the fit differs considerably between the currencies. This indicates 
that apart from the significant presence for all currencies, momentum traders are more active 
in the EURJPY and EURUSD markets than in the GBPUSD market. The model fit generally 
increases with the forecast horizon. 
There are two possible reasons for the small and sometimes insignificant coefficients of 
the basic momentum rule. Either investors that trade in these markets do not use (this form 
of) momentum in forming forecasts, or the group of contrarians and the group of positive 
extrapolators are of similar size, causing the effects to even out.  
By testing Equation (3.2), we can see which of these explanations is most plausible. The 
results are displayed on the right hand side of Table 3.3. It is worth noting that there are, 
indeed, two types of trend extrapolators active in this market with opposing beliefs about how 
to extrapolate trends. In general, the contrarian effect dominates given the significance and 
                                                          
23 Except for the one-month GBPUSD, but this coefficient is not significant. 
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effect size, which is why we see negative coefficients for the basic model. An interesting result 
is observed for the EURJPY as it reveals opposite extrapolation effects. Rather than short-
term positive feedback trading and long-term negative feedback trading, the traders on these 
markets expect the exact opposite to happen. Over the short term, there is a dominance of 
contrarian expectations, whereas over the long term, the bandwagon effect dominates. This 
unconventional way of expectation formation is not observed for the other two exchange 
rates. This might have to do with the fact that the yen moves opposite to its fundamental 
value, overall (see Figure 3.1). Furthermore, we can see that the effect of momentum traders 
in the market for GBPUSD is limited, as the coefficients are small. However, when split into a 
bandwagon and a contrarian effect, they turn significant. As the coefficients of these strategies 
are very similar in absolute terms, it is plausible that their effects even out on an aggregated 
level, which explains the insignificant coefficients in Equation (3.1). The same argument 
applies to the one-month EURUSD expectations.  
3.4.2 PPP traders 
As we can see in Table 3.4, where the results from estimating Equation (3.1) are 
displayed, PPP traders appear to be mainly active in the EURUSD and the GBPUSD markets. 
This means that, again, the traders show deviating behavior with respect to the Japanese yen 
FOREX market, as the PPP strategy is not used much for these currencies. The EURUSD 
reveals the expected results over different horizons, namely, a growing magnitude of the 
coefficients for longer forecast horizons. All significant results show the correct sign, thus 
indicating that PPP traders are stabilizing by expecting the exchange rate to revert to its PPP 
value.  
If we allow for non-linearity in the PPP rule, on the right side of the table, the results 
become significant for three of the four exchange rates. These results provide some evidence 
for the assumption that PPP traders become increasingly active in the market when the 
exchange rate moves further away from its fundamental value. Within this model, we can 
clearly see that PPP strategies are mainly used for longer horizons, as the fit of the model 
increases from one to twelve months. Again, we cannot find significant coefficients for the 
USDJPY. 
  
 
Table 3.3: Results momentum 
                              
  
Basic 
 
Dynamic 
  
constant momentum   adj R²   constant bandwagon contrarian adj R² 
EURJPY 1m -0.0039 *** -0.3888 *** 0.2418 
 
-0.0029 *** 0.4247 *** -0.6541 *** 0.5205 
  
-85.887 
 
-19.4223 
   
-67.478 
 
21.846 
 
-40.324 
  
 
3m -0.0096 *** -0.1885 *** 0.117 
 
-0.0062 *** 0.5935 *** -0.6879 *** 0.4521 
  
-27.178 
 
-5.8352 
   
-29.459 
 
20.196 
 
-28.719 
  
 
12m -0.0375 *** -0.0958   0.228 
 
-0.0333 *** 0.6738 *** -0.381 *** 0.5083 
  
-10.755 
 
-1.492 
   
-13.951 
 
9.8658 
 
-8.1092 
  EURUSD 1m 0.0048 * -0.0061   0.0928 
 
0.0019   0.0254 *** -0.0296 *** 0.542 
  
1.8671 
 
-1.1647 
   
1.2445 
 
7.1316 
 
-10.356 
  
 
3m 0.0169 *** -0.0205 * 0.1782 
 
0.0091 *** 0.0315 *** -0.0571 *** 0.588 
  
2.9086 
 
-1.6888 
   
2.9319 
 
4.5281 
 
-9.2028 
  
 
12m 0.0636 *** -0.1173 *** 0.3972 
 
0.037 *** 0.0206   -0.1503 *** 0.6969 
  
4.6049 
 
-3.6495 
   
4.1 
 
0.9095 
 
-7.6269 
  GBPUSD 1m -0.006   0.0043   0.0614 
 
-0.0045   0.0143 *** -0.0081 *** 0.5718 
  
-0.8998 
 
0.8028 
   
-1.1588 
 
4.4133 
 
-2.6969 
  
 
3m 0.0018   -0.002   0.061 
 
-0.0024   0.0127 *** -0.0098 *** 0.5716 
  
0.2911 
 
-0.3931 
   
-0.6325 
 
3.9192 
 
-3.3177 
  
 
12m 0.0055   -0.0052   0.0616 
 
-0.0006   0.0117 *** -0.0116 *** 0.5719 
  
0.7788 
 
-0.8697 
   
-0.1328 
 
2.8719 
 
-3.0745 
  USDJPY 1m -0.0074 *** -0.4353 *** 0.3539 
 
-0.0054 *** 0.293 *** -0.6571 *** 0.5716 
  
-142.76 
 
-22.174 
   
-92.666 
 
13.456 
 
-34.66 
  
 
3m -0.0196 *** -0.3329 *** 0.2661 
 
-0.0138 *** 0.2892 *** -0.6948 *** 0.4706 
  
-314.4 
 
-11.541 
   
-40.879 
 
6.8926 
 
-23.982 
  
 
12m -0.0592 *** -0.2637 *** 0.3633 
 
-0.0441 *** 0.2955 *** -0.6605 *** 0.5128 
    -193.88   -5.8458       -35.304   4.6647   -19.474     
Coefficients and t-statistics (shaded) from estimating Equation 3.1 and Equation 3,2. Significance is listed as ***, **, * for significance on 1%, 5% or 10% level respectively. 
  
 
 
Table 3.4: Results PPP 
                          
  
Basic 
 
Non-linear 
  
c   PPP   adj R²   c   PPP^3   adj R² 
EURJPY 1m -0.0048 *** 3E-04   0.0402 
 
-0.006 *** 0.3622 ** 0.0441 
  
-14.74 
 
0.057 
   
-17.02 
 
2.298 
  
 
3m -0.0117 *** 0.002   0.0873 
 
-0.014 *** 0.8775 ** 0.0967 
  
-12.499 
 
0.092 
   
-14.85 
 
1.9936 
  
 
12m -0.0474 *** 0.084 * 0.2463 
 
-0.05 *** 3.6655 *** 0.2747 
  
-18.703 
 
1.859 
   
-19.77 
 
2.9735 
  EURUSD 1m 0.0057 *** 0.04 *** 0.1038 
 
0.0033 *** 0.7569 *** 0.1024 
  
5.0844 
 
3.483 
   
8.2771 
 
3.804 
  
 
3m 0.0142 *** 0.073 *** 0.1894 
 
0.0102 *** 1.5321 *** 0.1908 
  
5.9347 
 
2.986 
   
10.184 
 
3.0937 
  
 
12m 0.0487 *** 0.362 *** 0.4582 
 
0.0276 *** 7.1707 *** 0.4545 
  
8.3863 
 
6.111 
   
12.909 
 
6.7418 
  GBPUSD 1m 0.0029 * 0.02 ** 0.0649 
 
0.0005   0.1551   0.0631 
  
1.7354 
 
2.125 
   
0.6986 
 
1.6153 
  
 
3m 0.0093 *** 0.056 *** 0.1377 
 
0.0031 * 0.4928 ** 0.1346 
  
2.7185 
 
2.86 
   
1.841 
 
2.124 
  
 
12m 0.0375 *** 0.266 *** 0.4264 
 
0.0108 *** 2.6544 *** 0.4239 
  
5.2212 
 
6.439 
   
3.5318 
 
6.4034 
  USDJPY 1m -0.0059 *** -0.002   0.0901 
 
-0.007 *** 0.1153   0.0913 
  
-5.1966 
 
-0.281 
   
-12.89 
 
1.443 
  
 
3m -0.0154 *** -0.023   0.1539 
 
-0.019 *** -0.047   0.1515 
  
-5.6248 
 
-1.287 
   
-14.73 
 
-0.2541 
  
 
12m -0.0524 *** -0.032   0.3017 
 
-0.057 *** -0.0435   0.3003 
    -7.9246   -0.753       -18.49   -0.0962     
Coefficients and t-statistics (shaded) from estimating Equation 3.3 and Equation 3.4. Significance is listed as ***, **, * 
for significance on 1%, 5% or 10% level respectively. 
  
  
 
Table 3.5: Results interest differential 
                              
  
Basic 
 
UIP & Carry 
 
  c   uipcarry   adj R²   c   Carry   UIP   adj R² 
EURJPY 1m -0.0102 *** -0.208 ** 0.0434 
 
-0.0072 *** -0.8032 *** 0.3512 *** 0.5617 
  
-3.7829 
 
-2.0125 
   
-5.6279 
 
-16.333 
 
6.618 
  
 
3m -0.0219 *** -0.3847   0.092 
 
-0.0125 *** -1.1943 *** 0.5988 *** 0.5812 
  
-2.8132 
 
-1.313 
   
-3.7028 
 
-8.6116 
 
4.6834 
  
 
12m -0.0112   1.1528   0.2336 
 
-0.0157   -1.5264 *** 1.6536 *** 0.5741 
  
-0.4998 
 
1.3964 
   
-1.2427 
 
-3.353 
 
3.4869 
  EURUSD 1m 0.0018 *** -0.0019   0.0914 
 
0.0008 *** -0.8815 *** 0.9122 *** 0.4592 
  
5.0955 
 
-0.0434 
   
2.5213 
 
-17.705 
 
15.748 
  
 
3m 0.0062 *** 0.1038   0.1737 
 
0.0033 *** -1.5418 *** 1.3869 *** 0.515 
  
9.4814 
 
1.284 
   
5.737 
 
-17.716 
 
16.414 
  
 
12m 0.0003   1.2227 *** 0.3852 
 
0.0029 ** -2.7433 *** 2.8396 *** 0.6315 
  
1.3801 
 
4.3455 
   
2.2195 
 
-9.2416 
 
16.532 
  GBPUSD 1m -0.0014 * -0.0562   0.062 
 
-0.0017 *** -0.7328 *** 0.602 *** 0.431 
  
-1.8457 
 
-0.9702 
   
-3.0942 
 
-18.802 
 
9.9389 
  
 
3m -0.0003   0.0131   0.125 
 
-0.001   -1.0661 *** 1.0732 *** 0.4931 
  
-0.215 
 
0.111 
   
-0.8987 
 
-15.54 
 
8.0704 
  
 
12m -0.0034   0.4512 * 0.3372 
 
-0.0022   -1.3434 *** 1.9356 *** 0.5623 
  
-1.0739 
 
1.7226 
   
-0.918 
 
-7.0672 
 
7.4367 
  USDJPY 1m 0.0064 *** -0.0039   0.0901 
 
-0.0055 *** -0.5098 *** 0.3489 *** 0.5343 
  
-4.0887 
 
-0.0852 
   
-5.3215 
 
-14.541 
 
10.491 
  
 
3m -0.0165 *** 0.0691   0.1521 
 
-0.0147 *** -0.8666 *** 0.5105 *** 0.5443 
  
-4.3478 
 
0.6307 
   
-6.4663 
 
-10.701 
 
7.453 
  
 
12m -0.0145   1.2119 *** 0.3421 
 
-0.0301 *** -1.4859 *** 1.2319 *** 0.5932 
    -1.3108   3.8914       -3.8769   -5.784   5.5814     
Coefficients and t-statistics (shaded) from estimating Equation 3.5 and Equation 3.6. Significance is listed as ***, **, * for significance on 1%, 5% or 10% level respectively. 
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The non-linear model performs worse in terms of model fit than the basic model in half 
of the cases, which makes the additional value of this model questionable. 
3.4.3 Interest differential traders 
The results of regressing Equation (3.5) can be found on the left side of Table 3.5. The 
evolution of the coefficients over the forecast horizons suggests that the interest differential is 
indeed used for carry trade for shorter horizons and that it follows the theory of uncovered 
interest parity for horizons of twelve months. However, none of the currencies have both 
significant short- and long-term effects at the same time. From the fit of the model, it seems 
that the information from the interest differential is mainly used for long forecast horizons 
and that we can find some evidence for UIP in expectations.  
Again, as we have seen for the momentum rule, the insignificant results might imply that 
the interest differential is not popular to use in forming expectations or that there are both 
carry traders and UIP traders in the market who cancel out each other’s effects. Support for 
both strategies can be found on the right side of Table 3.5, which represents the results from 
estimating Equation (3.6). For all exchange rates and forecast horizons, the effects are 
significant at a 1% level. Therefore, it can be stated that both strategies are being used in the 
foreign exchange market, but their effect is only marginal, as they even out on an aggregated 
level. The difference between the carry and UIP coefficients suggests that there is a shift from 
carry towards UIP expectations as the forecast horizon increases. The fit of the model 
increases over time, indicating that the information from the interest differential is used 
particularly for longer horizons24.   
3.4.4 Heterogeneity: combined model 
By estimating Equation (3.7) on the full panel, we attempt to discover whether 
institutional investors use the three simple rules of thumb. Combining all the strategies in one 
                                                          
24 Note that a carry trade strategy is more difficult to detect, as this strategy is already profitable if the expected 
change in exchange rate is lower than the profit made on the interest differential.  
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model reduces the risk of omitted variable bias and controls for potential correlations between 
models25. Results are displayed in Table 3.6. 
 
Table 3.6: Results heterogeneity (basic model) 
                      
  
c   momentum   PPP   uip/carry   adj R² 
EURJPY 1m -0.0229 *** -0.3792 *** 0.0271 *** -0.6667 *** 0.247 
  
-4.8818 
 
-19.576 
 
2.861 
 
-4.0962 
  
 
3m -0.0888 *** -0.1598 *** 0.1322 *** -2.6933 *** 0.1472 
  
-7.775 
 
-5.273 
 
5.7858 
 
-6.8163 
  
 
12m -0.151 *** -0.027   0.2458 *** -3.5286 *** 0.2587 
  
-5.8486 
 
-0.4129 
 
3.5912 
 
-4.5714 
  EURUSD 1m -0.0634 *** 0.2534 *** 0.5767 *** -0.1721 *** 0.2135 
  
-12.67 
 
15.04 
 
15.938 
 
-3.5523 
  
 
3m 0.0183 *** 0.1154 *** 0.2986 *** -0.0563   0.2086 
  
-2.473 
 
5.0013 
 
6.6323 
 
-0.6539 
  
 
12m 0.0379 *** 0.006   0.3391 *** 0.7167 *** 0.4728 
  
3.0587 
 
0.1766 
 
4.6246 
 
2.6423 
  GBPUSD 1m -0.2618 *** 0.2792 *** 0.5025 *** -0.0892   0.2 
  
-13.587 
 
13.571 
 
13.644 
 
-1.5873 
  
 
3m -0.0729 *** 0.087 *** 0.2018 *** 0.0228   0.1475 
  
-2.8699 
 
3.2591 
 
4.2384 
 
0.1985 
  
 
12m 0.0065   0.0486   0.3321 *** 0.2226   0.4351 
  
-0.1739 
 
1.2888 
 
5.3225 
 
0.9751 
  USDJPY 1m 0.0092 ** -0.4506 *** -0.0515 *** 0.255 *** 0.3639 
  
2.2127 
 
-22.935 
 
-4.3519 
 
3.3461 
  
 
3m 0.0088   -0.344 *** -0.0958 *** 0.3957 *** 0.2835 
  
1.0641 
 
-12.194 
 
-3.8086 
 
2.679 
  
 
12m 0.0149   -0.2914 *** -0.254 *** 0.9923 ** 0.4151 
    0.7153   -5.4703   -5.141   2.1231     
Coefficients and t-statistics (shaded) from estimating Equation 3.7. The full panel is used for this estimation. 
Significance is listed as ***, **, * for significance on 1%, 5% or 10% level respectively. 
  
                                                          
25 A principal component analysis was done to deal with possible collinearity in the model. Most outcomes were 
robust to this analysis, with the only exception being the interest differential trading in the EURJPY rate, where 
coefficients changed sign.  
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The momentum and PPP strategies are significant at a 1% level for all exchange rates 
and nearly all horizons. The PPP rule is significant for all horizons. The sign of this strategy is 
as expected for three out of four currencies, thereby stabilizing the exchange rate for those 
currencies. The PPP rule shows destabilizing behavior for the USDJPY exchange rate. The 
momentum rule shows stabilizing behavior for the Japanese yen against the euro and the U.S. 
dollar. In other words, the deviating behavior of traders for the Japanese FOREX market still 
occurs when regressing the combined model. We can find extrapolative effects for the U.S. 
dollar against the euro and the pound sterling. A strong pattern is observable for the 
significance of this rule over forecast horizons. The results clearly indicate that extrapolation 
becomes weaker and less significant for longer forecast horizons. For the twelve-month 
horizon, three out of four exchange rates no longer reveal extrapolative expectations. For 
these horizons, investors believe in UIP for two currencies. The EURJPY is dominated by 
carry trade, as this coefficient is negative and significant for all horizons. 
Numbers can be interpreted as follows: the coefficient of 0.2534 for the EURUSD one-
month horizon extrapolative strategy means that speculators expect 25% of the past period 
price movement to continue in the coming month. The EURJPY twelve month PPP 
coefficient of 0.2458 indicates that investors believe that, after twelve months, the deviation 
from the PPP value is reduced by 25%.  
As mentioned before, a drawback of the OECD rate is that its frequency (annual) does 
not correspond to the frequency of our survey data (weekly) and therefore contains less 
variation. This mismatch between the frequency of the forecasts and the PPP value may lead 
to the variation of the PPP rule being driven mainly by variation in the spot exchange rate 
(rather than variation in PPP). Correlations show that there is a certain degree of correlation 
between the PPP deviation and exchange rate returns. To make sure that this does not drive 
our results, however, we have run orthogonalized regressions with the series for the PPP rule 
replaced by the residuals obtained from regressing the PPP rule on the momentum rule of 
equation (3.9). This does not qualitatively change our results – the signs and significance stay 
the same26.  
                                                          
26 Correlation tables and results from the orthogonalized regressions are available upon request. 
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When regressing the strategies separately on the expectations, we find that there are two 
main improvements in the models. Distinguishing between bandwagon and contrarian 
expectations in the momentum model and distinguishing between carry and UIP traders in the 
interest model increased the fit of those models. Therefore, it seems appropriate to include 
these improvements in the combined model as well. Table 3.7 presents the results of 
regressing Equation (3.8).  
We find the results to be comparable to the regressions of the separate strategies and the 
regression of the combined model. In general, bandwagon and contrarian effects seem to 
decrease for longer forecasting horizons. The signs for bandwagon effects are as expected, but 
for contrarian effects, we find significant positive coefficients for the EURUSD one-month 
and the GBPUSD one- and three-month expectations. This can be caused by the fact that 
these exchange rates only showed positive returns for the sample period, which could have 
had an influence on the sentiment of investors. Moreover, the ‘short term’ for bandwagon 
effects is usually assumed to be one to three weeks, it is therefore unclear whether the one-
month horizon classifies as short or medium horizon. The PPP model shows the expected 
sign for three out of four currencies. For these currencies, the PPP expectations are 
stabilizing. Only the EURJPY shows a negative sign, which can be explained by the constant 
undervaluation of this exchange rate. If a currency is constantly undervalued, investors might 
adapt their expectations and lose their faith in mean reversion of the exchange rate. For carry 
and UIP trade, we find the expected signs for all significant coefficients. 
3.4.5 Time-varying rules 
Until now, we have assumed that agents assign constant weights to the three forecasting 
rules. In this section, we will change this by estimating Equations (3.9) - (3.11) on the mean 
expectations using nonlinear least squares. To test the added value of the switching rule, we 
estimate the model with static weights (Equation (3.7) with mean expectations) before we 
estimate the dynamic model. The added value is then tested by applying a likelihood ratio test 
and comparing these results with Chi-squared probabilities.  
  
  
 
Table 3.7: Results heterogeneity (extended model) 
                              
  
c   bandwagon   contrarian   PPP   carry   uip   adj R² 
EURJPY 1m -0.0077 *** 0.0595 *** -0.3156 *** 0.1244   -0.6193 *** 0.1699 *** 0.6117 
  
-5.1395 
 
2.5454 
 
-19.2827 
 
1.4617 
 
-11.042 
 
2.929 
  
 
3m -0.0191 *** 0.0787 *** -0.153 *** 0.5754 *** -1.2785 *** 0.2587 * 0.5903 
  
2.4038 
 
2.5971 
 
-6.2161 
 
2.6347 
 
-8.444 
 
1.7588 
  
 
12m -0.0454 *** 0.1647 ** -0.116 *** 1.811 *** -2.0345 *** 0.4277   0.589 
  
-3.8131 
 
1.9815 
 
-2.733 
 
3.0675 
 
-4.8258 
 
0.9673 
  EURUSD 1m -0.0057 *** 0.0393 *** -0.0028   1.0127 *** -0.3033 *** 0.2316 *** 0.5565 
  
-3.2064 
 
8.8691 
 
-0.6896 
 
6.2595 
 
-5.5241 
 
4.4035 
  
 
3m 0.0015   0.0405 *** -0.0258 *** 0.9026 *** -0.572 *** 0.4026 *** 0.6022 
  
0.4453 
 
4.7961 
 
-2.9891 
 
2.4038 
 
-5.113 
 
3.8496 
  
 
12m 0.0324 *** 0.0005   -0.1115 *** 1.099   -1.0829 *** 1.1447 *** 0.7137 
  
3.918 
 
0.0253 
 
-4.5298 
 
1.0207 
 
-2.6237 
 
4.4325 
  GBPUSD 1m -0.0218 *** 0.0277 *** 0.0092   0.305 *** -0.2012 *** 0.1322 ** 0.5828 
  
-3.1414 
 
4.6389 
 
1.4831 
 
3.3907 
 
-5.9692 
 
2.0704 
  
 
3m -0.0027   0.0157 * -0.0113   0.1269   -0.3435 *** 0.3482 *** 0.6149 
  
-0.2604 
 
1.6945 
 
-1.2274 
 
0.7012 
 
-5.7758 
 
2.4793 
  
 
12m -0.0031   0.0303 * -0.0164   0.9537 *** -0.2327   0.5335 ** 0.6951 
  
-0.1651 
 
1.8282 
 
-1.0191 
 
2.9286 
 
-1.3855 
 
2.0503 
  USDJPY 1m -0.0033 * 0.0541 *** -0.422 *** -0.0464   -0.2289 *** 0.2545 *** 0.6369 
  
-1.7152 
 
2.3391 
 
-23.3357 
 
-0.6064 
 
-5.5052 
 
4.977 
  
 
3m -0.0109 *** -0.0289   -0.3257 *** -0.225   -0.6051 *** 0.4476 *** 0.5888 
  
-2.913 
 
-0.8741 
 
-17.1432 
 
-1.5426 
 
-6.6079 
 
4.9721 
  
 
12m -0.0206 * 0.0354   -0.3182 *** -1.2992 *** -1.0878 *** 1.0243 *** 0.627 
    -1.6703   0.7195   -6.9576   -4.8151   -3.2863   3.0451     
Coefficients and t-statistics (shaded) from estimating Equation 3.8. The full panel is used for this estimation. Significance is listed as ***, **, * for significance on 1%, 5% or 
10% level respectively. 
  
 
Table 3.8: Results heterogeneity on  mean expectations (without switching) 
                    
  
c   momentum   PPP   uip/carry   
EURJPY 1m -0.0275 *** -0.9931 *** 0.1063 ** -2.5142 *** 
  
-3.2634 
 
-8.8967 
 
2.312 
 
-2.8624 
 
 
3m -0.0948 *** -0.1961   0.4336 *** -8.6739 *** 
  
-5.3227 
 
-1.1334 
 
4.4398 
 
-4.751 
 
 
12m -0.1801 *** 0.5228 ** 1.0308 *** -12.357 *** 
  
-4.4573 
 
2.1497 
 
5.4435 
 
-2.8919 
 EURUSD 1m 0.0042 *** -1.0542 *** 0.0098   -0.0477   
  
2.795 
 
-10.842 
 
0.3049 
 
-0.283 
 
 
3m 0.0145 *** -0.3512 *** 0.1505 ** -0.1462   
  
4.3807 
 
-2.804 
 
2.1386 
 
-0.3167 
 
 
12m 0.0567 *** -0.26 * 1.1145 *** 0.1577   
  
9.5245 
 
-1.8081 
 
10.08 
 
0.1679 
 GBPUSD 1m 0.0014   -0.975 *** 0.0204   -0.0765   
  
0.79 
 
-15.0011 
 
0.8321 
 
-0.4292 
 
 
3m 0.0105 *** -0.2436 ** 0.1684 *** 0.0461   
  
2.3704 
 
-2.2481 
 
3.0657 
 
0.1034 
 
 
12m 0.0387 *** -0.2587 *** 0.722 *** 0.2266   
  
11.1017 
 
-3.8336 
 
14.7603 
 
0.5496 
 USDJPY 1m 0.0078 * -1.2877 *** -0.1435 *** 0.6606 *** 
  
1.6936 
 
-15.7577 
 
-3.7214 
 
2.7274 
 
 
3m 0.013   -0.8892 *** -0.3357 *** 1.278 ** 
  
1.1524 
 
-7.1133 
 
-3.6143 
 
2.1356 
 
 
12m 0.0387 *** -0.7701 *** -0.9263 *** 4.078 *** 
    2.6025   -4.5643   -6.6027   4.2334   
Coefficients and t-statistics (shaded) from estimating Equation 3.7 on mean expectations with equal weights. 
Significance is listed as ***, **, * for significance on 1%, 5% or 10% level respectively. 
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The results can be found in Table 3.8. First, we observe that the results for the non-
switching regression with mean expectations do not differ much from the panel regression 
results discussed in Section 4.4
27
. This indicates that the mean expectation is a good 
representation of the combined individual expectations, and it is appropriate to use the mean 
in estimating the weighed function.  
The results of estimating the model with time-varying weights are found in Table 3.9. By 
comparing the estimated coefficients from the static weighing and the dynamic weighing 
models, we can see that the coefficients are of the same sign under the different models and 
are of similar magnitude. Therefore, the salient aspects here are the intensity of choice 
parameter ρ (‘switching’) and the weights assigned to the strategies.  
A negative intensity of choice parameter means that investors in these markets switch to 
the rule that generated the lowest forecast error in the previous period. The switching 
parameter of the EURJPY rate is positive and significant suggesting that investors in this 
market switch to the rule that generated the largest forecast error in the previous period. 
Hence, they expect mean reversion at the rule level. 
A likelihood ratio test tells us if allowing for switching in the model adds any value to 
the model with static weights. This is useful, as the intensity of choice parameter is sometimes 
insignificant because of the non-linear character of the switching (Terasvirta, 1994). The 
results of this test can be found in the final column of Table 3.9. The outcome of this test can 
be compared to a Chi-squared distribution to determine whether the log likelihood of the 
elaborate model is significantly higher than that of the nested model. This is the case for most 
exchange rates. For the twelve-month horizon, the likelihood ratio test shows us that the 
dynamic weighting model performs significantly better for all exchange rates. Overall, 
changing strategy becomes more important as the forecast horizon increases. 
  
                                                          
27 Note that the coefficients are three times larger due to the constant weight of 1/3. This also explains why certain 
coefficients are larger than one. 
  
 
Table 3.9: Results heterogeneity on mean expectations (with switching) 
                                
  
c   momentum   PPP   uip/carry   switching   LL w/sw LL wo/sw 2dLL   
EURJPY 1m -0.0302 *** -0.8053 *** 0.1424 *** -2.5068 *** 29.1584   714.16 713.03 2.25   
  
-3.6168 
 
-5.012 
 
2.9985 
 
-2.9998 
 
0.8964 
     
 
3m -0.0707 *** 0.2715   0.435 *** -4.648 *** 17.8676   604.04 595.93 16.22 *** 
  
-4.8368 
 
1.2719 
 
4.148 
 
-3.7844 
 
1.4292 
     
 
12m -0.1769 *** 0.9489 *** 1.0258 *** -9.1134 *** 12.7768 *** 542.67 487.24 110.85 *** 
  
-10.8966 
 
9.2938 
 
9.4404 
 
-8.5358 
 
3.3159 
     EURUSD 1m 0.0042 *** -1.0778 *** 0.0155   -0.0276   -52.9037   713.68 712.42 2.51   
  
2.9369 
 
-13.7345 
 
0.4912 
 
-0.1785 
 
-0.808 
     
 
3m 0.0143 *** -0.3764 *** 0.1394 * -0.1609   -37.4467   591.14 591.13 0.03   
  
4.2178 
 
-3.1644 
 
1.7831 
 
-0.3372 
 
-0.3283 
     
 
12m 0.0546 *** -0.2118 * 0.9762 *** 0.1005   11.5904   557.18 552.56 9.25 *** 
  
8.1243 
 
-1.648 
 
7.9324 
 
0.0895 
 
1.312 
     GBPUSD 1m 0.0014   -0.9727 *** 0.0205   -0.0773   9.2784   737.11 737.10 0.03   
  
0.8006 
 
-15.1939 
 
0.8344 
 
-0.4419 
 
0.1544 
     
 
3m 0.0106 ** -0.1325   0.1234 *** 0.352   454.3889   614.31 613.57 1.48   
  
2.3165 
 
-0.8295 
 
2.3964 
 
0.8401 
 
0.7136 
     
 
12m 0.0351 *** -0.2212 *** 0.5733 *** 0.3607   16.2669   657.91 649.53 16.75 *** 
  
9.1905 
 
-3.4058 
 
7.4424 
 
0.8678 
 
1.5372 
     USDJPY 1m 0.0073 * -1.3118 *** -0.1373 *** 0.6343 *** -24.7808   716.29 715.47 1.64   
  
1.6604 
 
-17.7188 
 
-3.5406 
 
2.7125 
 
-0.8455 
     
 
3m 0.0118   -0.998 *** -0.3359 *** 1.1728 ** -20.6565   583.04 582.17 1.73   
  
1.0896 
 
-6.5137 
 
-3.161 
 
2.0339 
 
-1.4959 
     
 
12m 0.0303 *** -1.011 *** -0.9425 *** 3.4927 *** -7.723 * 498.45 492.20 12.52 *** 
    2.5306   -5.8085   -4.1296   4.0492   -1.661           
Coefficients and t-statistics (shaded) from estimating Equation 3.9 on mean expectations. Significance is listed as ***, **, * for significance on 1%, 5% or 10% level 
respectively. 
  
 
Table 3.10: Descriptive statistics of the estimated weights 
                            
  
mean maximum minimum st. dev 
  
mom PPP UIP mom PPP UIP mom PPP UIP mom PPP UIP 
EURJPY 1m 0.3 0.321 0.379 0.436 0.371 0.459 0.224 0.235 0.308 0.038 0.026 0.028 
 
3m 0.307 0.322 0.371 0.312 0.346 0.406 0.294 0.289 0.348 0.003 0.018 0.017 
 
12m 0.276 0.331 0.393 0.323 0.457 0.498 0.225 0.192 0.315 0.023 0.078 0.058 
EURUSD 1m 0.302 0.355 0.343 0.333 0.38 0.345 0.277 0.328 0.339 0.012 0.011 0.001 
 
3m 0.274 0.374 0.352 0.337 0.423 0.359 0.224 0.321 0.341 0.023 0.021 0.004 
 
12m 0.063 0.561 0.376 0.496 0.716 0.463 0.001 0.202 0.283 0.112 0.122 0.043 
GBPUSD 1m 0.343 0.327 0.33 0.346 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.324 0.33 0.002 0.002 0 
 
3m 0.364 0.31 0.325 0.375 0.326 0.327 0.352 0.298 0.323 0.006 0.007 0.001 
 
12m 0.172 0.426 0.402 0.217 0.453 0.409 0.142 0.389 0.393 0.019 0.016 0.004 
USDJPY 1m 0.332 0.334 0.33 0.337 0.337 0.33 0.328 0.332 0.33 0.002 0.001 0 
 
3m 0.297 0.357 0.346 0.382 0.431 0.398 0.227 0.292 0.293 0.03 0.033 0.024 
  12m 0.267 0.37 0.363 0.348 0.47 0.416 0.208 0.276 0.311 0.03 0.056 0.032 
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Table 3.11: Correlations between strategy 
weights 
          
  
mom-PPP mom-int 
int-
PPP 
EURJPY 1m -0.67 -0.72 -0.032 
 
3m -0.394 0.215 -0.982 
 
12m -0.909 0.828 -0.986 
EURUSD 1m -0.996 -0.696 0.625 
 
3m -0.988 -0.599 0.471 
 
12m -0.935 0.041 -0.393 
GBPUSD 1m -0.998 0.101 -0.164 
 
3m -0.997 0.874 -0.908 
 
12m -0.988 -0.777 0.671 
USDJPY 1m -0.788 -0.43 0.464 
 
3m -0.696 -0.287 -0.489 
  12m -0.894 0.621 -0.907 
 
We can see the evolution of weights for the twelve-month forecasts in Figure 3.2. The 
graphs show variations in the weights for most of the currencies. Although the PPP rule has 
lost popularity for the EURJPY rate in the last few years, it has increasingly been used for the 
EURUSD and the GBPUSD. Although the absolute changes in weights appear relatively 
small, note that the relative changes are substantial. Furthermore, the analyses are done in a 
panel setup and, therefore, represent the average. As such, small deviations have a potentially 
large impact on the market itself. 
The descriptive statistics of the weights are displayed in Table 3.10. We can see that in 
the majority of the cases the weight assigned to the momentum rule declines as the forecast 
horizon increases. The opposite occurs for the PPP forecasting rule. This is in line with 
theory, as it is assumed that (positive) feedback trading mainly occur at short horizons, and 
forecasting based on PPP is more applicable for longer horizons (as it takes a long time before 
the exchange rate reverts to the value suggested by the purchasing power parity). We can also 
see that the standard deviation of the weights increases with forecasting horizon. 
Finally, it would be interesting to see between which strategies most switching takes 
place. We can evaluate this by looking at the correlations between the weights of the different 
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strategies. The results are shown in Table 3.11. For all currencies and horizons, we find a 
negative correlation between momentum traders and PPP traders; thus, the switching more 
often occurs between these strategies. Switching between the other strategies is not that 
straightforward. In the short term, switching also appears to occur between momentum 
traders and interest traders. However, in the long term, agents particularly switch between 
PPP traders and interest traders.  
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we used survey expectations for four exchange rates to evaluate the way 
in which investors form their expectations, building on the theoretical framework of the 
heterogeneous agent literature. To do this, we tested three different strategies on the 
disaggregated expectations: momentum trading, PPP trading and interest trading strategies. 
The momentum rule was divided into bandwagon and contrarian expectations, and the 
interest trading strategy was divided into UIP and carry trade expectations. These extensions 
to the basic models have shown to be a valuable improvement to the models. After testing the 
strategies separately and in a combined model the survey expectations were evaluated to 
determine whether agents switch between strategies over time. 
 We obtained significant results for all strategies when tested separately and when 
tested in a combined model. This implies that investors use past changes, PPP rates and 
interest rates in forming their expectations. Momentum trading especially occurs for short 
horizons, whereas PPP trading is more common for longer horizons. The interest differential 
is used on all horizons but primarily for long-horizon forecasting. We find indications that 
agents have a stronger tendency to apply a carry trade (UIP) expectation at the shorter 
(longer) forecast horizon. Interestingly, there are also differences in expectations within 
different strategies. Some people expect past trends to continue and therefore positively 
extrapolate past returns into future forecasts (bandwagon). Other investors expect past trends 
to revert. There are investors who use the interest differential as a tool for carry trade; that is, 
they expect an appreciation of the currency of the high-interest-rate country. There are also 
investors who believe in UIP and therefore expect a depreciation of the currency of the high-
interest-rate country. Furthermore, a long history of positive returns seems to influence 
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investors when forming their expectations, making them more vulnerable to bandwagon 
expectations. A long history of undervaluation of an exchange rate can cause a loss of faith in 
reversion to the fundamental value. 
Not only do investors use different strategies to form their expectations, they also 
change the weights they assign to these strategies based on the past forecasting accuracy of the 
strategies. The weight assigned to the extrapolative strategy decreases for longer horizons, and 
investors put more weight on PPP rates in this case. Investors switch more for longer 
forecasting horizons. Switching mainly occurs between momentum traders and PPP traders.  
Our results further indicate that investors have deviating ways of forming expectations 
for the exchange rates that involve the Japanese yen. For the momentum and the PPP rules, 
we found surprising results that contradict earlier works as well as our empirical findings for 
the other exchange rates. This might suggest that Japan can be seen as a separate case. One of 
the reasons for this can be that Japan is an export economy and therefore the Japanese 
government actively intervenes in the foreign exchange market to maintain their trading 
competitiveness, which makes conventional rules less useful. Further research could explore 
this phenomenon. 
The results we presented in this chapter are, on the one hand, a strong confirmation of 
theoretical statements and empirical findings from the behavioral finance literature. On the 
other hand, they are also an extension to the literature, as we have shown that there is also 
important heterogeneity within the strategies. Future research could investigate this 
heterogeneity and its implications for exchange rates. It would also be interesting to see 
whether these findings apply to other asset classes. Furthermore, applying the model to 
different time periods and/or focusing on different crises could provide better insight into the 
effect of heterogeneity and switching on crises and vice versa. 
  
 
 
Figure 3.2 Time varying weights for momentum (technical), PPP, and interest differential strategies, 12 month forecasting horizon.  
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Fear or fundamentals? 
4 Heterogeneous beliefs in the European sovereign CDS 
market28 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Motivated by the ongoing turmoil in international debt markets and the development of 
the European sovereign debt crisis following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), this chapter 
examines if the interaction of market fundamentals and momentum played a significant and 
potentially destabilizing role on sovereign CDS spread movements over the recent crisis 
period. Sovereign credit risk has come to the forefront of market participants’ concerns as 
recent crises have shown that well-developed countries are also prone to this risk and can also 
default on their liabilities. This concern is observable in the recent movements of sovereign 
credit default swap (CDS) spreads. For instance, as illustrated in Fig. 4.1, the CDS spreads for 
Eurozone countries were ranging from historically low levels of around 2 bps (for Germany) 
and 13 bps (for Greece) at the beginning of 2006 but had risen to levels of 25 bps and an 
alarming 270 bps, respectively, by the  initial stages of the European Debt Crisis in early 2010. 
Cross-sectional differences in sovereign CDS spreads have also magnified, as the spreads of 
certain peripheral countries in the Eurozone such as Ireland and Greece increased much more 
dramatically than the spreads of core Eurozone countries such as Germany and the 
Netherlands. Various authors explain this development as being due to global risk repricing 
                                                          
28 This chapter is based on “Chiarella, C., S. ter Ellen, X. He, E. Wu (2014), Fear or Fundamentals? Heterogeneous 
Beliefs in the European Sovereign CDS Market, Journal of Empirical Finance.” It was partly written while Saskia ter 
Ellen was visiting University of Technology Sydney (UTS) Business School. We would like to thank the editor, two 
anonymous referees, Remco Zwinkels, seminar participants at the University of Technology Sydney, University of 
Groningen, VU University Amsterdam, Norges Bank, and Australian National University, and participants of the 
2013 Auckland Finance Meeting, the 2013 meeting of the Society of Nonlinear Dynamics and Econometrics (SNDE), 
the Southampton International Conference on the Global Financial Crisis, the 11th INFINITI conference on “The 
Financial Crisis, Integration and Contagion” and the “Nederlandse Economen Dag” (Dutch Economists Day) for 
their useful comments. 
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and increased risk aversion of international investors combined with weakening 
macroeconomic factors (Sgherri and Zoli, 2009; Attinasi et al., 2009; Gerlach et al., 2010; 
Caceres et al., 2010). 
 In this study, we investigate whether the high sovereign credit spreads observed across 
Europe since the onset of the international crisis period were completely driven by 
(macroeconomic) fundamentals or were rather a result of the interaction of market 
fundamentals and momentum. Using a sample of thirteen European countries, of which ten 
are officially part of the European Monetary Union (EMU), we examine whether the 
widespread escalation in sovereign CDS spreads were the amplification effects of weakened 
fundamentals interacted with increasing market-wide momentum, while controlling for 
changes in global risk (re)pricing. In doing so, we uncover new evidence that indicates market 
momentum became more pervasive in sovereign CDS markets from 2007-2013. The 
dominant effect of momentum was magnified in peripheral Eurozone countries as mean 
reversion to fundamentals remained largely absent from the sovereign CDS markets for 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland and Portugal. In the core Eurozone countries, some of the recent 
movements in sovereign CDS spreads can be explained by the strains on fundamentals from 
having to support a weakening EMU and particularly the small group of troubled peripheral 
sovereigns, but we reveal that momentum has also played a large role in amplifying and 
destabilizing sovereign CDS spreads since the GFC. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the related 
literature. Section 3 explains how we calculate fundamental values for the different countries’ 
sovereign CDS spreads. Section 4 describes the data used in our empirical analyses and 
Section 5 describes the heterogeneous agent model that we use to explain the large 
movements in sovereign CDS spreads from 2007 onwards and how it is estimated. Section 6 
gives an overview and interpretation of our estimation results, and Section 7 concludes.  
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Figure 4.1. The sovereign CDS spreads of eleven countries from our sample grouped as either ‘peripheral’ or ‘core’ 
countries. The group of peripheral countries consists of Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Portugal (PT) and Spain 
(ES). The group of core countries consists of Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), France (FR) 
and Germany (DE). Note that the scaling of both graphs is equal to facilitate comparison.   
4.2 Related literature 
It is important to understand the market dynamics of sovereign credit markets as 
escalations in governments’ borrowing costs have undesirable welfare implications. This 
chapter proposes a simple model of heterogeneous expectations on market fundamentals and 
momentum to explain the dynamics of such markets.  
The literature traditionally relied on country fundamentals to predict sovereign risk 
levels but has struggled in recent years to explain the increasingly substantial deviations of 
actual market spreads from those implied by macroeconomic fundamentals. For instance, 
Arghyroua and Kontonikas (2012), Beirne and  Fratzscher (2012) and Ghosh et al. (2013) all 
find that before the crisis, spreads were too low, and the market pricing of sovereign risk was 
not fully reflecting fundamentals but rather international risks. However, recent works have 
also documented that the crisis led to a renewed interest in country-specific economic 
fundamentals for European economies (Mody, 2009; Jaramillo and Weber, 2012). Whilst 
various non-fundamental based explanations have been provided, there remains a gap in the 
current understanding on the exact cause of the recent debt market turmoils in Europe. For 
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example, Aizenman et al. (2013) find that spreads of European periphery countries were too 
high given fiscal space and other macroeconomic fundamentals, suggesting that these 
economies switched to a “pessimistic self-fulfilling expectational equilibrium”. De Grauwe 
and Ji (2013) offer a similar interpretation by saying that the surge in spreads during 2010-11 
was associated with “negative self-fulfilling market sentiments”. Badaoui et al. (2013) agree 
that spreads were not fully reflecting fundamentals during the crisis but argue that the increase 
in CDS spreads during the crisis was caused by a surge in liquidity and demand for credit 
protection. Despite the general agreement on the inability of fundamental forces to fully 
account for recent sovereign credit spread movements, there is conflicting evidence regarding 
the non-fundamental based explanations.  
We contribute to the debate on what has driven country spreads by providing a 
heterogeneous behavioral explanation for the escalation of the European Debt Crisis. Our 
main hypothesis is that market momentum, together with its interaction with fundamentals, 
played a dominant role in driving up CDS spreads of particularly the peripheral Eurozone 
countries beyond the levels warranted by their weakened economies. To date, there has not 
been a suitable theoretically motivated framework used to formally test this. 
This chapter is closely related to the literature on financial bubbles and momentum (in 
both time series and cross-section). It is generally understood that in many asset markets there 
can be large and persistent deviations from fundamentals from time to time. Moreover, short-
run momentum is also well documented in financial markets (Balvers and Wu, 2006, 
Moskowitz, Ooi and Pedersen, 2012, and Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen, 2013). The 
persistent deviations and trading activities in asset markets based on short-run momentum 
typically lead to so-called financial market bubbles. Specifically, Allen and Gale (2000) and 
Baker and Wurgler (2007) model this for equity markets; Frankel and Froot (1990b) for 
foreign exchange markets and Case and Shiller (2003) do so for the housing market. The time-
varying effect of fundamentals on sovereign CDS spreads documented in the current literature 
suggests that the pricing of credit risk in the European Union has important similarities to the 
assessment of risk and returns in other asset markets. In particular, there is anecdotal evidence 
that after the initial revelation of serious debt problems in some EMU members, some bond 
market specialists became very concerned and openly expressed their doubts regarding the 
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ability of market participants to correctly price (sovereign) credit risk. Disregarding the 
European 'no-bailout clause' (i.e. article 125 of the 'Treaty on the functioning of the European 
Union'), investors appear to have been overly optimistic pre-crisis about the economic and 
financial health of all Eurozone countries and the stability of the monetary union. Thus, it can 
be viewed that sovereign credit markets across Europe exhibited bubble-like behavior, with 
persistent under-pricing of sovereign credit risk pre-crisis and overpricing of credit risk post-
crisis possibly due to momentum trading activity. 
Our approach to capture this behavior in European sovereign CDS markets is largely 
motivated by successful descriptions and explanations of heterogeneous agent models for 
bubble-like behavior in a variety of other financial markets. Generally, traditional finance 
models where representative traders (agents) have homogeneous and rational expectations 
perform quite poorly in explaining the above described process. Models that relax those 
assumptions and introduce boundedly rational heterogeneous agents have evolved over the 
past three decades (Frankel and Froot, 1990a; Chiarella, 1992; Brock and Hommes, 1997, 
1998; Lux, 1998; Chiarella and He, 2003b; and De Grauwe and Grimaldi, 2006). These models 
assume that investors have heterogeneous expectations and are boundedly rational in the 
sense that they choose from a set of rules of thumb in order to form expectations about 
future asset prices. In most applications, two types of agents are distinguished. One type uses 
historical price movements to predict future returns and is commonly referred to as chartists 
(akin to momentum traders). The second type believes in a mean reversion of the market price 
to the fundamental value and is therefore generally referred to as fundamentalists. 
Complicated market dynamics occur when agents assess the relative performance of the two 
rules and some choose to switch to a better performing rule. These models have been 
successfully used to (empirically) explain speculation and bubble-like behavior in, for instance, 
stock markets (Boswijk et al., 2007; He and Li, 2007, Chiarella et al, 2012, 2013), foreign 
exchange markets (De Jong et al., 2010; Ter Ellen et al., 2013), option markets (Frijns et al., 
2010), housing markets (Kouwenberg and Zwinkels, 2013) and oil markets (Ter Ellen and 
Zwinkels, 2010). In this chapter we follow the same approach to describe the expectations and 
pricing of sovereign credit risk, measured by CDS spreads, within the EMU. Agents use a 
weighted average of fundamental and momentum strategies when forming their expectations 
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of the future CDS spreads. In aggregation, the market allocates time-varying weights to the 
two strategies, depending on the relative performance of these strategies. We model sovereign 
CDS spreads as they are accepted in the extant literature to be a pure measure of credit risk 
and thus should reflect the market's aggregate opinion on the price that is commensurate with 
taking on the sovereign obligor’s underlying default risk (Badaoui et al., 2013). This is because 
CDS contracts are derivative instruments designed to provide insurance against credit events 
such as sovereign defaults or debt restructurings (Longstaff et al., 2011).  
To the best of our knowledge, this chapter is one of the first to introduce a 
heterogeneous beliefs structure into the sovereign CDS market. Xiong and Yan (2010) 
introduce disagreement between two types of agents about future economic conditions to 
explain several stylized facts in the bond markets. They find that bond yield volatility is 
increased due to the changes in wealth of the two speculating parties.  They emphasize the 
importance of modelling a pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs and show that the results 
can only be obtained in a model with a representative agent under very strong assumptions. 
Blommestein et al. (2012) empirically investigate to what extent bond market participants in 
the CDS market are rational and conclude that it is more likely that they are boundedly 
rational. They distinguish between two regimes, where CDS spreads reflect credit risk 
correctly based on fundamentals in one regime, and credit risk is priced based on sentiment in 
the other regime. This chapter follows a similar approach but has the advantage of being able 
to realistically capture the dynamic switching behavior of the market between  fundamentals 
or momentum  based on their recent forecasting performance through the discrete choice 
model instead of relying on stochastic switching functions. 
4.3 Fundamental default spread 
The price of a CDS contract (often referred to as the ‘CDS spread’) is understood to 
consist of a compensation for default (hereafter referred to as the ‘fundamental default 
spread’) and an extra premium, often referred to as the ‘credit risk premium’. The 
fundamental default spread would be easy to calculate if one knew a country’s true default 
probability. However, usually we are not sure about the default probability and have to model 
the spread under certain assumptions. 
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Models for pricing credit risk can be generally divided into two groups, structural 
models (based on Merton, 1977) and reduced-form (also referred to as intensity-based) 
models. Both of these models are commonly used for pricing corporate CDS spreads. 
However, structural models are generally considered to be less suitable for sovereign credit 
spreads because they rely on estimates of levels and volatilities of equity and debt market 
values, which are not easily obtained for countries. Alternatively, reduced-form/intensity-
based models (Duffie, 1999; Hull and White, 2000; Duffie and Singleton, 2003; to name a few 
important contributions) obtain a CDS spread by equalizing the expected payments and 
expected payoff to solve for the annualized premium (spread). The expected value mainly 
depends on the recovery rate and the (risk-neutral) hazard rate. In order to obtain a 
fundamental default spreadas input for our model, we follow the theoretical models of Duffie 
(1999) and Duffie and Singleton (2003) for pricing credit default swaps. 
Duffie (1999) models the spread of a credit default swap as a function of the present 
value of the payments and the present value of the payoffs of the contract, conditional on a 
risk-neutral hazard rate. The market value of the swap is a function of default parameters h 
and f: 
𝑉(ℎ, 𝑓, 𝑇, 𝑈) = 𝐵(ℎ, 𝑇)𝑓 − 𝐴(ℎ, 𝑇)𝑈   (4.1) 
where 𝑈  is the market default swap spread, 𝑓 is the loss of face value at default, 𝐴(ℎ, 𝑇) 
is the price of an annuity of 1 unit paid at each coupon date until default or maturity 𝑇(𝑛) and 
𝐵(ℎ, 𝑇) is the market value of a payment of 1 unit at the first coupon date after default, 
provided the default date is before maturity date 𝑇(𝑛). Functions 𝐴(ℎ, 𝑇) and 𝐵(ℎ, 𝑇) are 
given by: 
𝐴(ℎ, 𝑇) = 𝑎1(ℎ) + ⋯ + 𝑎𝑖(ℎ)   (4.2) 
𝑎𝑖(ℎ) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−[ℎ + 𝑦(𝑖)]𝑇(𝑖)}   (4.3) 
𝐵(ℎ, 𝑇) = 𝑏1(ℎ) + ⋯ + 𝑏𝑖(ℎ)   (4.4) 
𝑏𝑖(ℎ) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝[−𝑦(𝑖)𝑇(𝑖)] {𝑒𝑥𝑝[−ℎ𝑇(𝑖 − 1)] − 𝑒𝑥𝑝[−ℎ𝑇(𝑖)]}  (4.5) 
where 𝑇(𝑖) is the time of  the 𝑖𝑡ℎ coupon date to maturity and 𝑦(𝑖) is the continuously 
compounding default-free zero-coupon yield to the 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ coupon date. In words, 𝑎𝑖(ℎ) is 
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the value at time zero of receiving 1 unit of account at the 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ coupon date in the event 
that default is after that date and 𝑏𝑖(ℎ) is the value at time zero of receiving 1 unit of account 
at the 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ coupon date in the event default is between the (𝑖 − 1) − 𝑡ℎ and the 𝑖𝑡ℎ 
coupon date. Hence, we can obtain the at market default swap spread 𝑈(ℎ, 𝑡, 𝑓) by solving 
𝑉(ℎ, 𝑓, 𝑇, 𝑈) = 0 for 𝑈: 
𝑈(ℎ, 𝑡, 𝑓) =
𝐵(ℎ,𝑇)𝑓
𝐴(ℎ,𝑇)
    (4.6)  
The most crucial element in this CDS pricing formula is the risk-neutral hazard rate 
ℎ, 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑐ℎ  is the arrival rate of the credit event. In a risk-neutral world the hazard rate is 0.01, 
or 100 basis points in the case that a credit event occurs once every hundred years. Several 
approaches for obtaining this element have been taken.  
As a proxy for the risk-neutral probability of default ℎ, Hull and White (2000) use bond 
prices based on arbitrage arguments. There are several arguments for why we do not use this 
approach here. First of all, sovereign yield spreads reflect not only credit risk, but also other 
factors such as liquidity (risk), tax regulation, and so forth. Secondly, our objective is to find 
the fundamental default spread, and not just the “arbitrage-free” spread. Using input from the 
underlying sovereign bond market to do this rests on the assumptions that credit risk is 
appropriately priced in the bond market. This is a big leap of faith when there is much 
evidence showing that price discovery actually occurs in CDS markets (Blanco et al. 2005; 
Forte and Pena, 2009 and Palladini and Portes, 2011). Moreover, speculation about sovereign 
credit risk (which we conjecture has played a role in recent debt market turmoils) will be more 
apparent in the CDS market where there is a price (risk premium) paid to ensure against 
default (a credit event).  
Another way of obtaining the risk-neutral probability of default is by using the historical 
probability of default as a proxy. However, as Duffie and Singleton (2003) point out: 
"differences between actual and risk-neutral default probabilities reflect the risk premia 
required by market participants to take on the risk associated with default". The historical 
probability of default will therefore most likely underestimate the risk-neutral probability of 
default, which is needed for CDS pricing. More importantly, for our sample of European 
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countries there does not exist a very rich history of default in recent decades making this an 
inferior approach.  
The available approaches to obtaining risk-neutral probabilities of default do not seem 
to be appropriate for calculating fundamental default spreads. To overcome this problem, we 
develop a new approach that combines methods from the theoretical literature on CDS 
pricing with methods from empirical works through the following three key steps.  
First, the formulas for pricing CDS spreads (Eq. (4.1)-(4.6)), in combination with market 
data on CDS spreads, are used to back out the implied risk-neutral hazard rate ℎ (Duffie, 
1999). We do this for every week and each country in our sample. This yields a panel of 
‘market-based hazard rates’ ℎ𝑡 . 
Secondly, the panel of market-based hazard rates is regressed on a set of fundamental 
factors drawn from the country risk literature that are known to affect a country’s probability 
of default. These factors are further explained in Section 4.  
Thirdly, the predicted hazard rates resulting from regressing ℎ𝑡 on the set of 
fundamental variables, are then used in the original CDS pricing formula to back out the 
fundamental default spreads, i.e., a fitted spread based on purely fundamental factors29.  
4.4 Data and fundamental variables 
4.4.1 Data description 
Our sample consists of weekly data covering thirteen countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal and 
Spain) from January 2004 to April 2013. The selection of these countries is mainly based on 
data availability. First, we selected all European Union countries for which sovereign CDS 
spreads were available in our dataset from the beginning of 2004. We then discarded all 
countries for which one or more of the selected macroeconomic variables used to obtain the 
fundamental default spreads were not available for the full sample period. Our sample 
comprises 13 members of the European Union of which ten countries are also part of the 
                                                          
29 Note that it is impossible to include all possible fundamental variables in this analysis, so that our fundamental 
default spread should be viewed as the average default spread given a set of fundamentals that are commonly used in 
the current literature. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
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Eurozone (including the five ‘troubled’ periphery countries: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain) and three countries (Denmark, Hungary and Poland) are not.  
Following prior studies, we also restrict our sample to sovereign CDS spreads on 
contracts denominated in US dollars with a five-year maturity provided by the Markit group. 
The five year maturity segment is commonly used as it is deemed to be the most liquid of all 
tenors (see Longstaff et al., 2011, Fender et al., 2012 and Remolona et al., 2008a,b). The CDS 
spreads, being the annual payment made for having a long position in a CDS contract, are 
weekly averages expressed in basis points (bps). Descriptive statistics for the sovereign CDS 
spreads can be found in Table 4.1.  
4.4.2 Estimating the probability of default 
We first obtain estimates for a country’s probability of default as the input for our 
fundamental default spread calculation. The statistics of the estimated fundamental spreads 
are summarized in Table 4.2. To estimate the risk-neutral probability of default based on the 
implied hazard rates, we consider a comprehensive list of traditional default determinants 
from the empirical sovereign credit risk pricing literature. There exists an extensive literature 
investigating the relation between sovereign credit spreads and (macro) economic 
fundamentals, and there are many potential determinants. Hence, we consider explanatory 
variables that have featured in several recent papers, selected on the basis of relevance for our 
sample European countries. These include the comprehensive study of Longstaff et al. (2011), 
which accounts for a number of global, regional and country-specific factors; the work of 
Dieckman and Plank (2012), which specifically looks at default risk in developed countries, 
and Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010), who also predict probabilities of default with a number of 
fundamental factors. Guided by the current literature, we include the following fundamental 
variables that have been documented to have a significant impact on country CDS spreads 
and/or probabilities of default. 
 
  
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of market sovereign CDS  spreads 
                            
 
Austria Belgium Germany Denmark Spain Finland France Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Poland Portugal 
  2004-2013 
Mean 48.34 64.82 25.28 31.1 118.99 21.33 44.75 751.43 187.71 184.83 115.28 89.64 230.69 
Max 246.25 342.59 104.02 141.28 568.63 85.93 216.94 21681.29 644.71 1116.57 526.32 383.48 1473.75 
Min 1.44 1.88 1.44 1.17 2.25 1.17 1.47 4.57 9.51 1.65 5.7 7.59 3.78 
St.Dev. 56.11 80.95 27.21 37.59 146.1 22.26 55.6 2196.52 173.7 244.16 139.45 81.42 349.32 
 Skew 1.11 1.32 1.06 1.33 1.13 1.07 1.36 5.01 0.63 1.27 1.34 0.93 1.63 
 Kurt 3.41 3.76 3.14 3.6 3.18 3.17 3.92 34.8 2.15 3.44 3.79 3.14 4.5 
  2004-2007 
Mean 2.59 2.85 3.03 2.66 3.34 2.92 2.97 10.86 24.31 2.88 9.25 19.48 6.25 
Max 3.38 3.85 4.5 3.43 4.17 3.79 4.06 17.06 49.47 4.13 14.73 40.15 9.36 
Min 1.59 2.23 1.5 1.45 2.25 1.66 1.6 7.04 9.51 1.65 6.97 9.16 4.77 
St.Dev. 0.42 0.46 0.78 0.45 0.55 0.55 0.77 2.51 8.66 0.54 1.83 7.23 1.25 
 Skew -0.19 0.78 -0.33 -0.94 -0.42 -0.65 -0.08 0.43 0.66 -0.05 1.02 1.34 1.02 
 Kurt 2.71 2.23 1.99 3.78 1.71 2.73 1.55 1.94 2.74 1.89 3.17 3.71 3.01 
  2007-2013 
Mean 70.16 94.39 35.89 44.66 174.17 30.11 64.68 1176.15 265.65 271.64 165.87 123.1 337.76 
Max 246.25 342.59 104.02 141.28 568.63 85.93 216.94 21681.29 644.71 1116.57 526.32 383.48 1473.75 
Min 1.44 1.88 1.44 1.17 2.33 1.17 1.47 4.57 16.96 1.83 5.7 7.59 3.78 
St.Dev. 56.35 83.52 27.3 38.96 148.67 22.21 57.76 2665.57 160.33 254.45 144.23 79.37 380.55 
 Skew 0.65 0.86 0.58 0.87 0.64 0.62 0.89 3.95 0.11 0.77 0.88 0.49 1.1 
 Kurt 2.81 2.78 2.54 2.53 2.41 2.55 2.88 22.64 2.15 2.43 2.77 2.91 2.95 
  
  
 
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics of fundamental sovereign CDS spreads 
                            
 
Austria Belgium Germany Denmark Spain Finland France Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Poland Portugal 
  2004-2013 
Mean 43.62 60.16 42.76 25.15 55.14 32.49 45.27 619.96 143.28 97.18 138.43 59.4 129.54 
Max 158.37 170.88 120.11 77.01 257.74 89.81 122.13 3143.69 397.44 398.03 372 146.86 514.93 
Min 2.03 2.85 2.09 1.57 1.71 2.18 1.98 9.31 12.46 1.32 7.9 7.46 4.12 
St.Dev. 42.63 57.09 40.99 23.42 69.33 27.95 43.68 901.6 118.37 128.44 126.85 47.48 159.14 
 Skew 0.4 0.19 0.2 0.2 1.41 0.21 0.18 1.42 0.21 1.13 0.23 0.13 1.12 
 Kurt 1.79 1.29 1.3 1.32 4.18 1.39 1.24 3.51 1.36 2.71 1.32 1.23 2.81 
  2004-2007 
Mean 3.07 3.91 3.18 2.28 2.37 5.1 2.74 15.92 28.64 1.87 16.07 11.83 6.83 
Max 6.87 6.72 5.2 4.59 3.99 15.31 4.61 36.63 75.97 2.87 37.32 18.57 17.89 
Min 2.03 2.85 2.09 1.59 1.71 2.18 1.98 9.31 12.46 1.32 7.9 7.46 4.12 
St.Dev. 1.15 0.91 0.83 0.72 0.59 3.02 0.65 6.22 13.29 0.33 6.83 2.3 3.44 
 Skew 1.92 1.37 0.75 1.95 1.06 1.68 1.38 1.9 1.18 1.12 1.44 0.58 2.04 
 Kurt 5.66 3.93 2.44 5.86 3.21 5.15 4.2 5.72 3.93 3.87 4.41 2.82 6.2 
  2007-2013 
Mean 62.97 86.99 61.65 36.07 80.32 45.55 65.55 908.11 197.97 142.65 196.8 81.35 188.07 
Max 158.37 170.88 120.11 77.01 257.74 89.81 122.13 3143.69 397.44 398.03 372 146.86 514.93 
Min 2.21 2.98 2.19 1.57 2.03 2.6 2.18 12.14 19.75 1.4 14.52 7.55 5.51 
St.Dev. 39.04 50.82 37.11 20.99 71.68 24.92 39.28 971.59 106.49 134.05 114.83 42.02 163.7 
 Skew -0.3 -0.69 -0.67 -0.68 0.98 -0.62 -0.71 0.88 -0.64 0.58 -0.61 -0.76 0.6 
 Kurt 2.28 2.01 1.98 2.05 3.14 2.07 1.93 2.2 2.04 1.76 1.89 2.03 1.91 
  
  
 
Table 4.3: Variable descriptions 
            
Variable Description Source 
Original 
freq Calculation Conversion 
CDS CDS spreads (bps) Markit daily 
 
weekly average 
CCR Sovereign credit rating scores S&P/Moody's/Fitch daily ratings from 0 (default) to 20 (AAA or similar) end of week value 
debtgdp Debt/GDP ratio  Eurostat annual 
 
constant until new value 
totvol Terms of trade volatility  IMF-IFS annual export-PI/import-PI; historical vol past 5y constant until new value 
stmret Local stock market returns  MSCI daily log returns aggregate 
stmvol Local stock market return volatility MSCI daily 90d rolling window historical vol aggregate 
locfin Local financials index Datastream daily log returns end of week value 
dba Domestic bank assets ECB monthly log returns constant until new value 
The table gives an overview of the variables used for estimating the implied hazard rate in Equation 4.7 based on weekly data, and the conversion of those variables from 
daily, monthly, or annual frequency to weekly frequency.  
  
 
Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics of the fundamental variables 
                            
 
Austria Belgium Germany Denmark Spain Finland France Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Poland Portugal 
  CCR score 
Mean 19.95 18.73 20 20 18.54 20 19.94 12.05 12.71 17.67 16.66 14.11 15.7 
Max 20 19 20 20 20 20 20 16 14.67 20 18 14.33 18 
Min 19.67 17.67 19.83 20 11.17 19.83 19.33 0.67 9.67 11.67 13 13.67 9 
St.Dev. 0.11 0.44 0.02 0 2.55 0.02 0.16 5.17 1.7 3.27 1.4 0.31 3.32 
  Debt-to-GDP 
Mean 66.21 92.92 70.99 39.35 49.73 42.54 71.52 121.21 70.09 51.22 109.97 49.23 77.29 
Max 73.4 99.6 82.4 47.2 84.2 53 90.2 170.3 81.8 117.6 127 56.2 123.6 
Min 60.2 84 64.4 27.1 36.3 33.9 63.3 97.4 58.6 24.6 103.3 45 59.4 
St.Dev. 4.15 4.64 6.52 6.65 11.68 5.23 8.81 23.64 8.89 31.02 7.23 3.87 16.9 
  Stock market volatility 
Mean 0.0155 0.0119 0.0127 0.0117 0.014 0.0159 0.0128 0.0189 0.0175 0.0165 0.0133 0.0147 0.0107 
Max 0.0497 0.0381 0.0342 0.0361 0.0363 0.0347 0.0362 0.0394 0.0478 0.0539 0.0355 0.0321 0.0292 
Min 0.006 0.005 0.0059 0.0052 0.0056 0.007 0.0056 0.0071 0.0095 0.0059 0.0048 0.0067 0.0035 
St.Dev. 0.0088 0.0066 0.0059 0.0059 0.007 0.0062 0.0062 0.009 0.0075 0.0097 0.0072 0.0054 0.0054 
  Stock market returns 
Mean -0.0001 0.0003 0.0008 0.0021 -0.0001 -0.0005 0.0003 -0.003 0.0009 -0.0017 -0.0012 0.0008 -0.0006 
Max 0.1324 0.106 0.1093 0.1255 0.1221 0.1122 0.1096 0.1528 0.1656 0.1729 0.1161 0.1384 0.0821 
Min -0.2048 -0.2231 -0.1649 -0.1805 -0.1291 -0.1552 -0.15 -0.1931 -0.2388 -0.2017 -0.1498 -0.1715 -0.1873 
St.Dev. 0.0399 0.0313 0.03 0.0282 0.0327 0.0365 0.0283 0.0463 0.0436 0.0414 0.0323 0.0357 0.0284 
  
  
 
Table 4.4 continued 
                            
 
Austria Belgium Germany Denmark Spain Finland France Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Poland Portugal 
  Terms of trade volatility 
Mean 0.0124 0.011 0.0249 0.0155 0.0177 0.0456 0.023 0.0205 0.0134 0.0259 0.0834 0.0161 0.0233 
Max 0.0313 0.0168 0.0308 0.0241 0.0295 0.0636 0.0288 0.031 0.0205 0.0425 0.1323 0.0258 0.0327 
Min 0.0048 0.0059 0.0171 0.0112 0.0102 0.023 0.0164 0.0113 0.0045 0.0105 0.0391 0.0081 0.015 
St.Dev. 0.0089 0.0035 0.0043 0.0042 0.006 0.0138 0.0053 0.0047 0.0055 0.0101 0.0319 0.0075 0.0061 
  Local financials 
Mean 0.0002 -0.0012 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.001 0.0023 -0.0004 -0.0059 0.0008 -0.0072 -0.0021 0.0012 -0.0037 
Max 0.1385 0.1732 0.1105 0.1588 0.1673 0.1074 0.1439 0.3409 0.2585 0.6683 0.1372 0.2033 0.273 
Min -0.2187 -0.2128 -0.1618 -0.236 -0.1579 -0.1619 -0.1556 -0.255 -0.3355 -0.7454 -0.1466 -0.2489 -0.1825 
St.Dev. 0.0401 0.0408 0.0326 0.036 0.0395 0.0342 0.043 0.0637 0.0598 0.0973 0.0414 0.0396 0.0464 
  Domestic bank assets 
Mean 0.0044 0.0029 0.002 0.0071 0.0073 0.01 0.0057 0.006 0.0068 0.0039 0.006 0.0109 0.0043 
Max 0.0798 0.0481 0.1008 0.0963 0.0822 0.1062 0.0609 0.0674 0.0558 0.0552 0.0832 0.0684 0.0426 
Min -0.0387 -0.0707 -0.0269 -0.1163 -0.0209 -0.0802 -0.0439 -0.119 -0.0687 -0.0716 -0.0333 -0.0548 -0.0217 
St.Dev. 0.0131 0.0215 0.0139 0.0381 0.0126 0.0314 0.0188 0.0195 0.0209 0.0211 0.0144 0.0246 0.011 
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Comprehensive sovereign credit ratings (CCR). Sovereign credit ratings reported by credit 
rating agencies (CRAs) reflect how likely it is that a country will default on its liabilities. 
Although these rating agencies have to be prudent in up- or down-grading a country based on 
new information and therefore the ratings sometimes lag behind market views, sovereign 
rating changes and outlook guidance are well-known to be related to CDS spreads and 
government bond yields (Afonso et al., 2011, Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010). Hence, we use a 
comprehensive credit rating score (CCR) as in Gande and Parsley (2005) and Remolona et al. 
(2008b), where both sovereign credit ratings and outlooks/watches are converted to a 
numerical score, with 20 as the maximum score and 0 representing default, averaged over the 
three main CRAs (S&P, Moody’s and Fitch). 
Debt-to-GDP ratio. The value of a country’s outstanding debts relative to the size of its 
economy affects the ability of that country to repay these liabilities in the long term. In the 
long run, these liabilities have to be repaid or rolled over, so the higher the level of debt 
compared to the size of the economy, the larger the risk that a country cannot fulfil its debt 
requirements in time.  
Terms of trade volatility. A country’s terms of trade affects its ability to repay its debt in the 
future. However, as Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010) highlight, it is mainly the volatility of the 
terms of trade that matters, as it shows whether any (adverse) shocks may occur to reduce 
either a country’s ability or willingness to repay its debts. Higher terms of trade volatility are  
therefore likely to increase the probability of default. 
Local stock market return volatility. Higher stock market volatility indicates higher (financial 
market) uncertainty and therefore increases the probability of default. It also partly covers 
other relevant forms of uncertainty that are hard to measure and quantify, such as political 
uncertainty. 
Local stock market returns. The stock market is generally seen as a good representation and 
prediction of the overall state of the economy. Positive returns indicate a prosperous economy 
and thus a greater ability for sovereign obligors to repay debts, and as such stock market 
returns are expected to have a negative impact on the probability of sovereign default. 
Change in domestic bank assets. The effect of growth of domestic bank assets is not 
straightforward. Before the crisis, a growing domestic banking sector was considered a good 
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thing. A positive change in domestic bank assets was a sign of prosperous growth, and 
therefore this decreases a country’s probability of default. However, during the crisis it 
became strikingly apparent that in bad times a large banking sector could transfer greater risks 
to the public sector. If banks in trouble need to be bailed out by governments, this puts a lot 
of pressure on the government’s ability to pay for its liabilities and therefore increases its 
probability of default. We therefore expect a negative effect of changes in domestic bank 
assets on the probability of default before the start of the recent crisis period, and a positive 
effect thereafter.  
Local financial index. Returns of the local financial index give a good representation of the 
state of the local financial sector. The reasons that the health of the financial sector matters 
for a country’s ability to repay its debt(s) are similar to the ones mentioned for stock returns 
and domestic bank assets. On the one hand, it’s an indication of the growth and state of the 
economy. On the other hand, a growing financial sector could cause problems for countries 
when they need to support them in times of (financial) turmoil. 
Further details on these variables and descriptive statistics can be found in Tables 4.3 
and 4.4 respectively. Note that we are obtaining fundamentals based default spreads, and 
therefore do not include measures for global risk aversion, suggested by Ang and Longstaff 
(2013), Fender et al. (2012) and Longstaff et al. (2011), at this stage of our analysis. We do 
however, control for global risk aversion in our subsequent estimation of the heterogeneous 
agent model. We also do not incorporate CDS spreads of other countries. An implication 
hereof is that we cannot attribute the difference between the fundamental and market spread 
soley to market speculation based on momentum trading activities. It is more likely to be a 
combination of a time-varying risk premium, omitted risks such as counterparty risk and 
contagion, as well as speculation. By estimating the model we can show that part of it is 
indeed caused by momentum. The first step of our analysis is to regress the implied hazard 
rates on the factors that affect the probability of default of a country and to predict fitted 
hazard rates based on that regression. We do this by estimating a panel regression with fixed 
effects. Because the dependent variable ℎ𝑖,𝑡 is a probability bounded between 0 and 1, we 
perform a logit transformation before regressing it on the explanatory variables: 
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𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(ℎ𝑖,𝑡) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
ℎ𝑖,𝑡
1−ℎ𝑖,𝑡
) = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑋𝐵 + 𝜀𝑡,𝑖    (4.7)  
Here the matrix X contains all country specific explanatory variables as mentioned 
above, as well as those variables that interact with a crisis dummy, which takes on a value of 0 
up until the Lehman collapse on 15 September 2008 and 1 thereafter.30 ℎ𝑖,𝑡 is the implied 
hazard rate for country i at time t. 𝑎𝑖,𝑡 is a constant capturing country differences (country 
fixed effects), and 𝐵 is a vector of coefficients.  
4.4.3 Panel regression 
The first step of our analysis is to regress the implied hazard rates on the factors that 
affect the probability of default of a country and predict fitted hazard rates based on the 
regression. We do this by estimating a panel regression with fixed country effects. 
The results of estimating equation (4.7) are displayed in Table 4.5. We ran two different 
specifications of this regression, with seven and six explanatory variables respectively that are 
also interacted with a crisis dummy that assumes a value of 1 in all the weeks following the 
Lehman collapse on 15 September 2008 and zero otherwise. Under specification (A) in 
column two, out of seven explanatory variables, six have a significant impact on the risk-
neutral probability of default. The signs are as expected. The comprehensive credit rating 
(CCR) score has a significantly negative impact on hazard rates, meaning that higher credit 
rating scores lower the probability of default. Interestingly, the effect of credit ratings is 
dampened during the crisis period. This is in line with the deteriorating faith of investors in 
credit rating agencies after they collectively failed to accurately rate securitized products and 
banks before the crisis. As expected, both an increase in debt-to-GDP ratio and an increase in 
terms of trade volatility increase a country’s probability of default, and this effect becomes 
stronger during the crisis in case of the debt-to-GDP ratio. Stock market return volatility also 
increases a country’s probability of default, but its impact is lower during the crisis, therefore 
the negative sign for this variable is in line with our expectations. However, because of the 
                                                          
30 While the European Debt Crisis started at the end of 2009, we define our extended period of global debt market 
turmoil (i.e. crisis period) from Lehman Brother’s collapse in 2008 as a large part of the stress in European debt 
markets emanated from the banking sector’s exposures to U.S. mortgage backed securities. This has consequently 
increased sovereign credit risk as large public sector bailouts have ensued in some European countries. 
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positive sign for its interaction with the crisis dummy and the size of the coefficient being 
almost the same as before the crisis, we can say that during the crisis sample, stock market 
returns had negligible effects on a European sovereign’s probability of default. Consistent 
with our expectations, a growing domestic banking sector was considered a good thing before 
the crisis as confirmed by the significant negative relationship with default risk. However, after 
the Lehman collapse and events following, it becomes clear that a large banking sector can put 
a lot of pressure on an economy if banks systematically get in trouble. We therefore see a 
positive sign for changes in domestic bank assets during the crisis period: a larger banking 
sector increased sovereign credit risk. 
 
Table 4.5: Results implied hazard rate estimation 
                
 
(A)   t-stat   (B)   t-stat 
constant -3.4344 *** -17.15 
 
-3.4304 *** -17.14 
CCR -0.283 *** -35.77 
 
-0.2832 *** -35.8 
   *crisis dummy 0.1646 *** 62.87 
 
0.1647 *** 62.88 
Debt-to-GDP 0.0057 *** 4.79 
 
0.0057 *** 4.79 
   *crisis dummy 0.008 *** 14.03 
 
0.008 *** 14.01 
Stock market  vol 121.7142 *** 46.16 
 
121.6711 *** 46.16 
   *crisis dummy -96.9312 *** -34.33 
 
-96.8762 *** -34.32 
Stock market returns -2.767 *** -3.84 
 
-2.1469 *** -6.09 
   *crisis dummy 2.8967 *** 3.58 
 
1.8175 *** 4.3 
Terms of trade vol 2.4719 *** 3.77 
 
2.4911 *** 3.79 
   *crisis dummy 1.1531   1.29 
 
1.1499   1.28 
Domestic bank assets -1.5357 *** -2.88 
 
-1.5332 *** -2.88 
   *crisis dummy 2.6635 *** 3.9 
 
2.6588 *** 3.89 
Local financials 0.6166   0.99 
  
  
    *crisis dummy -1.0082   -1.5 
  
  
 Adjusted R-sq (within) 0.90065       0.90063     
The implied hazard rate estimation of Equation 4.7 by means of a fixed effects panel data method. Specification (1) in 
column 2 uses all selected variables and specification (2) in column 4 drops ‘local financial’ as it is not significant for 
the full sample period. T-statistics are shown in grey in the third column. ***, **, and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05 and 
p<0.1 respectively. 
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To predict fitted hazard rates we ultimately dropped local financials index (locfin) as it 
was not significant for the full sample period. This led us to use specification (B) in column 
four of Table 4.5 for predicted hazard rates to obtain the estimates on fundamental default 
spreads.    
4.4.4 Market versus fundamental spreads  
In Figure 4.2 the market and fundamental spreads are plotted together. By first 
observation, it looks as if some of the spikes of the CDS spreads are driven by movements in 
the underlying fundamentals. However, there are large misalignments between the market and 
the fundamental default spreads, which suggests that either non-fundamental trading (such as 
momentum) or increasing global risk aversion (and thus a higher risk premium demanded for 
bearing volatility risk) may have played an important role. Some countries, such as Germany, 
Finland, and France, have a lower market spread than their fundamentals would predict until 
end of 2010. This might be explained by the increasing demand for these bonds and thereby 
decreasing bond yields and CDS spreads in these countries. The CDS spreads of periphery 
countries show that the countries cannot just be grouped together. The credit risk of some 
countries, such as Ireland, Portugal and Spain, has been heavily overpriced compared to their 
fundamentals in recent years. These countries have suffered from both deteriorating 
fundamentals as well as an overreaction to that. Investors seem to have been too pessimistic 
about the state of those economies and their ability to repay their liabilities. From 2011 
onwards there is a clear downward trend in the sovereign CDS spreads of these countries and 
CDS spreads reverted to more reasonable levels, at least for Spain and Portugal. For other 
countries, such as Italy, credit risk was not priced high enough for most of the crisis period. 
This is a strong sign that for some of the countries the rising spreads are a result of 
deteriorating fundamentals rather than excessive pessimism or speculation. In 2011, when 
most countries entered a more tranquil state, investors finally started to pick up on Italy’s true 
credit risk and the market spread even overshot the fundamental levels until mid 2012, when 
the CDS spread dropped below its fundamental default spread again.  
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4.5 Model 
Following the literature on heterogeneous agent models (for overview articles, see 
Hommes 2006; Chiarella et al. 2009a and Lux 2009), we develop a model for the pricing of 
CDS spreads based on heterogeneous expectations. Traditionally two types of agents are 
modelled, fundamentalists and chartists (labeled as momentum investors in this chapter). The 
assumption of two types of agents is mainly for convenience of discussion and this approach 
has been widely used in the heterogeneous agent model literature. As it would be difficult (and 
perhaps unrealistic) to identify whether an investor is a fundamentalist or a momentum 
investor , it is more likely that the expectation of an investor is a weighted average of beliefs 
on market fundamentals and momentum. In aggregation, the expectation of the market 
becomes a weighted average of the two beliefs. The weighting on the two components in 
market aggregate belief can be constant or time-varying, depending on the relative 
performance of the two beliefs.   
The heterogeneous agent paradigm can be merged with more traditional credit pricing 
theories as follows. Fundamental expectations of future sovereign CDS spread movements are 
based on the state of the country’s fundamentals and the ability of the market to price this. 
The fundamental rule therefore depends on the deviation between the market spread and the 
fundamental default spread.  
 Momentum expectations are formed based on the belief of persistency in  trends (or 
trend reversals) in credit risk. That is, the momentum rule dictates extrapolation of past 
movements of CDS spreads into the future in order to form expectations about future CDS 
spread movements. This can be explained in different ways. It might be considered a form of 
naïve expectations, a decision for a costless rule, herding behavior, or a result of believing that 
the market generally underreacts (overreacts) to news, causing positive (negative) serial 
correlation and momentum (or contrarian) behavior (Barberis et al., 1998). 
On top of these fundamental and momentum expectations, CDS spreads are driven by 
an extra premium, often referred to as the ‘credit risk premium’. The credit risk premium 
depends on the time-varying willingness of investors to be exposed to the variability in CDS 
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spreads and thus the price they require to bear the volatility risk in sovereign CDS markets31. 
In other words, the credit risk premium captures investors’ average risk appetite.  
The expectation of each investor is a weighted average of fundamental and momentum 
expectations. Investors are boundedly rational in the sense that they evaluate both expectation 
formation rules each period based on their past performance and attach more weight to a rule 
if it sufficiently outperforms the other rule. This means that the weights of each investors to 
the two expectations can be different from period to period. In aggregation, the  weighting 
mechanism of the market follows the discrete choice model of Brock and Hommes (1997, 
1998). It defines the probabilities of the two beliefs in market aggregation, which makes the 
changing weights of the two types of agents in the market a smooth rather than a random, 
process. When there are clear trends in CDS spreads, investors gradually  assign more weight 
to the momentum expectation. Because expectations are self-fulfilling, this amplifies the 
momentum effect. An external shock might raise awareness about the importance of market 
fundamentals and might reverse investors’ beliefs. Note that these dynamics can lead to both 
under- and overvaluation of sovereign credit risk.  
To summarize, changes, ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡+1 in CDS spreads between period 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1 are 
driven by changes in credit risk premium, ∆𝑅𝑃𝑡 , and a weighted average of the (net) 
fundamental and momentum demands 𝐷𝑡
𝑚 and 𝐷𝑡
𝑓
, respectively,: 
∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡+1 = ∆𝑅𝑃𝑡 + 𝑊𝑡  𝐷𝑡
𝑚 + (1 − 𝑊𝑡) 𝐷𝑡
𝑓   (4.8) 
Here, 𝑊𝑡 is the market weight assigned to momentum expectations.  
We now focus on the momentum and fundamental demand functions. The momentum 
demand 𝐷𝑡
𝑚 for CDS contracts in period 𝑡 can be represented in the following way: 
𝐷𝑡
𝑚 = 𝑎𝑚(𝐸𝑡
𝑚[𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡+1] − 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡)   (4.9) 
which is related to the expected change in the price of CDS contracts in the following 
period through a^m.   
                                                          
31 An anonymous referee rightfully referred to this as “the price of fear and greed”. 
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Figure 4.2 The sovereign CDS spreads and fundamental spreads for all countries in our sample ex Greece. Note that the scaling of the graphs is equal to facilitate 
comparison.   
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The demand is positively related to the expected price,𝐸𝑡
𝑚[𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡+1], which depends on 
the current price 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡  and a price trend  over the past 𝑘 periods 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡−𝑘 : 
𝐸𝑡
𝑚[𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡+1] = 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚(𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡 − 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡−𝑘)   (4.10) 
 A positive (negative) coefficient of  𝛽𝑚 is expected for momentum (reversion). The 
expectation  is formed by extrapolating past movements of CDS spreads in the future.. As 
outlined before, there are several explanations for such behavior, such as herding or a belief in 
market underreaction (overreaction) to news. The momentum trading rule is of the same form 
as found for individual forecasting behaviour in laboratory learning-to-forecast experiments in 
Hommes et al. (2005) and Heemeijer et al. (2009).  
Like the momentum demand, the fundamental demand is a positive function of the 
expected future price change: 
𝐷𝑡
𝑓
= 𝑎𝑓(𝐸𝑡
𝑓[𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡+1] − 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡)   (4.11) 
However, the expectation of the future price 𝐸𝑡
𝑓[𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡+1] follows  
𝐸𝑡
𝑓[𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡+1] = 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽𝑓(𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ − 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡)   (4.12) 
Here 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  is the fundamental default spread based on the estimated risk-neutral 
probability of default as in Section 3. Equation (4.10) shows that   if the current CDS spread 
𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡  deviates from the fundamental default spread, the future CDS spread is expected to 
move towards the fundamental default spread in the next period. We therefore expect a 
positive sign for 𝛽𝑓. 
The weights of the fundamental and momentum components in market belief can be 
either constant or time-varying. As we indicated previously, the time-varying weights are 
modelled and interpreted by the following switching mechanism Following Brock and 
Hommes (1997, 1998), the functional form of the switching is a multinomial logit rule. The 
population weight in the market depends on the relative forecasting accuracy 𝜋𝑡
ℎ (for h=m, f) 
of the respective forecasting rules: 
4.5 Model 93 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑡 = [1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝛾 [
𝜋𝑡
𝑚−𝜋𝑡
𝑓
𝜋𝑡
𝑚+𝜋𝑡
𝑓])]
−1
   (4.13) 
where 𝑊𝑡 is the fraction of the momentum component in the market (and thus [1 −
𝑊𝑡] is the fraction of the fundamental component in the market). The forecasting error is 
measured as the mean squared error (MSE) of each rule over the past 𝐽 periods: 
𝜋𝑡
𝑚 = ∑ [(𝐸𝑡−𝑗
𝑚 [𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡−𝑗+1] − 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡−𝑗) − ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡−𝑗+1]
2𝐽
𝑗=1   (4.14) 
𝜋𝑡
𝑓
= ∑ [(𝐸𝑡−𝑗
𝑓
[𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡−𝑗+1] − 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡−𝑗) − ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡−𝑗+1]
2𝐽
𝑗=1   (4.15) 
Following Ter Ellen and Zwinkels (2010), equation (4.11) differs slightly from the 
weighting mechanism originally proposed by Brock and Hommes (1997). Instead of using the 
absolute difference in forecasting accuracy of the two rules 𝜋𝑡
𝑚 − 𝜋𝑡
𝑓
, we calculate weights by 
using the relative forecasting (in)accuracy (
𝜋𝑡
𝑚−𝜋𝑡
𝑓
𝜋𝑡
𝑚+𝜋𝑡
𝑓). Ter Ellen and Zwinkels (2010) argue that 
this method has the advantages of ease of estimation and comparability between different 
markets, which are useful in the current study to compare the results for the different 
European countries. The coefficient 𝛾 is called the intensity of choice and represents the 
investors’ speed of switching32. If 𝛾 = 0, investors  do not adapt the importance given to the 
two rules and 𝑊𝑡 = 0.5. The other extreme is when 𝛾 = ∞ where investors are perfectly 
adaptive and immediately adjust all weight to the rule with the smallest forecast error. A small 
positive 𝛾 can be an indication of status quo bias, introduced by Kahneman et al. (1982). If 
investors suffer from this bias, they are reluctant to change their status quo belief, which 
results in slower updating of beliefs. 
On top of these dynamics, CDS spreads are driven by an extra premium, often referred 
to as the ‘credit risk premium’. As described earlier, the credit risk premium depends on the 
time-varying level of (global) risk aversion. Risk aversion is not directly measurable, but can be 
                                                          
32 Or, in essence, the flexibility of an investor to change weights on the two respective trading rules. 
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proxied by the variance risk premium, the difference between option implied volatility and 
realized volatility33: 
∆𝑅𝑃𝑡 = 𝛽𝑟𝑝∆𝑉𝑅𝑃𝑡    (4.16) 
Integrating equations (4.9)-(4.16) above to equation (4.8) and rewriting gives us the 
following set of equations to be estimated: 
𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡+1 − 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝑟𝑝∆𝑉𝑅𝑃𝑡 + 𝑊𝑡(𝛽𝑐(𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡 − 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡−𝑘))    
+(1 − 𝑊𝑡)(𝛽𝑓(𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ − 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡)) + 𝜀𝑡    (4.17a) 
𝑊𝑡 = [1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝛾 [
𝜋𝑡
𝐶−𝜋𝑡
𝐹
𝜋𝑡
𝐶+𝜋𝑡
𝐹])]
−1
    (4.17b) 
𝜋𝑡
𝐶 = ∑ [(𝛽𝑐(𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡−𝑚 − 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡−𝑘−𝑚)) − ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡−𝑚+1]
2𝑀
𝑚=1   (4.17c)    
𝜋𝑡
𝐹 = ∑ [(𝛽𝑓(𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡−𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡−𝑚)) − ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡−𝑚+1]
2𝑀
𝑚=1   (4.17d) 
A constant  𝑎 is included for estimation purposes, but theoretically it is expected to be 
zero. We estimate the model using quasi-maximum likelihood. To illustrate the explanatory 
power, we set the lag for momentum expectation at 𝑘 = 1 and the lag for switching at 𝐽 =
4.34  
4.6 Results 
We estimate the model with weights for both groups fixed to 𝑊𝑡 = 0.5, for which 
results are shown in Section 6.1, and with time-varying weights as specified in equation (4.17) 
in Section 6.2. This allows us to evaluate whether dynamic switching between a momentum 
and fundamental strategy has had an additional impact on European sovereign CDS spreads. 
                                                          
33 We followed the VRP calculation of Bekaert and Hoerova (2013) based on the S&P 500 index in order to 
account for the influence of global risk aversion (specifically the risk premium demanded for bearing volatility risk) in 
driving sovereign CDS spread movements. 
34 The price trend can be calculated by the lagged price, which is the simplest case or a weighted moving average 
with finite or infinite memory more generally, see Chiarella and He (2003a) and He and Li (2007). A Similar 
calculation applies to the forecasting error. To simplify the estimation, we use the lagged price of the previous week as 
the price trend and the last four weeks to calculate the forecasting error in this paper. Note that our results are robust 
to specifications for 𝑘 = 1 to 𝑘 = 4 and for 𝐽 = 1 to 𝐽 = 4. Results are available upon request. 
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We focus our analysis on the post-crisis period only from 2007 to 2013 as there was very little 
spread variation for European sovereign prior to this.35  
4.6.1 Equal weights 
Table 4.6 shows the results from estimating Equation (4.17) with fixed equal weights for 
the weighted fundamental and momentum expectations in sovereign CDS markets over the 
‘(post-)crisis period’ from 2007-2013. In this sub-sample period, CDS spreads are much more 
volatile and thus can be better explained by our model than in the pre-crisis sample. After 
controlling for the credit risk premium, we can see that in all thirteen countries, investors in 
each country extrapolate past trends in CDS spreads. The coefficients are all positive and 
significant, meaning momentum trading takes place. If there was a positive (negative) trend in 
the previous period, agents expect this trend to continue into the next period. Note that the 
coefficients are all between 0 and 1, so for none of the countries momentum expectations are 
‘explosive’. It is interesting to note that the range for the size of the momentum coefficients is 
roughly between 0.3 and 0.6, which is aligned with the laboratory-based learning-to-forecast 
experimental results in Hommes et al. (2005) and Heemeijer et al. (2009). In the 2-period 
ahead forecasting experiments in Hommes et al. (2005) the momentum or trend-extrapolating 
coefficients range from 0.4 to 1.3, while in the one-period ahead forecasting experiments of 
Heemeijer et al. (2009) (based on a similar price adjustment rule as Eq. (4.9) in the current 
chapter) the coefficients range from about 0.3 to 1. 
  
                                                          
35 The 2004-2007 sub-sample results are available upon request. 
  
 
Table 4.6: Results heterogeneity (equal weights for momentum and fundamentals) 
                            
 
Const.   z-score Mom.   z-score Fund.   z-score VRP   z-score loglik 
Austria 0.0035   0.64 0.5708 *** 8.02 0.1027 *** 4.48 0.1542 *** 7.18 320.74 
Belgium 0.006   1.13 0.4642 *** 6.46 0.0401 *** 2.66 0.1366 *** 6.34 332.47 
Germany -0.01   -1.3 0.5209 *** 8.29 0.064 *** 3.27 0.1541 *** 6.85 327.48 
Denmark 0.0072   1.44 0.5885 *** 7.7 0.0461 ** 2.17 0.1451 *** 7.76 339.38 
Spain 0.0176 ** 2.13 0.2936 *** 3.34 0.0147   0.78 0.1264 *** 7.45 346.54 
Finland -0.0142   -1.64 0.5062 *** 7.42 0.0778 *** 3.26 0.1323 *** 7.63 354.01 
France 0.005   0.93 0.4608 *** 6.66 0.0492 *** 3.05 0.1492 *** 7.64 341.65 
Greece 0.0212 *** 3.33 0.6011 *** 6.29 -0.004   -0.24 0.1052 *** 3.94 243.09 
Hungary 0.0119 ** 1.96 0.4399 *** 7.97 0.0383   1.54 0.1944 *** 12.15 354.49 
Ireland 0.0121   1.51 0.5555 *** 6.73 0.0069   0.42 0.1225 *** 6.79 338.68 
Italy 0.0038   0.62 0.3904 *** 4.95 0.0264   1.44 0.1651 *** 8.83 346.56 
Poland 0.0162 ** 2.17 0.4144 *** 5.66 0.0654 *** 2.58 0.2028 *** 11.51 334.73 
Portugal 0.0131 *** 2.51 0.4644 *** 5.36 0.0233   1.53 0.1289 *** 7.53 331.3 
Estimates of the chartists and fundamentalists in Equation 4.16 with equal weights using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). Z-scores are shown in grey in the third 
column. ***, **, and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.1 respectively.  
  
 
Table 4.7: Results heterogeneity (time-varying weights for momentum and fundamentals) 
                                      
 
Const.   z-score Mom.   z-score Fund.   z-score VRP   z-score Sw. int.   z-score loglik 2dLL   
Austria 0.005   0.95 0.3818 *** 5.21 0.2198 *** 9.02 0.1485 *** 7.32 2.8423 *** 3.7 331.18 20.89 *** 
Belgium 0.0053   1.03 0.5674 *** 8.37 0.0262 *** 3.18 0.1355 *** 6.62 -6.841 *** -2.54 336.23 7.52 *** 
Germany -0.0069   -1.06 0.291 *** 3.94 0.1017 *** 5 0.1524 *** 6.8 3.4206 ** 2.14 328.72 2.47   
Denmark 0.0069   1.39 0.5421 *** 6.1 0.0565 ** 2.17 0.1438 *** 7.46 0.9137   0.57 339.51 0.25   
Spain 0.0262 *** 3.06 0.1943 *** 2.63 0.0754 ** 2.04 0.1203 *** 6.98 3.1591 * 1.71 348.25 3.41 * 
Finland -0.0165 ** -1.97 0.3484 *** 4.85 0.1349 *** 3.97 0.1357 *** 8.24 1.5894 *** 2.64 355.78 3.54 * 
France 0.0041   0.79 0.2731 *** 3.7 0.1113 *** 5.73 0.1458 *** 7.43 3.582 *** 2.43 345.42 7.53 *** 
Greece 0.0207 *** 3.25 0.6282 *** 5.93 0.001   0.06 0.1055 *** 3.96 -0.7389   -0.43 243.15 0.12   
Hungary 0.0098 * 1.72 0.5275 *** 10.06 0.0197   1.48 0.1969 *** 12.52 -4.4319 *** -2.71 356.44 3.9 ** 
Ireland 0.0094   1.47 0.6536 *** 9.33 -0.0012   -0.15 0.1256 *** 6.85 -6.7803 * -1.88 343.18 9 *** 
Italy 0.0013   0.23 0.2702 *** 3.5 0.0839 *** 4.41 0.1609 *** 8.56 5.6586   1.54 350.41 7.7 *** 
Poland 0.0218 *** 3.18 0.3024 *** 5.06 0.2392 *** 4.07 0.1917 *** 10.6 2.7074 *** 4.47 336.75 4.04 ** 
Portugal 0.013 *** 2.51 0.5527 *** 6.04 0.014   1.32 0.134 *** 7.98 -3.7198 * -1.76 332.52 2.44   
The estimates of momentum and fundamentals 2007-2013 (time-varying weights). Z-scores are shown in grey. ***, **, and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.1 respectively.  
  
 
Table 4.8: Descriptive statistics of the estimated weights 
                            
 
Austria Belgium Germany Denmark Spain Finland France Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Poland Portugal 
Mean 0.5711 0.5083 0.6495 0.5101 0.6648 0.5948 0.6151 0.4915 0.5035 0.5569 0.6308 0.6911 0.5109 
Max 0.9448 0.9959 0.9678 0.7138 0.9563 0.8298 0.9725 0.6615 0.9754 0.9986 0.996 0.9355 0.9262 
Min 0.0582 0.0016 0.0944 0.3157 0.0657 0.1897 0.0473 0.3491 0.0604 0.0038 0.0073 0.1117 0.0616 
St.Dev. 0.2495 0.2747 0.2391 0.07 0.2129 0.1609 0.2534 0.0522 0.2329 0.2986 0.3035 0.2163 0.1996 
 Skew 0.0583 -0.1328 -0.4414 0.275 -0.6109 -0.3847 -0.1442 -0.2185 -0.0653 -0.3029 -0.3195 -0.7986 -0.2057 
 Kurt 1.6862 1.8863 1.9338 3.0947 2.4706 2.2096 1.7795 3.1675 1.9513 1.7415 1.704 2.3763 2.3414 
Gamma 2.8423 -6.841 3.4206 0.9137 3.1591 1.5894 3.582 -0.7389 -4.4319 -6.7803 5.6586 2.7074 -3.7198 
The descriptive statistics for the weights series obtained from estimating Equation (16). Note that the weights displayed represent the proportion of chartists in the market. 
The proportion of fundamentalists can be obtained by subtracting the chartist weight from one.  
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For seven out of thirteen countries, investors rely on the country’s fundamentals. The 
positive sign for the fundamental component is consistent with the model assumption, 
indicating that when there is a misalignment between the market spread and the fundamental 
default spread agents follow a fundamental strategy and expect the spread to revert back to its 
fundamental spread. In this way they act as a stabilizing force in the market.36 We can estimate 
the speed of reversion, in number of weeks, by calculating the ratio of one over the 
coefficient. If the beta coefficient for fundamentalists equals one, they expect the full 
misalignment to be reversed in the coming week. Strikingly, we reveal that the five countries 
without any significant presence of stabilizing fundamentalists are the peripheral countries that 
were in most trouble during the recent European sovereign debt crisis: Greece, Italy, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain (with the sixth country Hungary as an exception). This suggests that the 
more extreme and volatile CDS spreads in these countries are attributable to momentum 
trading behavior rather than bad fundamentals.   
4.6.2 Time-varying impact 
The results of estimating equation (4.17) when investors change their weights to the two 
demand components based on the relative forecasting accuracy can be found in Table 4.7. 
The coefficients of the momentum component of all sovereign CDS markets are significant, 
suggesting momentum behavior in all the CDS markets.  Whereas we would expect to see the 
largest momentum trading to occur in the peripheral countries, as it is sometimes claimed that 
they are most subjected to speculative attacks, this is not a pattern we can detect. Although 
the coefficients have changed slightly compared to the fixed-weights model, they are still well 
below one. In other words, we find no evidence that momentum trading in the peripheral or 
any other European sovereign CDS markets caused explosive CDS spread movements by 
chasing trends. 
In recent laboratory experiments, Hommes (2011) and Anufriev and Hommes (2012) fit 
switching models with trend-following versus adaptive expectations (similar to the 
fundamentalists in the current chapter). Our results are remarkably consistent with the trend-
following behavior observed in these laboratory experiments. The European CDS markets in 
                                                          
36 The estimated fundamental coefficients are very small, less than 0.20, meaning that the fundamental expectations 
are close to naïve expectations. 
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2007-2013 have been characterized by clear phases of strong momentum that are well 
described by (temporary) coordination on simple momentum strategies.37 
Nonetheless, fundamentals remained largely absent from the peripheral countries and 
momentum was the primary force driving their CDS movements during the crisis period.  For 
the majority of (nine out of thirteen) markets investors are using a fundamental strategy in 
which they expect the market price misalignment from the fundamental default spread to 
decrease in the next period. Out of the five ‘troubled’ countries for which we could not see 
any impact of fundamental in the model with fixed weights, two countries, Spain and Italy, 
now show a positive and significant sign. In these markets, even though the market price of 
CDS contracts exceeds the levels warranted by fundamentals, there are some periodic 
movements towards the fundamental value.38 
There are two channels that can lead to misaligned and more volatile CDS spreads. One 
is the strong dominance of momentum trading in the market, which is characterized by an 
insignificant switching intensity (γ), together with a significant coefficient for the momentum 
component and an insignificant coefficient for the fundamental component, which is clearly 
the case for Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. For Italy, the coefficient for the fundamental 
component is significant, but small; so with the insignificant switching coefficient we can also 
conclude that it is dominated by momentum trading. Another channel is the rational routes to 
randomness, developed in Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998) and characterized by significant 
switching among active strategies. This is illustrated by significant and positive coefficients of 
the fundamental and momentum components and the switching intensity. This is clearly the 
case for Spain, together with Austria, France, Hungary and Poland. On one hand, the 
fundamentals “work” in these countries; on the other hand, influenced by other EU countries, 
the speculative view taken on other countries has also spread to these countries. Overall, the 
                                                          
37 We would like to thank the referee for pointing out the consistency between our empirical findings and 
laboratory experiment results, as well as the references. We have added the references and some related discussion in 
Sections 5 and 6. 
38 Based on the estimation, Belgium and Ireland have a significant negative switching intensity.  Note that the 
estimated fundamental coefficients for the two countries are the smallest, 0.03 and 0.0023 respectively; while the 
estimated momentum coefficients, 0.58 and 0.65 respectively, are almost the largest among all countries. This implies 
that the fundamental expectation is reduced to a naïve expectation and the two markets are dominated by momentum 
trading. Hence, if the switching intensity were positive, the dominance of momentum trading would lead to explosive 
behavior. This could help to explain the negative switching intensity for the two countries.  It may also be due to the 
limitation of the stylized model. 
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results reflect some realistic features on what has been occurring in these countries’ sovereign 
credit markets.  
To ascertain whether the model with time-varying weights performs better than the 
model with fixed weights, we compare the two models based on a likelihood ratio (LR) test. 
In such a way we can conclude whether the model with time-varying weights significantly 
outperforms the fixed weights model on the basis of their log likelihoods. The LR results can 
be found in the last column of Table 4.739. The model with time-varying weights outperforms 
the fixed-weights model in seven out of thirteen cases. We can therefore say that in most EU 
countries investors have heterogeneous expectations and change the weights to different 
components over the time depending on the relative past performance of the respective 
components. 
4.6.3 Time-varying weights  
In order to gain more insight into the time-varying weights of momentum and 
fundamental expectations in European sovereign CDS markets, we include the descriptive 
statistics for the momentum weights in the market in Table 4.8. We can see that countries 
with a higher γ coefficient in equation (4.17) have a larger standard deviation in weights. They 
are more sensitive to changes in relative performance and therefore investors change their 
weights more often leading to more volatile weights. 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the effect of a time-varying impact of momentum and 
fundamentals for four selected countries. It provides some intuition on the dynamics of the 
model. It displays the weight series for the momentum component over time, so a higher 
value corresponds to more momentum trading in the market and a lower value corresponds to 
more fundamental trading. It is observed that a higher weight of fundamentals generally 
coincides with the sovereign CDS spread moving closer to its fundamental default spread. 
When this trend is picked up by the momentum trading in the market, the weight of the 
momentum component increases. As momentum becomes relatively more dominant in the 
market, the CDS spread subsequently overshoots. This pattern repeats multiple times over the 
                                                          
39 A likelihood ratio test involves comparing the differences in the log likelihood statistics between two nested 
models and evaluating whether this difference is significantly different from zero. The numbers in the 2dLL column 
are the result of multiplying the difference between the log likelihood of the static and the dynamic model.  
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full sample period studied and is most evident for the countries with a significant switching 
coefficient. 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter addresses the important question of whether the recent movements in 
European sovereign credit spreads are driven by weakened fundamentals or momentum 
trading behavior. In order to do this, a fundamental default spread is first calculated by means 
of regressing past hazard rates on a set of sovereign default determinants and using the 
resulting fitted values. Furthermore, to better explain the dynamics of sovereign CDS spread 
movements, a heterogeneous agent model with two key types of expectation formation rules 
and time-varying weights is estimated using market spreads and fundamentals-based spreads.  
The estimation of our heterogeneous agent model reveals that in most European 
sovereign CDS markets both fundamental and momentum expectations played a role. In 
peripheral countries fundamental expectations were dominated by momentum throughout the 
crisis period contributing to the observed higher spreads. Momentum trading exerted a 
destabilizing effect on the market by prolonging price trends. In some cases, fundamental 
expectations pulled the market spreads back to their fundamental-based level, thereby 
stabilizing CDS spreads. The change in the market weights of these two expectations 
coincided with larger market movements and both movements towards and away from the 
fundamentals implied-spread. The model with time-varying weights is a significant 
improvement over the model with fixed weights.  
To conclude, the recent movements in European CDS markets can be partly explained 
by deteriorating fundamentals for core countries strained by the obligation to support the 
troubled peripheral countries and a weakened Eurozone.  However, momentum expectations, 
as well as switching between different these forecasting rules also played a significant role in 
explaining the sovereign CDS market dynamics. Based on our results we can conclude that for 
the five troubled peripheral countries, momentum trading played a much more dominant role 
in increasing their sovereign CDS spreads beyond the levels justified by weakening 
fundamentals. 
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The model proposed in this chapter is of course very stylized and we do not take into 
account potential spill-over effects between national CDS markets when investors trade across 
multiple markets. Flight to safety has been suggested as one of the reasons for the strong 
increase of CDS spreads in peripheral countries. Taking these effects into account, extending 
the model in a portfolio setting, and allowing cross-country / cross-market switching based on 
credit risk or fundamentals of other (regional) countries would be an interesting avenue for 
future work.  
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Figure 4.3 The sovereign CDS spreads, fundamental spreads and time-varying weights for four selected countries. For these countries the time-varying weights model 
outperforms the model with equal weights and both strategies have significant coefficients. 
  
 
 
 
Agreeing on Disagreement: 
5 Heterogeneity or uncertainty in the foreign exchange 
market?40 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we study heterogeneity and uncertainty and their relation to risk in the 
foreign exchange market. The heterogeneous nature of agents in economic and financial 
markets is becoming increasingly embedded in the finance literature, often by taking into 
account the disagreement between different market participants (i.e. dispersion of beliefs). 
Support for such an approach comes from different sources. Fama and French (2007) 
conclude that disagreement matters for asset pricing if investors are risk averse. If informed 
traders were risk neutral, they would offset the positions of the uninformed traders and 
CAPM prices would sustain. Carlin et al. (2012) analyze the effects of disagreement in the 
market for mortgage backed securities (MBS) and find that disagreement (heterogeneity) is 
associated with higher expected returns and higher trading volume. They state that “[in this 
market] it is much more likely that disagreement among dealers is due to differences in their 
model choice, underlying assumptions, and interpretation of economic news”. Giordani and 
Soderlind (2006) show that disagreement about the growth rate of consumption increases the 
equity premium in an Arrow-Debreu economy. Buraschi and Whelan (2012) focus on bond 
markets and show that bond risk premia and volatility of the term structure are affected by 
disagreement about macroeconomic fundamentals and future bond prices. Anderson et al. 
(2005) find that heterogeneity of beliefs matters for asset pricing, and that their proxy of 
disagreement about earnings is a risk factor affecting both equity returns and volatility.  
                                                          
40 This chapter is based on “Ellen, ter S., W.F.C. Verschoor and R.C.J. Zwinkels (2015), Agreeing on 
Disagreement: heterogeneity or uncertainty in the foreign exchange market?, working paper.” 
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Several authors have linked disagreement or dispersion in beliefs to foreign exchange 
markets and puzzles. Fisher (2006) proposes a model where the foreign exchange forward 
premium depends on the diversity of prior beliefs about a country’s inflation process. 
Gourinchas and Tornell (2004) propose a solution for both the forward premium puzzle and 
the delayed overshooting puzzle based on investor’s distorted beliefs about interest rates. 
Beber et al. (2010) show that disagreement about future currency returns has a large impact on 
currency risk premia.  
Empirically, (analyst) disagreement has not only been used to measure heterogeneity. 
The measure is becoming increasingly popular to proxy for uncertainty as a part of risk that 
volatility alone does not cover41. Bomberger (1996) analyzes the relation between disagreement 
and uncertainty measured as the conditional variance of an individual forecast, and concludes 
that the two are strongly related. Likewise Giordani and Soderlind (2003) show that 
disagreement is a better proxy of inflation uncertainty than what previous literature has 
indicated. Various studies have found that uncertainty has an impact on the risk premium of 
assets. Anderson et al. (2009) link a disagreement factor, based on the weighted cross-sectional 
volatility of equity return forecasts, to equity premia. They find that this measure of 
uncertainty is more important in explaining the equity premium than volatility.  
Despite the fact that the literature on dispersion of beliefs is already quite extensive, a 
solid conclusion about the different interpretation of disagreement has not been reached. This 
may be best captured by two papers from Anderson et al. (2005, 2009). In their 2005 paper, 
they argue, both theoretically and empirically, that heterogeneous beliefs matter for asset 
pricing. They first derive the pricing kernel under the assumption of agents with 
heterogeneous beliefs. In the empirical part of the paper, where heterogeneity of beliefs is 
measured by disagreement of earnings forecasts, the authors show that heterogeneity (earnings 
disagreement) is a priced risk factor in equity markets. In their 2009 paper, a similar result is 
established for disagreement being a priced risk factor. However, in this case disagreement is 
assumed to measure uncertainty and therefore the conclusion is that uncertainty is a priced 
                                                          
41 In finance and economics, different definitions of risk and uncertainty are used. In some cases, uncertainty is the 
‘umbrella’ term, capturing both risk (known unknowns) and ambiguity (unknown unknowns). In some cases risk is 
defined as the aggregate of known and unknown unknowns, but proxied by measures of known unknowns. In other 
papers, risk is the ‘umbrella’ term and composed out of volatility (known unknowns) and uncertainty (unknown 
unknowns). We follow the latter approach. 
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risk factor. Although there are many differences in the two approaches, of which the most 
important is perhaps the difference between disagreement of idiosyncratic earnings and 
aggregate corporate profits, the fact that a similar measure is used to measure heterogeneity 
and uncertainty respectively is characteristic for this measure42. 
Arguments for disagreement being a measure of heterogeneity or uncertainty are 
appealing for both interpretations. If there is high uncertainty about future exchange rate 
movements, distance between forecasts is large (i.e. agents heavily disagree about their point 
forecasts). However, the distance between forecasts may also be large because investors 
(prefer to) have different forecasting models, have information asymmetry, have limited 
attention, and/or are affected by other psychological traits.  
In this chapter, we will analyze whether the time-variation in disagreement (dispersion 
of forecasts of future exchange rate movement) is mostly representative of time-variation in 
the heterogeneity of agents’ beliefs, or rather of time-variation in uncertainty. To this end we 
utilize a standard VAR model to disentangle the direction of the relation between 
disagreement and volatility. In doing so, we build on the proposition that the relation between 
uncertainty and volatility is mostly contemporaneous (volatility is often even used as a 
measure or proxy for uncertainty), and the relation between heterogeneity and volatility runs 
from the former to the latter (more heterogeneity induces more noise trading, which leads to 
higher levels of volatility). We also look into the (possibly time-varying) relation between 
disagreement and volume and disagreement and liquidity, thereby building on the proposition 
that there should be a positive relation running from heterogeneity (uncertainty) to volume 
(illiquidity) and vice versa. The data we employ captures disagreement of future exchange rate 
movements for two major currency pairs, the EUR/USD and the USD/JPY. One of the main 
benefits of focusing our analysis on the foreign exchange market is that our results will not be 
affected by short sale constraints. This reason was also brought forward by Beber et al. (2010) 
for studying the foreign exchange market, and by Carlin et al. (2012) for studying the MBS 
market. 
Our results suggest that the time-variation in disagreement measures time-variation in 
heterogeneity in tranquil times, but becomes a good measure of uncertainty during a period of 
                                                          
42 A possible explanation for the case of Anderson et al. (2005, 2009), might be that idiosyncratic disagreement 
measures heterogeneity, and aggregate disagreement measures uncertainty. 
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turmoil. After having established this, we analyze whether disagreement has added value over 
realized volatility when linking it to risk and risk premium. Malkiel (1982) states that “the best 
single risk proxy is not the traditional beta calculation but rather the dispersion of analysts’ 
forecasts”. Anderson et al. (2009) confirm this. We find that disagreement indeed has 
explanatory power for risk and risk premia beyond realized volatility, and that its impact is 
sometimes even larger than the impact of realized volatility. Moreover, we find that 
disagreement is only linked to our measure of total risk in times of turmoil, whereas realized 
volatility has a constant relation with total risk. This confirms our result that disagreement 
only measures uncertainty in periods of turmoil. 
The remainder of the chapter is set up as follows. Section 2 describes the data and our 
hypotheses and results concerning whether time-variation in disagreement measures time-
variation in heterogeneity or uncertainty. Section 3 assesses the added value of disagreement in 
explaining risk and risk premia. Section 4 summarizes the results and discusses implications 
for current and future research. 
5.2 Heterogeneity and uncertainty 
5.2.1 Data 
The focus variable used for our analyses is disagreement between analysts, also referred 
to as dispersion of analyst forecasts. To be more precise, disagreement is the cross-sectional 
(across respondents) standard deviation of the analysts’ 1, 3 and 12 months ahead forecasts. 
To measure disagreement, we use a dataset with monthly forecasts from financial analysts and 
investors gathered by Consensus Economics®. Consensus Economics is the world’s leading 
international economic survey organization and their datasets are unique in terms of their long 
time span, large number of respondents, level of responding institutions, and the disaggregate 
level of forecasts.  Forecasts are given every month for the future value of the dollar against 
the Euro and the Japanese yen 1, 3 and 12 months ahead. As previously mentioned, a main 
benefit of focusing our analysis on the foreign exchange market is that our results will not be 
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affected by short sale constraints. Our survey sample runs from January 1999 to December 
200943.  
We use implied volatilities, and spot and forward exchange rates from Thomson Reuters 
(obtained through Datastream). Realized volatility is calculated as the sum of squared 15 
minute returns over the past 30 days. Data on 15 minute prices is obtained from Reuters 
RTCE (Reuters Tick Capture Engine)44. Our high-frequency return sample runs from January 
2001 to December 2009.  
As Pastor and Stambaugh (2001) state, “liquidity is a broad and elusive concept that 
generally denotes the ability to trade large quantities quickly, at low costs, and without moving 
the price”. Our liquidity measures relate to the trading at low costs (bid-ask spread) and 
trading without moving the price (high-low spread). High bid-ask spreads (computed as the 
difference between the ask and bid spread divided by the mid-spread) reflect high transaction 
costs and make it more expensive to trade. High-low spreads (log of the highest price of the 
day minus log of the lowest price of the day divided by the log of the number of trades) 
indicate the impact that trades have on prices, per unit of trade. In illiquid markets, trades 
have a larger impact on prices and we would therefore see larger high-low spreads. We obtain 
bid-ask spreads and high-low spreads from Reuters. Bid ask-spreads are averaged over the day 
and over the future month, following the Consensus forecast date. High-low spreads are 
converted to monthly frequency by taking the maximum ‘high’ and minimum ‘low’ over the 
day, averaging these over the future month following the Consensus forecast date, and 
dividing the resulting spreads by the trading volume of that month. 
A direct measure of FX trading volume is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain as the 
foreign exchange market is decentralized. The RTCE data provides us with two different 
proxies for trade: number of trades (per 15 minutes) and ask-quote frequency (per 15 
minutes). Hartmann (1999) uses reported Japanese FX broker volume to proxy for trading 
volume, and finds his results are robust to using Reuters FXFX quoting frequency (‘tick 
count’). In an earlier paper, Hartmann (1998) shows that monthly Reuters ticks are strongly 
                                                          
43 However, because the sample of our other data runs from 2001, we will use a sample from January 2001 until 
December 2009 for all our analyses. 
44Most inter-dealer FX trading is executed on either Reuter’s or EBS’ platforms. Although EBS is the main trading 
platform for the EURUSD and USDJPY, a substantial amount of trading for these currency pairs takes place via 
Reuters.. 
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correlated with monthly trading volumes (from Japanese FX brokers). However, there are a 
few disadvantages of using tick frequency. First of all, Hartmann (1998) found that the 
relationship between volume and ticks is unstable over time. Also, tick frequency is not the 
same as transaction frequency – there may not be trading at every quote. We therefore choose 
to use number of trades (also referred to as ‘trade count’ in the rest of the chapter) as our 
main proxy for trading volume. However, even transaction frequency has the disadvantage of 
not capturing the amounts at which is traded. In times of uncertainty and/or low liquidity, 
traders may decide to cut trades up in smaller portions, thereby lowering average trade size but 
keeping transaction frequency equal or perhaps even increasing their transaction frequency. 
We therefore obtain a second proxy for FX trading volume as a robustness check, FX futures 
volume (used by, among others, Frankel and Froot, 1990) from CME.   
Finally, we also detrend and standardize some of the data to respectively deal with unit 
roots and for the ease of comparability. First of all, futures volume contains a unit root and is 
detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (1997). More specifically, we use the filter to 
decompose our measure into a trend and a so-called cycle component. It is this cycle-
component that is stationary and that we use for our analysis. Disagreement, realized volatility, 
implied volatility and our measures for FX trading volume and liquidity are standardized for 
the ease of comparability45.  
5.2.1.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the variables of interest are shown in Table 5.1. We can see that 
the longer the horizon, the larger the disagreement is on future values of the exchange rates. 
We can further see that the market for EURUSD is larger than the market for USDJPY, both 
in terms of number of trades and number of futures contracts traded, and is more liquid, as 
seen by the lower bid-ask spreads and scaled high-low spreads. Note that the size of one 
EURUSD (USDJPY) futures contract is EUR 125,000 (JPY 12,500,000), whereas the average 
trade size in the interdealer market may be closer to USD 2 million.  
 
 
                                                          
45 The variables are standardized as to having a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. 
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics of main variables 
              
  
 Mean  Median Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. 
  Disagreement 
EURUSD 1m 0.028 0.026 0.065 0.014 0.0096 
 
3m 0.0408 0.039 0.076 0.026 0.0115 
 
12m 0.0677 0.066 0.102 0.039 0.0142 
USDJPY 1m 2.7533 2.7 5.7 1.7 0.6581 
 
3m 4.007 3.9 6.4 2.8 0.7527 
 
12m 6.8065 6.8 11.2 4.7 1.0866 
  Volatility 
EURUSD Realized volatility 3.5428 3.2713 10.5349 1.6513 1.4209 
 
Implied volatility 10.2005 9.8375 21.75 5.05 3.0202 
USDJPY Realized volatility 2.6856 2.486 8.286 0.4721 1.2804 
 
Implied volatility 10.6426 9.75 24 6.375 3.2644 
  Volume 
EURUSD Trade count 38025 39175 76470 6432 14975 
 
Futures 2477859 2758136 5989844 73167 1531210 
USDJPY Trade count 3229 2905 7119 1091 1425 
 
Futures 1260497 1042918 3726350 244616 884333 
  Liquidity 
EURUSD bid-ask (%) 0.0015 0.001 0.0099 0.0003 0.0017 
 
(high-low)/tc 2.94E-03 1.51E-03 2.53E-02 4.77E-04 3.85E-03 
USDJPY bid-ask (%) 0.0022 0.0022 0.0066 0.0005 0.001 
  (high-low)/tc 4.35E-03 1.50E-03 9.68E-02 5.26E-04 1.11E-02 
Descriptive statistics for disagreement (cross-sectional standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts of the exchange rate 1, 
3, and 12 months ahead), realized volatility (cumulative 5 minute squared returns over the past 30 days), and implied 
volatility (option implied volatilities for maturity of 1 month). 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, there are various ways to proxy for volume and 
liquidity in foreign exchange markets. We therefore use two different proxies for each. In 
Table 5.2 we can see to what extent these variables are related, by analyzing their correlations. 
We can compare the measures along two dimensions; we can assess whether they are related 
within one market (EURUSD or USDJPY) or whether they are related across markets. 
Strikingly, the correlation between trade count and futures volume is very low: around 0.24 for 
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the USDJPY market and close to zero for the EURUSD market. The number of trades across 
markets is also uncorrelated. This implies that the two volume proxies seem to measure 
completely different aspects of the true volume in these FX markets. If we turn to our 
liquidity measures, we even see the opposite pattern: the liquidity measures for EURUSD are 
correlated, but the correlation for USDJPY liquidity measures is close to zero.  
Figure 5.1 gives a graphical representation of the HP filter decomposed measures of 
volume. Although futures volume shows a clear trend, once we filter out the trend it looks like 
a much more stable measure of volume.  
5.2.2 Timing, volume, and liquidity 
To investigate whether disagreement is mostly measuring uncertainty or heterogeneity, 
we make use of the timing of the disagreement-volatility relation46. As Frankel and Froot 
(1990) state in their seminal paper on heterogeneity in the foreign exchange market, more 
heterogeneity induces more noise trading, which leads to higher levels of volatility. Carlin et al. 
(2012) confirm this prediction for the MBS market. The relation between heterogeneity and 
volatility should therefore be running from heterogeneity to volatility.  
Hypothesis 1a: If analyst disagreement measures heterogeneity, we should see a link running from 
disagreement to volatility. 
The relation between uncertainty and volatility can be seen as a contemporaneous one – 
volatility is often even used as a measure or proxy for uncertainty. In times of high 
uncertainty, asset volatility is generally higher. Alternatively, financial market participants may 
become more uncertain about their point forecasts when volatility is high. In that case, the 
relation runs from volatility to uncertainty. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: If analyst disagreement measures uncertainty, we should see a contemporaneous relation 
between disagreement and volatility 
                                                          
46 At this point we should make clear that, going forward, when we talk about heterogeneity, we mean every type of 
heterogeneity that is not directly caused by uncertainty. For example, investors may be heterogeneous because they 
(prefer to) have different forecasting models, have heterogeneous information, have limited attention,  and/or are 
affected by other psychological traits. When investors’ heterogeneity is caused by uncertainty, we call this uncertainty. 
 
  
 
Table 5.2: Correlation tables for volume and liquidity measures 
        
  Liquidity measures 
 
bid-ask bid-ask high-low 
 
(EURUSD) (USDJPY) (EURUSD) 
bid-ask (EURUSD) 1.00 
  bid-ask (USDJPY) 0.47 1.00 
 high-low (EURUSD) 0.68 0.40 1.00 
high-low (USDJPY) -0.06 -0.04 0.24 
  Raw volume measures 
 
trade count trade count futures cycle 
 
(EURUSD) (USDJPY) (EURUSD) 
trade count (EURUSD) 1.00 
  trade count (USDJPY) -0.04 1.00 
 futures cycle (EURUSD) -0.02 0.04 1.00 
futures cycle (USDJPY) 0.11 0.24 0.47 
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Figure 5.1. Graphical representation of applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter to obtain decomposed futures volume 
(blue line) in a trend (red line) and a cycle (green line) component. 
  
-2,000,000
-1,000,000
0
1,000,000
2,000,000
3,000,000
4,000,000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
FUTURES_USDJPY
FUTURESTREND_USDJPY
FUTURESCYCLE_USDJPY
114  Chapter 5. Heterogeneity or uncertainty in the foreign exchange market? 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 1c: If analyst disagreement measures uncertainty, we should see a link running from 
volatility to disagreement. 
As stated above, more heterogeneity induces more noise trading, which leads to higher 
levels of volatility (Frankel and Froot, 1990). It is by now well established that the large 
volume of foreign exchange markets cannot be explained by international trade only (Frankel 
and Froot, 1990), and that heterogeneity of market participants is necessary for such large 
volumes. Unless disagreement is caused by uncertainty, it will lead to more trading. This 
positive relation between heterogeneous beliefs and volume is documented by, amongst 
others, Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006), Banerjee and Kremer (2010), and Buraschi and Whelan 
(2012). Lee and Swaminathan (2000) even use high trading volume as a proxy for differences 
of opinion. Carlin et al. (2012) find that higher disagreement in the MBS market (stemming 
from model choice and information interpretation) is followed by higher volume and higher 
volatility. Whereas heterogeneity has a positive effect on volume (and to some extent 
liquidity), uncertainty generally reduces volume and liquidity, as investors are more hesitant to 
update their portfolios (Buraschi and Whelan, 2012; de Castro and Chateauneuf, 2011). This is 
to some extent confirmed by Carlin et al. (2012), who find that volatility does not lead to 
higher trading volume. Therefore we can use volume as a distinguishing factor between 
uncertainty and heterogeneity.  
Hypothesis 2: If analyst disagreement measures heterogeneity, we should see a positive relation between 
disagreement and volume. 
Hypothesis 3a: If analyst disagreement measures uncertainty, we should see a negative relation between 
disagreement and liquidity. 
Hypothesis 3b: If analyst disagreement measures heterogeneity, we should see a positive relation between 
disagreement and liquidity. 
 The relation between uncertainty and volume is not that straightforward. In 
times of high uncertainty investors may be hesitant to update their portfolios, resulting in 
lower trading volumes, or they may unwind some (risky) positions, leading to lower liquidity 
but larger trading volume. Testing hypothesis 2 will therefore give us some insight in whether 
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disagreement measures heterogeneity or not, but will not give us much information on 
whether disagreement measures uncertainty. On the other hand, liquidity is expected to be 
higher when heterogeneity is higher (because of higher trading volume and more investors 
willing to take the other side of a position), but lower when uncertainty is higher. Testing 
hypotheses 3 a and b should therefore shed some more light on this distinction. 
5.2.2.1 Timing tests 
Periods of high uncertainty are associated with periods of high volatility. Hence, a 
contemporaneous relation between volatility and disagreement indicates uncertainty. This is 
measured in a simple OLS setup by  
𝜓𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡    (5.1) 
Here, 𝜓𝑡 denotes disagreement measured as the cross-sectional standard deviation of 
survey forecasts, and 𝜎𝑡 denotes realized volatility measured from 15 minute square returns. 
The results of this regression are displayed in Table 5.3. We can see that there is a strong 
contemporaneous relation between volatility and disagreement. This relation is the strongest 
for the short horizon, where we use dispersion of the 1 month ahead forecasts, and for the 
EURUSD exchange rate. This is in line with hypothesis 2a, and thus indicative for 
disagreement measuring uncertainty. However, there may also be a relation running from 
disagreement to volatility. 
Table 5.3: Results disagreement and realized volatility (OLS) 
                          
 
1m 3m 12m 
 
 
EUR 
USD   
USD 
JPY   
EUR 
USD   
USD 
JPY   
EUR 
USD   
USD 
JPY   
constant 0.0207   0.0056   0.0409   -0.0536   0.0441   -0.1146 
 
 
0.1844 
 
0.0346 
 
0.3158 
 
-0.3221 
 
0.2707 
 
-0.6883 
 realized volatility 0.7173 *** 0.3049 *** 0.6794 *** 0.2795 ** 0.4959 *** 0.0604 
 
 
10.3587 
 
2.5550 
 
10.1128 
 
2.3071 
 
3.1102 
 
0.5331 
 adj R2 0.5163   0.0755   0.4650   0.0670   0.2382   -0.0058   
Results from estimating Equation 5.1, the contemporaneous relation between disagreement and realized volatility. 
Note that the variables are standardized for ease of coefficient interpretation. T-statistics are displayed under the 
coefficients (shaded). 
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 Heterogeneity induces more (noise) trade and therefore more volatility. Hence, if 
there is a relation running from disagreement to volatility, this is an indication that it may 
capture time-variation in heterogeneity. In case disagreement measures uncertainty, there 
should be a relation from volatility to disagreement. We estimate a VAR with two lags47 to 
capture the possibly two-way relation between disagreement and volatility. We also perform 
Granger causality tests to investigate whether disagreement Granger causes volatility or vice 
versa. 
[
𝜎𝑡
2
𝜓𝑡
2] = [
𝛼1
𝛼2
] + [
𝛽1;11 𝛽1;12
𝛽1;21 𝛽1;22
] [
𝜎𝑡−1
2
𝜓𝑡−1
2 ] + ⋯ + [
𝛽2;11 𝛽2;12
𝛽2;21 𝛽2;22
] [
𝜎𝑡−𝑖
2
𝜓𝑡−𝑖
2 ] + [
𝜀1,𝑡
𝜀2,𝑡
]  (5.2) 
The results of this estimation are displayed in Table 5.4. There is no strong evidence for 
either hypothesis 1a or 1c. The results for USDJPY show there is no Granger causality from 
disagreement to volatility or the other way around, nor are there clear lead-lag relations. The 
results for EURUSD are not clear: for the short and medium forecast horizon, disagreement 
Granger causes volatility, favoring the heterogeneity hypothesis (1a). However, the exact 
opposite is the case for the long horizon where volatility Granger causes disagreement.  We 
can therefore say that the VAR results are inconclusive. 
5.2.2.2 Volume and liquidity tests 
After having analyzed the timing of the disagreement-volatility relation, we now turn to 
analyzing the effect of disagreement on trading volume. We analyze this relation because the 
noise trading caused by heterogeneity of expectations should show up in trading volumes. We 
first look at the unconditional relation between disagreement and volume.  
𝑡𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝜓𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡    (5.3) 
                                                          
47 To be able to compare the results over forecast horizons and currencies, we imposed the same lag structure on 
all VARs. A lag of 2 was obtained by comparing the AIC over different lags and choosing the number of lags that had 
the highest AIC for most horizons over both currency pairs. 
  
 
Table 5.4: Results disagreement and realized volatility (VAR) 
                  
 
EURUSD USDJPY 
 
disagreement volatility 
disagreemen
t volatility 
  1 month 
disagreement(-1) 0.5104 *** 0.4862 *** 0.5686 *** 0.0895   
 
4.7672 
 
4.5747 
 
5.357 
 
1.1217 
 disagreement(-2) 0.2252 ** -0.3257 *** 0.0267   -0.1604 ** 
 
2.0993 
 
-3.0591 
 
0.2471 
 
-1.974 
 volatility(-1) 0.196 * 0.7714 *** -0.0613   0.4868 *** 
 
1.9062 
 
7.5587 
 
-0.4536 
 
4.7889 
 volatility(-2) -0.0329   -0.1045   0.1858   0.3628 *** 
 
-0.3156 
 
-1.0111 
 
1.3699 
 
3.5563 
 adj R2 0.6988 
 
0.7113 
 
0.3646 
 
0.6078 
 Granger test 4.4396 
 
21.1891 
 
2.6167 
 
3.8992 
 p-val 0.3498 
 
0.0003 
 
0.6239 
 
0.4198 
   3 months 
disagreement(-1) 0.7003 *** 0.4505 *** 0.7096 *** 0.0458   
 
6.4997 
 
3.0346 
 
6.6886 
 
0.4585 
 disagreement(-2) 0.1856 * -0.2952 ** 0.0376   -0.1278   
 
1.7594 
 
-2.031 
 
0.3485 
 
-1.2578 
 volatility(-1) 0.1222   0.7723 *** 0.0816   0.5003 *** 
 
1.6079 
 
7.3745 
 
0.7555 
 
4.9213 
 volatility(-2) -0.0531   -0.0918   0.0204   0.3481 *** 
 
-0.6803 
 
-0.8539 
 
0.1872 
 
3.3859 
 adj R2 0.8294 
 
0.6849 
 
0.5591 
 
0.5999 
 Granger test 2.786 
 
9.7467 
 
1.8448 
 
2.0333 
 p-val 0.5942 
 
0.0449 
 
0.7643 
 
0.7296 
   12 months 
disagreement(-1) 0.6866 *** 0.2126   0.7614 *** 0.0477   
 
6.5635 
 
1.3945 
 
7.3646 
 
0.3437 
 disagreement(-2) 0.1239   -0.258 * 0.1014   -0.1374   
 
1.2624 
 
-1.8033 
 
0.9681 
 
-0.9769 
 volatility(-1) 0.1654 *** 0.8416 *** -0.0383   0.5003 *** 
 
2.3286 
 
8.1318 
 
-0.5081 
 
4.9436 
 volatility(-2) 0.0507   -0.0418   0.1108   0.3301 *** 
 
0.6581 
 
-0.3727 
 
1.4776 
 
3.2769 
 adj R2 0.8407 
 
0.6635 
 
0.7259 
 
0.599 
 Granger test 17.8704 
 
3.361 
 
3.0782 
 
1.8166 
 p-val 0.0013   0.4993   0.5448   0.7694   
Results from estimating Equation 5.2, a VAR model to study the lead-lag relations between disagreement and realized 
volatility. Note that the variables are standardized for ease of coefficient interpretation. T-statistics are displayed 
under the coefficients (shaded).  
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Here, 𝜓𝑡 denotes disagreement, and 𝑡𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑡  denotes trading volume, where trading 
volume is either proxied by RTCE number of trades or detrended CME futures volume. 
Results of estimating Equation 5.3 by means of OLS can be found in Table 5.5.  We can see 
that there is no unconditional contemporaneous relation between disagreement and trading 
volume for the EURUSD market, regardless of whether we use futures volume or number of 
trades as proxies for trading volume. However, the results for the USDJPY market show a 
marginal positive relation between disagreement and volume for both the number of trades 
and the futures volume, which would indicate heterogeneity. These results are therefore also 
not very conclusive.  
However, if disagreement is a proxy for heterogeneity but at uncertain times it is a proxy 
for uncertainty, the relation we observe between disagreement and FX trading volume will be 
time-varying. In that case, we should also see a strong drop in the relation during the most 
recent period of turmoil in our sample, from around 2007. We test whether there is a time-
varying relation between change in disagreement and trading volume by employing a simple 
OLS regression estimated with a rolling window, to get time-varying coefficients and 
confidence bands. A graphical representation of this time-varying relation can be seen in 
Figure 5.2. We employ a rolling window size of 24 months.  
The upper half of Figure 5.2 shows the time-varying relation between disagreement 
(over the 1 month forecasts) and number of trades for the EURUSD (left) and the USDJPY 
(right). The results reveal that the relation is indeed time-varying. The results are strongest for 
the EURUSD. Before 2007, the relation between disagreement and volume is significantly 
positive. More heterogeneity induces more (noise) trading, and we can therefore say that 
disagreement was measuring heterogeneity until 2007. However, there is a clear drop in the 
relation around 2007/2008, when markets started to be more uncertain, after which the 
coefficient stays significantly negative.  
We now turn to our liquidity analyses. Recall that we expect a negative relation between 
uncertainty and liquidity. Because our measures are actually illiquidity measures (a higher bid-
ask spread and high-low spread indicate lower liquidity) we expect the relation from Equation 
5.4 to be positive if disagreement measures uncertainty. 
  
  
 
Table 5.5: Results disagreement and volume 
                          
 
1m 
   
3m 
   
12m 
   
 
EUR 
USD 
 
USD 
JPY 
 
EUR 
USD 
 
USD 
JPY 
 
EUR 
USD 
 
USD 
JPY 
   volume (no. of trades) - disagreement relation   
constant -0.0492   -0.1311   -0.0463   -0.1294   -0.0459   -0.1302 
 
 
-0.251 
 
-0.8034 
 
-0.2416 
 
-0.7871 
 
-0.2413 
 
-0.7982   
disagreement 0.1414   0.1165 * -0.0622   0.0184   -0.0811   0.1215 
 
 
0.7247 
 
1.7559 
 
-0.2322 
 
0.1918 
 
-0.2875 
 
0.7601 
 adj R2 -0.0036 
 
0.0029 
 
-0.0098 
 
-0.0103 
 
-0.0092 
 
-0.0064 
   volume (futures volume) - disagreement relation   
constant -0.0208   -0.0171   -0.016   -0.0146   -0.0202   -0.0106   
 
-0.149 
 
-0.1095 
 
-0.1196 
 
-0.0926 
 
-0.1486 
 
-0.0678 
 disagreement 0.2047   0.2344 *** -0.1893   0.0849   -0.0342   -0.2599   
 
1.1663 
 
2.5092 
 
-0.7743 
 
0.7652 
 
-0.1737 
 
-0.9694 
 adj R2 0.0042   0.0336   -0.0039   -0.0071   -0.0103   0.0047   
Results from estimating Equation 5.3, the relation between disagreement and two proxies for trading volume: tick 
frequency and futures volume. Note that the variables are standardized for ease of coefficient interpretation. T-
statistics are displayed under the coefficients (shaded). 
 
Table 5.6: Results disagreement and liquidity 
                          
 
1m 
   
3m 
   
12m 
   
 
EUR 
USD 
 
USD 
JPY 
 
EUR 
USD 
 
USD 
JPY 
 
EUR 
USD 
 
USD 
JPY 
   liquidity (high-low) disagreement relation 
constant -0.0546   -0.0332   -0.0638   -0.044   -0.0567   -0.0456   
 
-0.4759 
 
-0.2225 
 
-0.5465 
 
-0.3189 
 
-0.4276 
 
-0.3388 
 disagreement 0.3016 * -0.1122   0.2886   -0.1704   0.0365   -0.1221   
 
1.8331 
 
-1.0329 
 
1.5737 
 
-1.0755 
 
0.4244 
 
-0.9099 
 adj R2 0.0954 
 
0.0025 
 
0.0865 
 
0.0173 
 
-0.0088 
 
0.0009 
   liquidity (bid-ask spread) disagreement relation 
constant -0.0535   -0.0552   -0.0644   -0.0447   -0.056   -0.0309   
 
-0.3867 
 
-0.359 
 
-0.4392 
 
-0.2954 
 
-0.3131 
 
-0.2049 
 disagreement 0.5935 *** 0.1547   0.5226 ** 0.1764 * 0.1916   0.2279 * 
 
2.5407 
 
1.6149 
 
1.9847 
 
1.664 
 
1.135 
 
1.824 
 adj R2 0.3406   0.0153   0.2622   0.0207   0.0269   0.0307   
Results from estimating Equation 5.4, the relation between disagreement and two proxies for liquidity: high-low 
spread and bid-ask spread. Note that the variables are standardized for ease of coefficient interpretation. T-statistics 
are displayed under the coefficients (shaded).  
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Figure 5.2. Graphical representation of the time-varying relation between disagreement and volume (trade count, upper two graphs), and between disagreement and liquidity 
(bid-ask spread, lower two graphs).  
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𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝜓𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡     (5.4) 
The results from estimating Equation 5.4 are displayed in Table 5.6. We can see that 
there is a positive relation between disagreement and illiquidity for the EURUSD and weakly 
so for the USDJPY, suggesting disagreement measures uncertainty, at least for EURUSD. 
However, the earlier results from the VAR suggested that disagreement in the EURUSD 
measures heterogeneity.  
These results are puzzling, but may be explained by the time-varying relationship we 
already observed for volume. We therefore do the same simple OLS regression estimated with 
a rolling window of 24 months, to get time-varying coefficients and confidence bands for the 
relation between disagreement and liquidity (bid-ask spread).  
A graphical representation of this time-varying relation can be seen in the lower half of 
Figure 5.2. We do not find a negative relation between disagreement and liquidity. However, 
these currency pairs are considered amongst the most liquid, and generally have very low and 
efficient bid-ask spreads. It is therefore questionable whether more heterogeneity would be 
able to make these markets even more liquid. However, we do see a very clear rise in the 
relation during the recent period of turmoil from 2007 to the end of our sample. In this 
period, the bid-ask spread widens when disagreement increases. This is in support of 
Hypothesis 3a. 
The results from our time-varying regressions reveal that disagreement measures 
heterogeneity in tranquil times, but increasingly becomes a measure of uncertainty in periods 
of turmoil. This explains why neither the unconditional VAR, nor the unconditional 
regressions including volume and liquidity showed clear evidence in favor of any of the 
hypotheses outlined before. 
5.3 Disagreement, risk, and expected returns 
Our results from Section 2 show that disagreement is not a stable measure to use for 
either heterogeneity or uncertainty. However, as summarized in Section 1, there is ample 
evidence in the literature that disagreement, and uncertainty derived from disagreement, have 
asset pricing implications. We now turn to testing the implications of disagreement for asset 
pricing in the time-series of exchange rates. In effect, we focus on the first two moments, 
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expected excess returns and option implied volatility, and test whether disagreement as a 
measure of uncertainty has explanatory power over the commonly used measure of realized 
volatility, and whether this relation depends on market turmoil. We first explain how we 
obtain the relationships between expected returns, risk, uncertainty and volatility, and then 
continue to test these. 
5.3.1 Expected returns and risk 
It is by now widely understood that the relation between exchange rate movements and 
interest rate differentials (uncovered interest parity) is distorted by a risk premium, a premium 
that international investors demand for the risk they bear that the exchange rate moves against 
them (Fama, 1984; Engel, 1984; Menkhoff et al., 2012): 
  𝐸[∆𝑠𝑡+1] = 𝑖 − 𝑖
∗ + 𝜌𝑡     (5.5) 
Because of covered interest parity (CIP: 𝑓𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑖 − 𝑖
∗), and by assuming the investor 
maximizes utility in a mean-variance optimizing way, we can rewrite Equation 5.5 in expected 
return risk premium (Dornbusch, 1982; Frankel, 1982): 
𝐸[𝑟𝑡+1] = 𝐸[∆𝑠𝑡+1] − 𝑓𝑑𝑡 = 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 × 𝛾𝑡   (5.6) 
where fdt is the forward discount. Note that in a rational world (𝐸[∆𝑠𝑡+1] = ∆𝑠𝑡+1) and 
for risk neutral investors (𝛾𝑡 = 0), there would be no risk premium and uncovered interest 
parity would hold. Menkhoff et al. (2012) show that these excess returns are indeed a 
compensation for time-varying risk, as carry trades perform well in tranquil times, but perform 
very poorly in times of turmoil. They find that global FX volatility is important in explaining 
the cross-section of excess currency returns. In this chapter we consider the time-variation 
rather than the cross-section of excess returns and risk. We also adopt a broader concept of 
total risk where we consider both volatility and uncertainty as risk components.  
 𝜌𝑡 = 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 × 𝛾𝑡 = 𝐹{𝜎𝑡, 𝜓𝑡}    (5.7) 
Decomposing risk in a component related to volatility and a component related to 
uncertainty is motivated by and based on earlier work from Lahiri et al. (1988), Giordani and 
5.3 Disagreement, risk, and expected returns 123 
 
 
 
Soderlind (2003) and Huisman et al. (2011). This approach of aggregate market risk is micro-
based, and thus starts from an agents’ subjective probability distribution.  
In forecasting future foreign exchange returns 𝐸[𝑟𝑡+1], each agent is driven by its own 
subjective probability distribution function with mean 𝜇𝑖 and variance 𝜎𝑖
2. Note that these 
(theoretically) correspond to an agent’s point forecast for the future return and its expected 
volatility. The average expected volatility of the market then corresponds to 𝐸(𝜎𝑖
2) =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝜎𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1 . If agents are assumed to be homogeneous in their expectations the only risk they 
would face is the volatility of foreign exchange returns. However, the evidence for 
heterogeneous beliefs in financial markets is overwhelming (see, among others, Frankel and 
Froot, 1987; Jongen et al., 2012; Ter Ellen et al., 2012) and therefore we need to incorporate a 
component to account for disagreement among agents. After all, if the distance between 
forecasts is very large (i.e. agents heavily disagree about their point forecasts) this will increase 
market risk about future exchange rate movements. Giordani and Soderlind (2003) and 
Huisman et al. (2011) show theoretically that aggregate risk in a market with heterogeneous 
expectations is equal to the sum of average expected volatility, 𝐸(𝜎𝑖
2), and the cross-sectional 
variance, i.e., disagreement, of return expectations. This brings us to the following 
decomposition of risk: 
𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 = 𝐸(𝜎𝑖
2) + 𝜎𝜇𝑖
2     (5.8) 
In words, the total risk of the market is a sum of the average expected volatility and the 
disagreement among investors about expected returns. This equation mainly differs from 
Giordani and Soderlind (2003) in the left-hand side component, where we have replaced the 
variance of the aggregate distribution with a more general term (total) ‘risk’. Giordani and 
Soderlind (2003) mention that interpreting the aggregate distribution is not straightforward for 
inflation forecasts. However, as Huisman et al. (2011) point out, in financial markets we can 
interpret the aggregate distribution as a measure of total risk in the market.  
As pointed out by Anderson et al. (2009), because volatility is persistent, precise 
estimation is possible by sampling returns over relatively short time intervals. The drift 
component, however, requires a very long data interval rendering it difficult to obtain an 
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efficient estimate due to structural breaks. Hence, asset returns are risky due to the deviations 
from the mean (i.e., volatility) but they are uncertain because the unconditional mean is 
unknown. Therefore, they argue, dispersion in the expected mean is a reasonable proxy for 
uncertainty. We follow their interpretation and argue that the dispersion in beliefs, 𝜎𝜇𝑖
2 , equals 
market uncertainty, given by 𝜓𝑡 . This is partly backed up by our former analyses in Section 2. 
The foreign exchange risk premium, decomposed into risk and risk aversion, is a 
function of volatility 𝜎𝑡 and uncertainty 𝜓𝑡   of future exchange rate returns. Former research 
has shown the importance of accounting for uncertainty in the context of risk premia. Beber 
et al. (2010) find that uncertainty has a large impact on currency risk premia. Anderson et al. 
(2009) focus on equity markets and show that uncertainty is more important in explaining the 
equity risk premium than volatility.  
Many studies have measured risk or uncertainty in a narrow way, taking only known 
unknowns into account, by using volatility models such as GARCH, squared returns or 
historical variance, which are all based on historical returns. However, such measures 
underestimate the total risk underlying the market. Anderson et al. (2009) show that 
uncertainty is even more important in explaining the equity risk premium than volatility.  
5.3.2 Estimation and results 
We now turn to studying the relations given by (6) - (8) empirically in order to determine 
the relative importance of volatility and uncertainty for risk and risk premium measures in the 
foreign exchange market. Our empirical analysis consists of linear regressions (OLS) to 
estimate the relation between different features of foreign exchange risk premia on the one 
hand and volatility and disagreement on the other hand.  
5.3.2.1 Expected return risk premium 
First, we study the expected return risk premium, based on survey data of exchange rate 
expectations. We may not find very strong results due to the nature of foreign exchange 
returns: positive returns for one side of the market mean negative returns for the other side.  
𝐸[∆𝑠𝑡+ℎ] − 𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡 + 𝛾𝜓𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡     (5.9) 
  
 
Table 5.7: Results expected risk premium 
                          
 
EURUSD USDJPY 
1m (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3)   
constant -0.0008   -0.0007   -0.0008   -0.0036   -0.0035   -0.0035   
 
-0.5609 
 
-0.4645 
 
-0.5653 
 
-1.5538 
 
-1.481 
 
-1.5216 
 disagreement 0.002   
 
  0.0021   0.0031 ** 
 
  0.0026 * 
 
1.452 
   
0.9033 
 
2.1744 
   
1.72 
 realized volatility 
 
  0.0012   -0.0002   
 
  0.0025   0.0017   
   
1.3362 
 
-0.1277 
   
1.1257 
 
0.7519 
 adj R2 0.0127   -0.0014   0.0023   0.0214   0.0088   0.0192   
3m (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3)   
constant -0.0032   -0.003   -0.0033   -0.0034   -0.0039   -0.0032   
 
-1.5829 
 
-1.3232 
 
-1.6425 
 
-1.0617 
 
-1.0566 
 
-1.0255 
 disagreement 0.0054 *** 
 
  0.0065 *** 0.0106 *** 
 
  0.0098 *** 
 
3.0143 
   
2.6213 
 
4.2072 
   
3.807 
 realized volatility 
 
  0.0028 ** -0.0017   
 
  0.0058 * 0.0031   
   
2.225 
 
-0.8393 
   
1.8985 
 
1.1911 
 adj R2 0.0987   0.0191   0.0949   0.1768   0.0461   0.1829   
12m (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3)   
constant -0.0058   -0.0056   -0.0059   0.0073   0.0062   0.0084   
 
-0.9797 
 
-0.9452 
 
-0.992 
 
1.0222 
 
0.9244 
 
1.3371 
 disagreement 0.005   
 
  0.0061   0.0188 *** 
 
  0.0175 *** 
 
0.9741 
   
1.1353 
 
2.821 
   
2.949 
 realized volatility 
 
  0.0007   -0.0024   
 
  0.0181 *** 0.017 *** 
   
0.2285 
 
-0.6561 
   
3.6266 
 
4.0965 
 adj R2 0.0146   -0.0099   0.0085   0.1467   0.1735   0.3014   
Results from estimating Equation 5.9, the impact of disagreement and realized volatility on the expected return risk premium. Note that the explanatory variables 
are standardized for ease of coefficient interpretation. T-statistics are displayed under the coefficients (shaded). 
  
 
Table 5.8: Results implied volatility 
                          
 
EURUSD USDJPY 
1m (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3)   
constant -0.063   -0.0494   -0.053   0.0093   0.0335   0.03   
 
-0.7024 
 
-0.738 
 
-1.0057 
 
0.0791 
 
0.1993 
 
0.2824 
 disagreement 0.8248 *** 
 
  0.4267 *** 0.6977 *** 
 
  0.6203 *** 
 
7.023 
   
5.444 
 
7.1796 
   
5.3699 
 realized volatility   0.8587 *** 0.5476 *** 
 
  0.4667 *** 0.2776 *** 
   
14.4625 
 
7.1072 
   
4.1524 
 
3.4856 
 adj R2 0.6974 
 
0.76 
 
0.8472 
 
0.48 
 
0.1903 
 
0.5401 
 3m (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3)   
constant -0.0876   -0.0494   -0.0655   0.0459   0.0335   0.0641   
 
-0.8842 
 
-0.738 
 
-1.2583 
 
0.3201 
 
0.1993 
 
0.48 
 disagreement 0.8026 *** 
 
  0.3925 *** 0.6551 *** 
 
  0.5709 *** 
 
5.1338 
   
5.6842 
 
4.4955 
   
3.5673 
 realized volatility   0.8587 *** 0.592 *** 
 
  0.4667 *** 0.3072 *** 
   
14.4625 
 
9.7408 
   
4.1524 
 
3.8542 
 adj R2 0.6497 
 
0.76 
 
0.8419 
 
0.3928 
 
0.1903 
 
0.4675 
 12m (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3)   
constant -0.0851   -0.0494   -0.0589   0.0461   0.0335   0.0776   
 
-0.5877 
 
-0.738 
 
-0.9669 
 
0.2597 
 
0.1993 
 
0.4784 
 disagreement 0.5885 *** 
 
  0.2155 *** 0.4179 *** 
 
  0.3847 *** 
 
3.9389 
   
2.9278 
 
2.6377 
   
2.6579 
 realized volatility   0.8587 *** 0.7519 *** 
 
  0.4667 *** 0.4435 *** 
   
14.4625 
 
11.6136 
   
4.1524 
 
4.2781 
 adj R2 0.3512   0.76   0.7944   0.1195   0.1903   0.2925   
Results from estimating Equation 5.10, the relation between implied volatility, disagreement and realized volatility. Note that the variables are standardized for ease of 
coefficient interpretation. T-statistics are displayed under the coefficients (shaded).  
  
 
Table 5.9: Results implied volatility for heterogeneity versus uncertainty 
                          
 
1m       3m       12m       
 
EURUSD   USDJPY   EURUSD   USDJPY   EURUSD   USDJPY   
constant -0.15189 *** -0.036143   -0.145143 *** 0.029527   -0.100786   0.114958   
 
-2.576791 
 
-0.326926 
 
-2.661501 
 
0.23628 
 
-1.576136 
 
0.661353 
 heterogeneity 0.150068   0.142544 * 0.138053   0.048257   0.081921   -0.095632   
(base effect) 1.524335 
 
1.948118 
 
1.203376 
 
0.537685 
 
1.104975 
 
-0.614226 
 realized volatility 0.532843 *** 0.480041 *** 0.538471 *** 0.56715 *** 0.58769 *** 0.722205 *** 
(base effect) 5.863339 
 
4.300885 
 
5.725202 
 
4.170642 
 
4.845296 
 
3.791618 
 uncertainty 0.469629 *** 0.690449 *** 0.357388 *** 0.78053 *** 0.226514 * 0.673006 *** 
(marginal effect) 3.263335 
 
6.232559 
 
2.396209 
 
4.349247 
 
1.904722 
 
2.679875 
 realized volatility turmoil -0.110284   -0.243084   0.009577   -0.235667   0.163033   -0.248545   
(marginal effect) -0.874925 
 
-1.602059 
 
0.077453 
 
-1.393196 
 
1.142746 
 
-1.097405 
 adj R2 0.864444   0.620866   0.85292   0.56548   0.80952   0.337225   
Results from estimating Equation 5.10, the relation between implied volatility, disagreement and realized volatility. The base period is the period from 2001 to 2007, and 
represents the period in which disagreement measures heterogeneity. The lower part of the table shows the marginal (“added”) effects for the period from 2007 to 2010, 
when disagreement measures uncertainty. Note that the variables are standardized for ease of coefficient interpretation. T-statistics are displayed under the coefficients 
(shaded).  
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The results of estimating Equation 5.9 can be found in Table 5.7. Disagreement has a 
significant relation with the expected return risk premium for all horizons for USDJPY, and 
for the three month horizon for EURUSD. This indicates that to some extent, investors want 
to be compensated for uncertainty or the risk of heterogeneous beliefs. These results are 
promising for our total risk analyses, as we will not have the same problem with the two-
sidedness of the market as we have with analyzing returns. 
5.3.2.2 Total risk 
Next, we study the relation between total risk, disagreement, and realized volatility. We 
proxy total risk with implied volatility. The implied volatility of an asset is the risk-neutral 
volatility implied from an option pricing model such as the Black and Scholes (1973) model. 
Due to the fact that investors in real life are risk averse, realized volatility is generally smaller 
than implied volatility. Therefore, implied volatility can be seen as a purer and more direct 
measure of the total risk in the market. Ajinkya and Gift (1985) were among the first to 
analyze risk and dispersion of financial analysts’ earnings forecasts. They state that implied 
volatility measures are superior to historical measures of volatility because implied volatility 
also captures analyst dispersion (which they state is a contemporaneous measure of stock 
variability). Therefore, the relation between total risk (implied volatility), disagreement, and 
realized volatility is studied: 
𝜎𝐼𝑉,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡 + 𝛾𝜓𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡    (5.10) 
The results are shown in Table 5.8. Because disagreement and realized volatility are 
highly correlated, we replace 𝜓𝑡 from Equation 5.10 with the residual of regressing 
disagreement on realized volatility in model (3). We can see that realized volatility is positively 
related to implied volatility, as expected. More interestingly, uncertainty, measured by 
disagreement, has a large and significant effect on implied volatility beyond the impact of 
realized volatility. Note that the variables are standardized and we can therefore compare 
models (1) and (2) over variables, horizons, and markets. The obtained coefficients are 
qualitatively and quantitatively consistent between the EURUSD and USDJPY markets. We 
neither confirm nor reject the results of Anderson et al. (2009), who conclude that uncertainty 
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is a more important component in explaining the risk-return relationship. However, the 
impact of disagreement is substantial, with coefficients from regression (1) ranging from 
0.4197 to 0.8248 and from 0.3330 to 0.5895 for regression (3). Moreover, adjusted R-squares 
from regression (3) are all between 0.6945 and 0.9207, which means that the combination of 
volatility and uncertainty explains a very large part of the variance of implied volatility. 
Furthermore, we can see that the effect of disagreement is strongest if we use disagreement 
from 1 month forecasts, and weakest if we use the 12 month disagreement. 
Finally, we split our sample in two by including a dummy variable that is zero from the 
start of our sample until the beginning of 2007, and one from 2007 to the end of our sample, 
to capture the possible time-variation in the interpretation of our disagreement measure. As 
the relation between disagreement and implied volatility should stem from it being a measure 
for uncertainty, we expect the relation to be strongest for the second part of our sample, and 
weaker or nonexistent for the first part. Results can be found in Table 5.9. 
We can indeed see that for all horizons and both currency pairs, disagreement is only 
related to implied volatility in the turmoil period. This confirms our earlier results indicating 
that disagreement measures heterogeneity in tranquil times and uncertainty during turmoil. 
5.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have investigated the dual usage of disagreement as a measure for 
heterogeneity and uncertainty, and the added value of this measure in explaining risk and risk 
premia. Although arguments for disagreement being a measure of heterogeneity or uncertainty 
are appealing for both interpretations, they may in times have different (asset pricing) 
implications. For example, they have different and perhaps even opposing effects on trading 
volume and liquidity, and the timing of their effect is different. It is therefore important to 
analyze whether the time-variation in disagreement mainly measures time-variation in 
heterogeneity or time-variation in uncertainty.  
To investigate whether disagreement is mostly measuring uncertainty or heterogeneity, 
we made use of the timing of the disagreement-volatility relation and the impact of 
heterogeneity on trading volume. More heterogeneity induces more noise trading, which leads 
to higher levels of volume and volatility. The relation between heterogeneity and volatility 
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should therefore be running from heterogeneity to volatility. The relation between uncertainty 
and volatility can be seen as a contemporaneous one – volatility is often even used as a 
measure or proxy for uncertainty. In times of high uncertainty, asset volatility is generally 
higher. Alternatively, financial market participants may become more uncertain about their 
point forecasts when volatility is high. In that case, the relation runs from volatility to 
uncertainty. Our VAR estimation did not provide us with convincing results for either of the 
two hypotheses. This can also be said about the findings from our unconditional trading 
volume and liquidity analyses. Whether there is a positive (negative) relation between 
disagreement and volume (illiquidity) depends on the time-period. In tranquil times, the 
relation between disagreement and volume is positive, and there is no significant relation 
between disagreement and liquidity. In such times disagreement is thus a proper measure of 
heterogeneity. However, in times of turmoil, higher disagreement is followed by lower volume 
and lower liquidity. We can therefore say that in such times, disagreement measures 
uncertainty. 
After having analyzed when the time-variation in disagreement mainly measures time-
variation in uncertainty or time-variation in heterogeneity, we tested whether it has any 
explanatory power for risk and expected risk premia beyond (the more traditional uncertainty 
measure) volatility. We find that investors want to be compensated for both uncertainty and 
volatility, and that there is a very strong relation between implied volatility and disagreement. 
This relation remains strong after controlling for realized volatility. As we can expect, this 
relation only holds for the second part of our sample, when disagreement measures 
uncertainty. 
Our contribution to the current literature is twofold. First of all, we unfold the 
important finding that disagreement is not a stable measure for heterogeneity, nor for 
uncertainty, and that we need to take into account whether we are in a turmoil market state or 
not when interpreting this measure. We also show that in such states it measures a substantial 
part of risk that is not covered by volatility, a traditionally used measure of uncertainty, and in 
that function explains variation in risk and expected risk premium. 
Future research could further investigate the use of disagreement in different market 
states (tranquil and turmoil), from different underlying fundamentals (such as interest rates), 
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and for a large cross-section of currencies. When using an unconditional measure of 
disagreement, one should be wary of the fact that there is not a clear interpretation of 
disagreement that holds in different states of the market. 
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
6.1 Main findings 
This dissertation has shed more light on the dynamics, measurement, and implications 
of heterogeneous beliefs in financial markets. In doing so, I have tried to merge two strands of 
literature by using concepts from the agent-based finance literature and combining those with 
more conventional framing in the general (behavioral) finance literature. I want to stress that 
there is room for improvement in linking these different strands of literature that try to tackle 
problems in a similar way but work almost completely parallel to each other. For example, 
what the agent-based literature labels as a ‘chartist’ is often labeled as a ‘momentum’ trader in 
the general finance literature, and what is labeled as a ‘PPP’ or ‘UIP’ strategy in the latter is 
often labeled a ‘fundamentalist’ strategy in agent-based modeling.  
However, considering the different names given to the types of investors or types of 
forecasting strategies, there is a growing literature that rejects the notion of rational 
homogenous investors. We have learned from this dissertation that investors are not only 
heterogeneous, they also do not use stable, unconditional, forecasting rules to form their 
expectation on future movements of exchange rates. Instead, they may change the way they 
form expectations based on various factors, such as the past performance of different 
forecasting rules or the horizon for which they form their expectations. The dynamics 
between the different types of investors can cause periods of severe mispricing and disruption 
of financial markets. Survey datasets that contain analysts’ forecast are important tools to 
unravel investor expectation mechanisms and dynamics that can otherwise not always be 
directly observed in the data. They can also reveal why investors sometimes disagree more 
with each other than at other times and how the differences of these reasons can be of crucial 
importance for market dynamics.  
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 By analyzing such a survey dataset in Chapter 3, I find that there is a lot of 
heterogeneity in the beliefs and forecasting behavior of investors. Investors in foreign 
exchange markets use past changes, PPP rates and interest rates to form their expectations. 
Momentum trading especially occurs for short horizons, whereas PPP trading is more 
common for longer horizons. The interest differential is used on all horizons but primarily for 
long-horizon forecasting. We find indications that agents have a stronger tendency to apply a 
carry trade (UIP) expectation at the shorter (longer) forecast horizon. Interestingly, there are 
also differences in expectations within different strategies. Some investors expect past trends 
to continue and therefore positively extrapolate past returns into future forecasts 
(bandwagon). Others expect past trends to revert. There are investors who use the interest 
differential as a tool for carry trade; that is, they expect an appreciation of the currency of the 
high-interest-rate country. There are also investors who believe in UIP and therefore expect a 
depreciation of the currency of the high-interest-rate country. Furthermore, a long history of 
positive returns seems to influence investors when forming their expectations, making them 
more vulnerable to bandwagon expectations. A long history of undervaluation of an exchange 
rate can cause a loss of faith in reversion to the fundamental value. The results I presented in 
this chapter are, on the one hand, a strong confirmation of theoretical statements and 
empirical findings from the behavioral finance literature. On the other hand, they are an 
extension to the literature, as I have shown that there is also important heterogeneity within 
the strategies. 
With a similar framework as used in Chapter 3, I analyze the sovereign CDS market 
during the European sovereign debt crisis in Chapter 4, and find that heterogeneity and 
dynamics in the composition of market beliefs have played a large role in the mispricing of 
sovereign credit risk during this episode. This chapter addresses the question of whether the 
recent movements in European sovereign credit spreads are driven by weakened fundamentals 
and/or momentum trading behavior. In order to do this, a fundamental default spread is first 
calculated by means of regressing past hazard rates on a set of sovereign default determinants 
and using the resulting fitted values. Furthermore, to better explain the dynamics of sovereign 
CDS spread movements, a heterogeneous agent model with two key types of expectation 
formation rules and time-varying weights is estimated using market spreads and fundamentals-
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based spreads. The estimation of this heterogeneous agent model reveals that in most 
European sovereign CDS markets both fundamental and momentum expectations played a 
role. In peripheral countries fundamental expectations were dominated by momentum 
throughout the crisis period contributing to the observed higher spreads. Momentum trading 
exerted a destabilizing effect on the market by prolonging price trends. In some cases, 
fundamental expectations pulled the market spreads back to their fundamental-based level, 
thereby stabilizing CDS spreads. The change in the market weights of these two expectations 
coincided with larger market movements and both movements towards and away from the 
fundamentals implied-spread. For the five troubled peripheral countries, momentum trading 
played a much more dominant role in increasing their sovereign CDS spreads beyond the 
levels justified by weakening fundamentals.  
Whereas I have shown ways in which investors in the foreign exchange and sovereign 
CDS markets can be heterogeneous and how this changes conditional on certain variables in 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, I evaluate a commonly used measure for the level of heterogeneity 
in Chapter 5. Disagreement has become a widely used measure to account for both investor 
heterogeneity and uncertainty, and a solid conclusion about the different interpretations of 
disagreement has not been reached. In this chapter I assess the usefulness of the variable to be 
used as a measure of either one, by utilizing the codependency between disagreement and 
volatility and the different effect that heterogeneity and uncertainty have on foreign exchange 
trading volume and liquidity. Using the full sample of observations, I do not find evidence for 
either one of the hypotheses and therefore employ measures to reveal possible time-variation 
in the relation between disagreement and volume or liquidity. These results suggest that the 
time-variation in disagreement measures time-variation in heterogeneity in tranquil times, but 
becomes a good measure of uncertainty during a period of turmoil. After having established 
this, I analyze whether disagreement has added value over realized volatility when linking it to 
risk and risk premium. I find that disagreement indeed has explanatory power for risk and risk 
premium beyond realized volatility, and that its impact is sometimes even larger than the 
impact of realized volatility. Moreover, I find that disagreement is only linked to total risk in 
times of turmoil, whereas realized volatility has a constant relation with total risk. This 
confirms the earlier result that disagreement only measures uncertainty in periods of turmoil. 
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However, we can see from the results in Chapter 4 that the finding that disagreement mainly 
measures uncertainty in periods of turmoil does not mean that there is no heterogeneity in 
such periods. 
With these chapters, I have completed the trinity of dynamics, measurement, and 
implications of heterogeneous beliefs in financial markets. Although all three themes come 
back in some form in every chapter, the chapters each have their own focus. In Chapter 3, I 
have focused on the dynamics of heterogeneous beliefs. Chapter 4 reveals some of the 
implications that heterogeneous beliefs can have for financial markets. And, finally, Chapter 5 
analyzes a broadly used variable to measure heterogeneous beliefs. 
6.2 Looking ahead 
Naturally, this dissertation also has some shortcomings. For issues that arise when 
estimating heterogeneous agent models, such as parameter instability, calculating fundamental 
values, and the functional form of the switching function, I would like to refer to Chapter 8 of 
Zwinkels (2008), in which these are extensively discussed. I would rather like to focus on 
bridging gaps in the literature. As I stated at the beginning of this chapter, one of the aims of 
this dissertation was to link heterogeneous agent models from the agent based literature to 
other models in the behavioral finance literature that model heterogeneous beliefs. Although 
heterogeneous agent models have been very successful in explaining market dynamics in a 
wide range of financial markets (see Chapter 2), the majority of papers developing, simulating, 
or estimating these models are published in quite specialized journals and are therefore mainly 
read by a very specific group of people. In my opinion this is partly caused by the choice of 
terminology. Whereas the agent-based literature often speaks of ‘chartists’ and 
‘fundamentalists’, the (behavioral) finance literature rather speaks of ‘technical analysis’ or 
‘momentum’ for the former type of agent or investor, and of the respective fundamental 
model (e.g. PPP or UIP) used for the latter type. To link those streams of literature I have 
used the latter formulation in models that are otherwise quite standard heterogeneous agent 
models. Moreover, many people find it hard to believe that there are two substantially and 
perhaps even fundamentally different types of agents who ‘easily’ change their type once they 
can be more profitable in the role of the other type. A commonly heard argument is that 
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‘fundamental’ investors (say, for example, Warren Buffet) will always be fundamentalists and 
will never change their ‘religion’ to chartism. I acknowledge and to some extent share this 
concern, and believe that it is important to stress that a more realistic way of thinking about 
such models is that there are different agents who all use those two (or more) strategies to 
form their expectations, and that they apply different and dynamic weights to these strategies. 
In such a framework, there can be ‘hardcore’ fundamentalists who will never use technical 
analysis in their expectation formation process, and pure chartists who do not bother to 
gather information on fundamentals but rather look at trends, moving averages, and candle 
sticks. The majority of the agents will be somewhere in between, adding some weight to their 
fundamental strategy when that has performed well in the (recent) past, and shifting more 
weight to forecasts arising from technical analysis if that has proven to be profitable.  
I believe this interpretation is crucial, because I think our main aim should be to model 
behavior of market participants in a more realistic way, with the underlying goal of modeling 
financial markets in a more realistic way. In that context, I also see a lot of potential for 
linking some of the agent-based literature to the microstructure literature. The latter focuses 
on what the microstructure of a certain market looks like, and what kind of implications this 
has for the price dynamics in these markets. Whereas both streams of literature are micro-
based, the agent-based literature starts from modeling the behavior of agents in a realistic way, 
and the microstructure literature aims to understand the market structure and the actions of its 
participants in a more realistic way. A potential alley could be to test predictions from 
heterogeneous agent models on (high frequency) micro data such as order flow and trading 
positions. 
In more general terms, I feel that there should be more room for interdisciplinary 
research. Progress can be made by linking different sub-fields of finance and economics to 
each other, but even more interesting is the integration with and application of insights from 
completely different fields, such as physics, biology, psychology, and sociology. In effect, the 
field of behavioral economics would not exist without such interactions, and often the most 
revolutionary findings come from those who succeed in applying ideas, theories and 
frameworks from one field to another. One characteristic from research in fields such as 
physics and medicine is the cooperation between research teams. Whereas cooperation 
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between four or five people is already quite unique in economics, research in medicine is 
sometimes published with an author list exceeding 50 people, and some research in quantum 
mechanics yields papers with author lists exceeding 3000 people. Perhaps the economics 
profession could use a bit of this attitude of cooperation to tackle recurrent problems (such as 
financial crises) in a more effective way. 
In light of these shortcomings of the profession, there is room for improvement in 
linking different strands of literature that try to tackle problems in a similar way but work 
almost completely parallel to each other. In the process of writing this dissertation I have 
experienced that one sometimes needs to be satisfied with taking tiny steps in the right 
direction. When cooperating on a larger scale, the progression may be larger than the sum of 
these tiny steps.  
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Summary 
This dissertation is part of a growing research field in which the heterogeneity of 
economic actors is incorporated. It bundles four studies that consider the measurement, 
dynamics and implications of heterogeneous beliefs in financial markets, using a variety of 
datasets. The studies show that investors are not only heterogeneous, they also do not use 
stable, unconditional, forecasting rules to form their expectation on future movements of 
financial markets. Instead, they may change the way they form expectations based on various 
factors, such as the past performance of different forecasting rules or the horizon for which 
they form their expectations. The dynamics between the different types of investors can cause 
periods of severe mispricing and disruption of financial markets. Survey datasets that contain 
analysts’ forecast are important tools to unravel investor expectation mechanisms and 
dynamics that can otherwise not always be directly observed in the data. They can also reveal 
why investors sometimes disagree more with each other than at other times and how these 
underlying reasons can be of crucial importance for market dynamics. 
  
  
 
 
  
  
 
Nederlandse samenvatting 
Dit proefschrift maakt onderdeel uit van een groeiend onderzoeksdomein waarin de 
heterogeniteit van economische actoren in acht wordt genomen. Het voegt vier studies samen 
waarin de meting, dynamiek en implicaties van heterogene opvattingen in financiële markten 
worden getoetst, met behulp van verschillende soorten datasets. De studies tonen aan dat 
beleggers heterogeen zijn en geen onvoorwaardelijke strategieën gebruiken om hun 
verwachtingen te vormen over toekomstige onwikkelingen in financiële markten. In plaats 
daarvan vormen ze tijdsvariërende verwachtingen op basis van een verscheidenheid aan 
factoren, zoals de in het verleden behaalde resultaten van de verschillende strategieën of de 
horizon waarvoor zij hun verwachtingen vormen. De dynamiek tussen de verschillende 
soorten beleggers kan markten uit evenwicht brengen en perioden creëren waarin financiële 
instrumenten te laag of juist te hoog gewaardeerd zijn. Survey datasets waarin de prognoses 
van beleggers worden gevat, kunnen bruikbare informatie bevatten over de verschillende 
manieren waarop beleggers hun verwachtingen vormen. Met behulp van dit soort datasets kan 
onderzocht worden waarom beleggers het soms meer of minder met elkaar eens zijn, en hoe 
de onderliggende redenen daarvoor cruciaal kunnen zijn voor de dynamiek van financiële 
markten.  
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